Why is it that so many of our senior military officers see the light when they have retired from service?  There is this impressive brigade of former generals, air marshals and admirals which looks critically at our national security policies that, to a large extent, are conceived in and defined by the GHQ.  And our relations with India constitute the core substance of these policies.  Unfortunately, our official media has not encouraged sufficient debate on these issues.

            It has often been hazardous, in the overall environment of intolerance and militancy, to objectively argue for a drastic shift in the nation’s strategic sense of direction.  But something very refreshing did take place on the way to the Indo-Pakistan summit held in Agra in the middle of July.  Suddenly, the South Asian media was flooded with candid observations on the imperatives for peace between the two countries.  Here was, thus, an opportunity to refer to, and applaud, Major General (Retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani’s excellent study India & Pakistan: The Cost of Conflict and the Benefits of Peace, which underlines the material as well as social cost of conflict and the benefits of peace between India and Pakistan.  Indeed, this should have been a major document of reference in the media debate.

            I have alluded to the emergence of so many commentators and columnists from the ranks of retired military officers but General Durrani belongs to a higher rank, intellectually.  Apart from analysing various issues that relate to the subject, he has ably mobilised the relevant facts and statistics to vindicate his stance.  That he has summarised his material to around 100 pages has greatly enhanced the readability of the book.  Here is a wide-ranging perspective on the history of conflict and confrontation in South Asia.  General Durrani’s study was conducted on behalf of a group of Pakistanis and Indians, in association with noted Indian journalist Bharat Bhushan, until recently Executive Editor of The Hindustan Times.  In his foreword, Bharat Bhushan refers to “the emotional investment made in the venture.”

            There is a touching human dimension in how General Durrani was led to his realisation that peaceful cooperation was the only option for India and Pakistan.  He begins his preface with the following confession: “I grew up with the firm conviction that the only good Indian was a dead Indian.”  That was why he joined the Pakistan Army. He fought in both the 1965 and the 1971 wars and was decorated for his valour, contributing “to the ranks of good Indians.”  In 1973, however, he was sent to the United States for training and it was there that he first interacted with an officer of the Indian Army.  There were, later, more encounters and revelations.  “As I grew in age, I reflected on war in the Indo-Pakistan context and its inability to solve our problems.  International exposure and working for a President of  Pakistan also expanded my vision and belief in the power of dialogue over war.”  It would surely have been educative for General Durrani that he served as our defence and military attaché in Washington D.C. for five years, from 1977 to 1982.                         

            A great plus point  of the book is its brevity. It does not ramble on.  We have, for instance, less than four pages in the chapter on the causes of conflict.  But all the major points have been carefully noted and there are some very illustrative charts and graphs.  Also, the positions taken by the two countries have objectively been stated.  In ‘Endnotes,’ we arrive at the conclusion of the Kargil crisis.  Hence, we have the entire backdrop to the Agra summit and the message of this book found its echo, almost for the first time, in the statements made by the leaders on both sides.

     This book should be assigned a prestigious position in the peace campaign.  It is more compelling because it does not resort to rhetoric and emotionally charged slogans.  The Agra summit, we know, failed to reach the “destination” of an agreed declaration, even though both sides, in an attempt to control the damage, have said that the process would continue.  This means that there is still a major role to play for the peace movement.  General Durrani’s book deserves a structured promotion at this time and the Oxford University Press may even want to sponsor an Indo-Pakistan seminar or workshop on the subject, projecting the book as a source material.  South Asia is about the most militarised zone in the world, with an obvious relationship between military expenditure and development.  The focus on Kashmir is not misplaced but the search for a solution to this festering conflict should not detract our attention from the futility of our two countries’ massive militarisation.  After all, the most evident message of our time is that there is no military solution of the South Asian crisis.