As the media waited impatiently outside the closed gates, all eyes were on Agra’s Jaypees hotel where Pakistan’s President, General Pervez Musharraf, was closeted with Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, for their farewell meeting.  Any feeble hopes of a last minute breakthrough were shattered as a grim-looking General Musharraf sped away at midnight without contracting a declaration. 

The historic Agra peace summit between India  and Pakistan ended in a stalemate after a tension-filled day that ended with the two leaders unable to agree on the wording of the declaration.  It was a disappointing finale to a landmark meeting which promised normalisation of relations between the two South Asian nations.  However, all was not lost as General Musharraf and Vajpayee bade each other good-bye with a  promise to meet again and pick up the threads from there. Despite the acrimony and bitterness that marked its closure, the Agra summit has broken the ice and revived the process of dialogue which was frozen after the Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999.

For most observers, the deadlock at Agra did not come as a surprise.  The bitter memory of Kargil cast its heavy shadow throughout the three-day peace summit, clouding any chances for either side to show any flexibility.  The tough statements made by the Indian and Pakistani leaders in the run-up to the talks, and their respective hard-line positions on Kashmir, eroded any hopes of a breakthrough. Predictably, the breakdown came when India refused to accept the centrality of the Kashmir issue and insisted on including the question of “cross border terrorism” in the declaration.  Pakistan also showed reservations over the reference to the Agra process as a continuation of the Simla and Lahore declarations.  Both sides have blamed each other of intransigence, but the reality is that neither of the leaders was prepared to resist pressure from their respective hard-liners.

         The backdrop at Agra was radically different from that of the Lahore summit meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February 1999.  While Lahore was more fanfare with little substance, the Agra Summit was marked by tension-ridden, tough, diplomatic negotiations.  The much hyped Lahore Declaration was largely a deed of goodwill without the firm commitment of seriously dealing with the main issue plaguing relations between the two nations. General Musharraf went to Agra weighed down by heavy political baggage.  Seen as the architect of the Kargil misadventure, he faced a far more difficult situation than any of his predecessors.  He was received in India with a mixture of cynicism and hope.  General Musharraf appeared grim and tense as he arrived in the unfamiliar territory that he left when he was a four-year-old boy.  However, by the very first evening, he seemed to have settled into a confident and relaxed mode as he called for burying the past and looking ahead.  “The legacy of the past years is not a happy one...blood has been spilt, precious lives have been lost ...we must not allow the past to dictate the future,” he declared in his speech at the Indian president’s dinner.  His clarion call for peace changed the atmosphere and set a positive tone for the Summit.  The general seemed to have established a good rapport with the aging Indian prime minister.  Unlike any other summit, the Agra Summit had no prior agreed-upon agenda and most of the meetings were one on one.  While personalised diplomacy helped break the ice, it also carried some serious problems. Many political observers cite this as a major reason for the failure to arrive at a declaration.

        Pakistani officials maintain that the Indians backtracked thrice on an agreed draft following pressure from some of their cabinet ministers opposed to the peace process.  The Indians objected to the formulation of the proposed declaration which reportedly said that, “The settlement of the Kashmir issue would pave the way for normalisation of relations between the two countries.”  They also insisted that any framework to address the differences on Kashmir would have to include the issue of cross-border terrorism in its ambit.  The Indian press confirmed that Home Minister L.K. Advani’s views, that the declaration went too far, that it would offend the BJP constituencies, and that there was no reason why India should be held hostage to this formulation, finally prevailed.  A senior Indian official was quoted saying that the determined Pakistani insistence on placing “overwhelming’’ emphasis on how to deal with Kashmir was not agreeable to a section in New Delhi.  The foreign ministry bureaucracy, which was anyway not very happy with Vajpayee’s summit move, was believed to have also joined hands with Advani to block the draft.  It was difficult for Vajpayee to ignore objections from his key minister, particularly in view of the forthcoming elections for the UP state assembly, which are crucial for the BJP and its allies.

        On the other hand, General Musharraf’s tough and unrelenting position on Kashmir did not leave much room for a compromise.  Never before has a Pakistani leader brought Kashmir to the centre of the summit table as forcefully as he did.   His blunt talk with the Indian media editors on July 16, which was televised by several networks, was also used by the Indian hard-liners to obstruct an accord.  The mood on the Indian side turned visibly bitter when Musharraf declared there should not be any illusion that the main issue confronting the two countries is Kashmir.  “I will keep saying it whether anyone likes it or not,” he said.  General Musharraf’s own dilemma of walking the tightrope was obvious when he told the editors that he better buy the “Neharwali Haveli and live there if India wants me to ignore the Kashmir issue.”

            Many Indian political commentators believed the televised breakfast meeting proved to be the turning point that resulted in a further toughening in the Indian position.  In fact, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh went as far as accusing Pakistan’s president of “conducting diplomacy through the media.”  Almost two weeks later, in what can only be called a rather delayed reaction, Prime Minister Vajpayee launched a harshly critical attack on General Musharraf’s lack of diplomacy and his ignorance of history and politics, not to mention his questionable intentions.  The tirade took many political observers by surprise, particularly since the two leaders did not part on a hostile note.

         Nevertheless, the Summit did produce some positive results.  The Indian prime minister accepted Pakistan’s invitation for a return visit to Islamabad.  It was also agreed to hold summit meetings between the Indian and Pakistani leaders once a year and biannual talks at the foreign ministerial level to discuss issues relating to peace, security, confidence-building measures, Kashmir, narcotics and terrorism.  It is not clear when Mr. Vajpayee will come to Pakistan, but the two leaders are expected to meet in September in New York during the UN General Assembly session. The foreign ministers are also expected to meet soon.  While it is true that the Agra Summit was held largely because of strong international pressure on both countries, it has now created its own dynamics.  There are strong internal compulsions, forcing both countries to continue the dialogue.

        The process of normalisation will, however, be long-drawn and rocky. Kashmir will continue to be a stumbling block.  Not surprisingly, the violence in the Indian-controlled state escalated during the Summit and 81 people were killed.  It was the highest death toll in the disputed valley since the Indian government called off its unilateral ceasefire in May and was largely seen as a result of the stepping up of operations by the Indian troops against the Kashmiri militant groups which had vowed to intensify the fighting. The bloodiest  incidents occurred in the two border districts of Baramullah and Kapwara on the last day of the Summit, when Indian troops shot six civilians dead, alleging that they were involved in terrorist activities.  Some reports suggest that  the hard-line home minister instructed security forces to intensify the clean-up operation during General Musharraf’s visit.  On the other hand, Kashmiri militant groups, like  Lashkar-i-Taiba, which opposed any peace talks with India, increased their suicide attacks on Indian soldiers.  The situation in Kashmir worsened after the Summit.  Earlier, guerrilla organisations had warned that the breakdown of the talks would lead to further escalation of violence, while the Lashkar leaders had vowed to extend their attacks inside India.

        Even more disturbing is the resumption of the exchange of artillery fire along the Line of Control breaking the eight-month-old ceasefire. Significantly, the incidents occurred as General Musharraf arrived in Delhi, giving rise to conspiracy theories of sabotage.  The ceasefire agreed to by the two countries had significantly helped to ease tensions on the 1000-kilometre long LoC and cleared the way for the peace summit.  Though there has not been any further border firing since then, political observers fear that any escalation on the LoC may impede normalisation, if not derail the peace process altogether.

        It is not surprising that the breakdown of the Agra talks has been hailed by extremists in both India and Pakistan, who hope to strengthen their position in an atmosphere of tension. The inconclusive end of the peace talks may have helped Mr. Vajpayee avert an internal party revolt against him by the BJP extremists and endeared  General Musharraf to hard-liners, particularly the Islamic extremist groups, but the cost of continuing tension may prove too high for both countries in the long term.

       The Agra Summit is over, leaving both a positive and negative legacy in its wake.  It remains to be seen where Mr. Vajpayee and General Musharraf will go from there.  Will they move forward in the journey which began in Agra or revert to their traditional course of confrontation?