|
The
Middle East's latest crisis erupted with little warning on the morning
of Wednesday, July 12, when a bunch of Hezbollah fighters crossed
Lebanon's southern border and ambushed a small Israeli military
contingent, killing up to eight soldiers and taking two of them
prisoner. In retaliation, Israel lost little time in launching bombing
raids that targeted Beirut airport and bridges across Lebanon before
spreading to residential areas and other civilian infrastructure,
such as power plants.
The
aim, Israel said, was not only to win the release of the two captured
soldiers, but to eliminate once and for all, the threat posed by
Hezbollah across its northern border. The militant Shia organisation
responded with a barrage of Katyusha rockets aimed at Haifa and
other northern Israeli towns.
The
bloody conflict erupted as the leaders of eight of the world's most
powerful nations were attending a summit in St Petersburg. Whether
or not it would have had any immediate effect on the warring parties,
it wasn't unreasonable to expect a collective call for a ceasefire.
It never came, although the majority of leaders would have found
it unobjectionable. Among them, however, were a pair of recalcitrants.
A private conversation between the two, picked up by a live microphone,
suggested that at least one of them had a particularly Manichean
perspective on the situation. "You see," he was heard
telling the other between bites on a bread roll, "the thing
is, what they need to do is to get Syria to get Hezbollah to stop
doing this shit, and it's over."
The
author of that characteristically eloquent analysis of the situation
was, of course, George W. Bush, while Tony Blair hovered obsequiously
behind him like a butler, offering his services as a scout for Condoleezza
Rice. The British prime minister's idea of heading to the troubled
region to "just talk" (whereas he figured that Condi,
"If she goes out, she's got to succeed"), was brusquely
dismissed by the US president, who was anyhow in no rush to despatch
his secretary of state in the direction of Lebanon and Israel.
Blair was apparently untroubled by his chief ally's strategy
of allowing Israel to continue its operation for some time, but
he appears to naively have assumed that when Rice did eventually
head to the Middle East, it would be on a quest for peace. She had
nothing of the kind on her mind. On her helicopter ride to Beirut,
she couldn't have failed to notice the destruction all around, nor
could she have been unaware of the rapidly mounting death toll and
the fact that the overwhelming majority of victims were civilians,
one third of them children. She surveyed the horrors of war and
saw in them, "the birth pangs of a new Middle East." Presumably
a Middle East in which the balance of terror is decisively tilted
in favour of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).
After her delayed foray into the Middle East, Rice flew to
Rome, where a conference on the crisis had been scheduled, albeit
without the participation of any of the belligerents, real or presumed.
In attendance were representatives of the United Nations, Lebanon,
the US, Britain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada, France,
Germany, Spain, Cyprus, Italy, Turkey, the European Union (EU) and
the World Bank. Israel and Hezbollah were unrepresented, as were
Iran and Syria, who are seen by the west as Hezbollah's sponsors
and suppliers. Among those present, everyone favoured calling for
an immediate ceasefire - with two exceptions: Rice and her British
counterpart, Margaret Beckett.
A joint statement issued at the end of the conference expressed
the determination of the participants, "to work immediately
to reach with the utmost urgency a ceasefire", which is not
quite the same thing. At Washington's insistence, the statement
also said that the eventual cessation of hostilities must be "lasting,
permanent and durable" - three words that mean more or less
the same thing and in effect reflect America's fervent desire for
unchallenged Israeli hegemony in the region. Not unreasonably, Israel
interpreted the outcome at Rome as a green light to continue its
military operations. This caused consternation in some European
capitals, but not in Washington.
The US (with Britain tagging along), also stymied efforts
towards a ceasefire resolution at the UN Security Council, to the
visible frustration of Kofi Annan. The UN Secretary-General called
not just for an immediate truce, but also for talks with Damascus
and Tehran, risking Washington's ire. He also had occasion to provoke
the wrath of Israel when, after four UN peacekeepers in southern
Lebanon were killed and many others wounded in an Israeli attack,
he noted that the UN post had apparently been deliberately targeted.
Israel's UN ambassador, Dan Gillerman, added insult to injury by
describing the claim as "ludicrous, very hasty, unfortunate,
appalling and irresponsible,'' adding: "Nobody in his right
mind would accuse Israel of doing something like that."
The US did not say whether it agreed with the clear implication
that the Secretary-General is out of his mind, but it prevented
the Security Council from unequivocally condemning the targeting
of members of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil). In much
the same fashion, the US was instrumental in scuttling an Arab-proposed
resolution on the siege of Gaza, which, arguably, led to the border
incident that sparked the one-sided war.
Washington is represented at the UN by a comically moustachioed
and toupeed ultra-conservative, who appears to have been given the
job because he detests everything that the United Nations stands
for. John Bolton is so far off the radar ideologically that the
US Congress refused to confirm his appointment and Bush used a constitutional
loophole to temporarily ensconce him in the post during a congressional
recess. His tenure runs out next January, and the White House decided
last month to exploit the Lebanese crisis by making a fresh bid
for reconfirmation.
When Bolton is on the job, it's often hard to tell whether
he represents the US or Israel, so it's hardly surprising that the
Zionists are even more enamoured of him than the neo-cons. "I'm
certainly not going to tell the Senate or the House of Representatives
how to vote," ventured the aforementioned Gillerman, "but
if John Bolton were to be confirmed by the Israeli Knesset, he would
get all 120 votes."
Considering the Israeli lobby's influence on Capitol Hill,
after that endorsement, many US legislators would be inclined to
think twice before voting to reject the nominee.
Of course, even if Bush were compelled, by some miracle,
to pick another punter for the post, it is unlikely that that would
resolve the UN's paralysis. Which is somewhat ironic, given the
importance now being attached to Security Council resolution 1559
from two years ago, whereby all Lebanese militias were supposed
to be disarmed. It hasn't been fully implemented, partly because
the official Lebanese army (which is largely Shia anyhow), has made
no effort to divest Hezbollah of its armouries. But whenever this
context comes up, very few commentators in the west go out of their
way to mention the fact that there is a long list of Security Council
resolutions that Israel has brazenly disobeyed over the decades
- without ever attracting even a threat of sanctions.
In keeping with its traditional excuses for overkill, Israel
has tried to paint its assault on Lebanon as a picture of self-defence.
Furthermore, it has sought to create the impression that in attacking
Hezbollah it is not only protecting its own interests, but also
doing Lebanon a favour. The wanton murder of hundreds of civilians
more than suffices as a counter-argument. Hezbollah, too, can be
accused of similar war crimes, albeit on a much smaller scale. Israel's
claim that it has exercised restraint in its bombardments is not
outrageous: there can be little question that had it so wished,
Israel could have visited death and destruction on Lebanon on a
far greater scale. But the fact that it did not do so hardly qualifies
as a demonstration of moral rectitude. It had more prosaic reasons
for limiting the death toll: casualties in the thousands rather
than the hundreds would have changed the tenor of international
condemnation (which, barring the US and its British lapdog, has
been more or less universal) and made it that much more difficult,
even for Washington, to keep the green light switched on.
Hezbollah's rocket barrages, on the other hand, are presumably
the worst it could do. Its arsenal does appear to have been larger
than anyone suspected, but its ability to hurt Israel is nonetheless
severely restricted. It can inflict bruises, whereas Israel is capable
of striking death blows. Israeli military power, however, also has
its limitations: it can destroy Lebanon, but it proved incapable
of crushing Hezbollah without completely wrecking the host country.
Initially, Israeli generals spoke of completing their task within
72 hours. That proved to be a serious miscalculation. A week, they
then said. Again they were proved wrong, as the Katyushas kept flying.
The time scale then changed to weeks - effectively an indefinite
period of time. And the US went along.
Simultaneously, the Israelis also changed their aim from
crushing Hezbollah to significantly weakening it. Ground incursions
proved costlier than Israel had expected, and the prospect of a
full-fledged invasion of southern Lebanon was put on hold. The government
began saying that it was willing to accept Hezbollah as a political
entity provided it gave up its weapons. Hezbollah, on its part,
reportedly agreed to free the two captured soldiers within six hours
of a ceasefire. But the two sides weren't talking directly to each
other, and the killing went on.
In the beginning, pro-US Arab countries such as Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Jordan were more vociferous in their criticism of Hezbollah
than of Israel. As the days passed without any respite from the
Israeli side - and as it became clearer that the Arab masses had
been enthused rather than dismayed by Hezbollah's pluck - Cairo,
Riyadh and Amman began changing their tune. Likewise, initial widespread
resentment towards Hezbollah within Lebanon gradually gave way to
indignation towards Israel and solidarity with its declared foe.
In Beirut and so many other Arab capitals, the cleric at Hezbollah's
helm, Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, began acquiring the status of a folk
hero.
Palestinians began looking upon him as a saviour. In Cairo,
demonstrators carried his photographs alongside those of Gamal Abdel
Nasser. In Damascus, it was posters of Nasrallah and Bashar Al Assad.
Iraqi Shia chieftain Moqtada Al Sadr began portraying himself as
a fan of Hezbollah. And Tehran, predictably, was crowing amid repeated
vows to despatch Israel to some other part of the world. On a visit
to Washington, even Iraq's puppet prime minister, Nouri Al Maliki,
felt obliged to defy his hosts by adding his voice to calls for
an immediate ceasefire. And Al-Qaeda's purported second-in-command,
Ayman Al Zawahiri, opportunistically released a video featuring
a diatribe against Zionists and crusaders in an attempt to ensure
that his network's brand name would not be completely overshadowed
by Hezbollah.
The charge that Hezbollah is aided and abetted by Syria and
Iran is not entirely without merit: it clearly does have links with
those two states, although the precise nature of those links is
uncertain. For all that, the organisation is very much a Lebanese
phenomenon: apart from its armed wing (whose strength, again, is
open to conjecture), it operates a social welfare network that lends
some semblance of civility to life in southern Lebanon. It is therefore
unrealistic to dismiss it solely as a militia or a terrorist organisation.
Furthermore, it's also worth recalling the circumstances
in which Hezbollah came into being. It did not exist at the time
of Israel's last full-fledged invasion of Lebanon back in 1982 -
which cost an estimated 18,000 lives and included the infamous massacres
at the Sabra and Chatila Palestinian refugee camps, for which an
Israeli commission of inquiry held Ariel Sharon responsible long
before he became prime minister. Having driven out the Palestine
Liberation Organisation, Israeli troops vacated most of Lebanon,
but ensconced themselves on a broad strip in the south (in defiance,
incidentally, of UN Security Council resolutions), which they ruled
in alliance with a right-wing Christian militia. Hezbollah evolved
during this period as a resistance movement, and when Israel finally
vacated the strip in 2000, Hezbollah was credited with securing
the first Arab success in a war against the Zionist state.
This time around, survival alone will suffice for Hezbollah
to declare victory. The biggest tragedy, apart from the loss of
lives, is of course that large parts of Lebanon, including numerous
neighbourhoods in Beirut, lie in ruins once again, having been painstakingly
built up since 1990, when Lebanon's destructive civil war finally
drew to a close. Beirut was beginning to aspire once more to its
bygone title of Paris of the East. Its ambitions have been set back
by a decade or two. Reconstruction under the auspices of Rafik Hariri
cost far more than anticipated because of kickbacks. But the rotund
businessman-turned-statesman wasn't unpopular, and his assassination
last year spurred a popular drive to end the Syrian presence in
Lebanon.
The strategy of mass demonstrations combined with international
pressure worked well enough, and the last Syrian troops left the
country. It has lately been assumed that Syria has helped to provoke
the latest crisis in order to pave a path back for Syria. The assumption
was based on conjecture, but if it's true, there are chances Bush
might be willing to lend Assad a helping hand - particularly if
it succeeds in distancing Damascus from Tehran.
Iran, meanwhile, is suspected of seeking a distraction from
the pressure against its nuclear programme. That, again, is conjecture.
What's less uncertain is that Syria and Iran are likely to emerge
as the biggest beneficiaries of Israel's power play. The rape of
Lebanon has also taken the focus away from the deteriorating conditions
in Baghdad and the siege of the Gaza Strip that followed the capture
of an Israeli soldier. There, as in Lebanon, Israel responded with
collective punishment of the population and degradation of the infrastructure.
In Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and defence minister Amir Peretz,
Israel has a pair of leaders without military experience - which
helps to explain their eagerness to be seen as tough. In the long
term, however, this won't pay dividends. Even if Israel could eliminate
Hezbollah and decimate Hamas, others would inevitably take their
place. Entering into David and Goliath contests - with Israel playing
Goliath, needless to say, notwithstanding the Star of David it supposedly
bears allegiance to - won't solve anything.
It is perfectly reasonable of Israel to seek security against
attackers and intruders. Hopefully, one day it will realise that
this can only be achieved in the context of a comprehensive peace
settlement that guarantees a coherent and equally secure Palestinian
state, rather than by devouring the children of its perceived enemies.
|