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The
extensive coverage of Pakistan in the international press in the
aftermath of the Lal Masjid tragedy included a report by Somini
Sengupta in The New York Times that begins with a quote from Hameeda
Sarfraz, a 19-year-old Jamia Hafsa alumna. Explaining the attraction
of the hereafter, she says: "In heaven you get everything without
hardship. In heaven, if a martyr feels hungry, food appears, the
best-quality food, and you won't even know where it came from."
The
combination of innocence and delusion in her line of thinking offers
an indication of where the urge for martyrdom springs from in so
many young Muslims. But her words also seem to encapsulate one of
the core problems that has dogged Pakistan over the years: too much
faith, not enough food.
It
could be argued that the faith bit is not particularly surprising,
given that the nation was forged on the basis of religion - a distinction
it shares so far with only one other country, namely Israel. But
there are more ways than one of interpreting that fact.
Over
the past few decades, the notion that Pakistan was created in the
name of Islam has acquired the status of received wisdom. What Mohammed
Ali Jinnah aspired for, however, was a separate homeland for the
subcontinent's Muslims. Which isn't quite the same thing. In fact,
Jinnah was averse to the concept of an ideological state, an attitude
that earned him the epithet "kafir-e-azam" from the Islamists
of the day - whose successors subsequently appointed themselves
guardians of what they called the "ideology of Pakistan."
By
the time he died 13 months after Partition, it is said Jinnah was
despondent about the consequences of his achievement. He had by
then discovered the inadequacies of his lieutenants and presumably
regretted his inability to leave the infant nation in good hands.
It is also more than likely that the scale of the holocaust that
accompanied independence took him completely by surprise. It is
unlikely he could have guessed that a little more than two decades
hence, the Muslims of the subcontinent would be divided more or
less equally between three discrete homelands.
For
most of those two decades, however, Islam did not weigh too heavily
on the national consciousness. It remained largely in the background
of Pakistan's political and economic developments and travails.
Despite the overwhelming Muslim majority, demands for a strict application
of Islamic laws were restricted to the margins of society. This
wasn't an indication of the widespread absence of faith, but most
people simply took religion in their stride. Being devout did not
necessarily constitute a barrier to enlightenment. A tradition of
healthy disrespect for the mullah sat comfortably alongside a system
of belief in which a clerical class is supposedly superfluous.
Looking back, I can recall only one Independence Day celebration
when there really seemed to be something worth celebrating. The
country turned 25 that August. The mass murder in East Bengal -
a monumental crime for which Pakistan has never adequately atoned
- was at the time a very recent memory, but Yahya Khan was gone
and a freshly liberated Bangladesh offered cause for hope. Furthermore,
there was evidence that democracy was taking root in Pakistan. The
nation's first elected government had introduced land reforms, and
the ruling party had honoured the popular mandate in the smaller
provinces by inviting other parties to form governments in NWFP
and Balochistan. The following year, Pakistan had a new constitution
based on a parliamentary consensus.
The
potential for things going awry had never receded too far from the
surface, however. The illusion of placid progress didn't last very
long. A few years later, when I travelled abroad for the first time,
I left behind a troubled semi-democracy. A year or so later, I returned
to a troubling dictatorship. I arrived back on an inauspicious day:
it was the day Z.A. Bhutto was taken into custody for the last time.
The
absurdly conducted murder case against him wasn't the only foul
portent. There were public executions and floggings that attracted
large crowds, and amid all this vulgarity and obscenity, one was
confronted with street signs demanding an end to uryani and fuhashi.
Chadar and chardiwari was the official prescription for all womankind,
and it had a devastating effect in some parts of the country. When
I moved from Lahore to Karachi in the early 1980s, it seemed a decidedly
saner place, not least because society did not appear to consist
solely of males; in Lahore, women had almost vanished from the streets.
Of course, Karachi's sanity, such as it was, didn't last too long:
by the middle of the decade, ethnic riots and curfews were the norm,
and the metropolis has never entirely recovered from those ordeals.
Perhaps
the same could be said about the country as a whole. The lasting
damage from ubiquitous invocations to prayer and other such irritants
may not seem particularly grave, but let's not forget that it took
more than 20 years to rescind the odious Hudood laws. In recent
years it has become painfully clear, however, that the excruciating
Zia regime's deadliest legacy stems from its decision to embroil
Pakistan in Afghanistan's troubles. The heroin-and-Kalashnikov culture
was an immediate consequence of that decision, but its longer-term
repercussions have proved even more toxic.
And
it is extremely difficult to have any confidence in the healing
powers of the present general, the self-anointed champion of enlightened
moderation, when there's evidence that he does not understand the
prime causes of the malady for which he claims to have a cure. His
autobiography, for instance, makes a couple of ever-so-mildly derogatory
passing references to Zia-ul-Haq's obscurantist excesses, but his
Afghan misadventure does not even come in for muted criticism. If
anything, Pervez Musharraf seems to regard Pakistan's participation
in that so-called jihad, alongside the US and Saudi Arabia - a jihad,
mind you, that spawned, inter alia, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban
- as somehow obligatory. He, or whoever ghost-wrote In the Line
of Fire, even trots out the silly old Cold War myth that Moscow's
intervention in Afghanistan was in pursuit of the Soviet yearning
for a warm-water port.
Musharraf
isn't, of course, the only one unwilling to acknowledge the glaring
contradiction between participation in a jihad as well as the consequent
counter-jihad. Hardly any Americans will admit that the former allies
they have now pledged to destroy often use tactics gleaned from
terrorist manuals prepared for the mujahideen by the CIA. Pakistan,
meanwhile, can lay claim to a certain continuity: in the 1980s it
played the American game, and now it's doing it again.
I
moved out of Pakistan about 20 years ago, a year or so before Zia's
remains rained down from the skies. That was a riveting moment,
and the army's decision at the time to hold elections and allow
a civilian government to take over appeared to herald a turning
point, even as the ISI strove to cobble together the Islami Jamhoori
Ittehad as a means of keeping the PPP and Benazir Bhutto out of
office. The endeavour was only partially successful, but one thing
became clear over time: the army had ceded office, but not power.
Poor governance and galloping corruption meant that the two truncated
terms that Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were each allowed proved abysmal
in a variety of ways, but it's important to remember that the men
in khaki were never quite out of the picture.
From
a distance, Pakistan looked like a mess; on closer inspection, it
invariably turned out to be worse than one suspected. It wasn't
the sort of not entirely unhealthy chaos that accompanies democracy
in countries such as India. There was something more insidious about
it. And one can only wonder whether the quality of democracy would
improve with age. In Pakistan's case, no one has ever had the chance
to find out.
My
initial years of self-exile (regularly interrupted by visits to
Karachi and Lahore, and on one occasion to Islamabad, to interview
the first female prime minister of a Muslim country) were spent
in Dubai, which hardly felt like a foreign country, although its
relatively relaxed approach to social mores was a welcome change.
It wasn't far away, however, to offer the option of disengagement.
However, 10 years ago my family and I opted for a considerably more
distant shore, some 15 hours away by direct flight (but there are
no direct flights).
Does this degree of distance afford a remarkably different perspective?
Well, it probably would have a decade or two ago, but the stupendous
advances during this period in means of communication have changed
all that. If I were thus inclined, it probably wouldn't be too hard
to gain access to a Pakistani television channel or two, but access
to online newspapers suffices as a means of staying in touch. Which
isn't, of course, the same as being there: the level of engagement
is necessarily rather different.
I visit regularly, albeit briefly, and am prone to mixed feelings
at both the emotional and the intellectual levels. There are occasionally
welcome signs of progress: for instance, the road network in Lahore
has, in recent years, been embellished with an elaborate series
of over- and under-passes. But there is invariably a downside: traffic
congestion in the Punjab capital is worse than ever, not because
of the structural adjustments, but because the number of private
vehicles has risen manifold. Is that a sign of greater prosperity?
Yes, but the distribution of wealth remains as inequitable as ever.
If the well-off are multiplying, that is one sphere in which the
poor are able to keep up.
And we are blessed with leaders who believe there's no harm in enriching
the few, because the wealth will trickle down. Where in the world
has an adequate - or even a semi-adequate - redistribution of wealth
been achieved on this basis, outside the mind of Milton Friedman
and his acolytes? Were the theory practicable, wouldn't absolute
hunger have been abolished in all capitalist societies? It certainly
hasn't happened in Pakistan, which partially helps to explain why
so many madrassahs are thriving. Another reason is that the defence
budget has always enjoyed priority over the education and health
budgets.
Where will a sexagenarian Pakistan go? How long will it continue
to be hounded by the 'Terrorism Central' tag? Could, heaven forbid,
Iraq be the template for what lies ahead? I'm not sure whether being
physically closer to the country would make it any easier to answer
such questions. The food/faith dilemma remains unresolved. And the
mixed feelings linger on. I couldn't possibly hope to express them
better than Faiz:
Yeh jama-e roz-o-shab gazeeda
Mujhe yeh pairahan-e-dareeda
Azeez bhi, napasand bhi hai
Kabhi yeh farman-e joshe-e wehshat
Keh noch kar iss ko phhaink dalo
Kabhi yeh israr-e harf-e ulfat
Keh choom kar phir gallay lagalo 
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