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Ahmed
Rashid is, arguably, the most famous journalist-scholar from Pakistan
because of his books on Central Asia: The Resurgence of Central
Asia (1994); Taliban (2000) and Jihad (2002). Taliban is probably
the most cited work on the Taliban and the politics of oil as it
relates to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The book under
review is the latest addition to his writings on this volatile region,
and promises to become a landmark study on the rise of militant
Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the policies, both
American and Pakistani, which have made this possible.
The
book's subtitle sums up its theme in a nutshell: 'How the war against
Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central
Asia.'
Ahmed
Rashid begins his introduction with 9/11 and his own belief that
the war in Afghanistan was a "just war and not an imperialist
intervention." Whether one agrees with this point of view or
not (I do not subscribe to it), the rest of the author's argument
- that the United States did not develop this area, resulting in
its passing into the hands of warlords and extremists - is correct.
Indeed, one does not know of any author who has documented this
great betrayal of the Afghan people in such detail and with such
an inside knowledge of events and actors as Ahmed Rashid has.
The
first part of the book is an elaboration of this thesis. One finds
glimpses of Hamid Karzai as well as a number of other people who
were politically active during those years. Rashid stipulates that
although the Taliban had been defeated, the United States was not
creating a unified central power. Instead, the warlords were back
with US blessing and Afghanistan was descending into chaos. The
drug trade, controlled by the Taliban, was taking root again. The
intelligence agencies, both of India and Pakistan, were establishing
their hold in the country and their proxy wars were adding to the
chaos into which Afghanistan was descending.
In
Chapter 2, the author states that the Pakistani military supported
the Taliban before 9/11 because of its belief that it could secure
its strategic interests in Afghanistan through them. But on September
13, the United States gave Pakistan a list of demands which were
ostensibly accepted by General Musharraf. However, according to
Ahmed Rashid, the militants were allowed to enter and re-group in
Pakistan. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 give details of this "schizophrenia."
As before, the military establishment wanted to use the Taliban
to keep its clout in Afghanistan (especially against India) intact.
Then came militant attacks on the Indian parliament and the danger
of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. At this time, the author
states, General Musharraf did change some aspects of his pro-militant
policies - an action which made him their target - but still the
Taliban in Afghanistan were not wholly targeted. Chapter 11 gives
details of camps in Quetta where the Taliban received help from
the ISI in order to re-enter Afghanistan. This chapter is based
on Ahmed Rashid's observations and conversations with people who
have knowledge about these activities. Interestingly, Rashid also
contends that "for four years, Mullah Omar and his commanders
were able to operate freely in Balochistan and southern Afghanistan
without being monitored by US intelligence." This is inexplicable
in view of the general perception that America has the capability
of keeping a close watch on any part of the earth it desires. If
true, the oversight by the Americans appears to be the height of
folly for US policy-makers.
Also
surprising, but reassuring, is Rashid's view of the huge enthusiasm
in Afghanistan about elections. Even women stood as candidates and,
despite all the dangers, the Loya jirgas were held and people were
elected. Unfortunately, however, because the chance to truly develop
Afghanistan was lost by the world, simultaneously, the warlords
flourished and the Taliban became increasingly stronger and the
elected members of parliament remained ineffectual.
Rashid
discusses how the region continues to descend into chaos not only
because the Taliban, like the warlords, started cultivating poppy
(98% of the heroin sold in London comes from Afghanistan), but also
because it still does not have a central authority. In Afghanistan,
the war still goes on. In Pakistan, a large part of the Pashto-speaking
area - FATA and Swat - are becoming Talibanised. Ahmed Rashid suggests
that parts of the military in Pakistan feel that a "'Talibanised
belt' in FATA would keep the pressure on Karzai to bend to Pakistani
wishes." If this is so - though unfortunately there is no proof
to suggest what percentage of the decision-makers subscribe to this
view - it would be a recipe for suicide for Pakistan. Furthermore,
the evidence suggests that Islamic militants, driven by their beliefs,
would impose their ideology and way of life on society without consulting
their former supporters.
This
brings one to the strengths and weaknesses of Ahmed Rashid's book.
The strengths are obvious. It is the first work on the policies
and events which have made Afghanistan and Pakistan so volatile
and unstable in the last few years. As news of girls' schools and
CD shops being bombed fill the pages of Pakistani newspapers, militants
target the paramilitary and military forces and the writ of the
state gradually loses its meaning in FATA and Swat - this book helps
one understand why all this is happening. Rashid has actually lived
and moved in this area, knows and understands it well and met a
number of the actors, all of which lend his account credibility.
Nonetheless,
actors may be untruthful or biased, and the secrecy which surrounds
intelligence agencies makes it difficult to establish that everything
Ahmed Rashid reports is absolutely accurate. It is not possible
for any researcher to get his facts or analysis 100% right. That
notwithstanding, there is no doubt that his major hypotheses are
true.
All
in all, Descent into Chaos is a very significant book which no social
scientist can ignore.
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