Dressed in dark European suits, the leaders of Afghanistan’s four factions pencilled another ‘historic’ peace agreement on December 5, in a bid to end years of bloodshed in their war-torn country.

            Unlike the war in the ’80s waged by the infamous ‘Gucci’ guerillas – the Afghan warriors backed by US money and arms to fight the Soviet troops – this time round, the rules of the game are quite different.  “It’s fighting for peace rather than fighting for war which is driving the new Afghan political process,” was how a senior western diplomat assessed the Bonn gathering.  “Anyone who tries to wreck this process will find themselves at a distinct disadvantage,” he added.

            Those participating in the talks seemed keenly aware of this fact.  The agreement was reached after furious haggling stretching over nine days about the power sharing formula for Afghanistan in the post-Taliban set-up.  Even the tranquillity of the holiday resort outside Bonn, with its numerous spas and the stately Petersburg castle overlooking Koenigswinter where the meeting was held, did little to calm the delegates as they attempted to hammer out a deal.  Seemingly insurmountable hurdles and major differences between the key players were, however, eventually cast aside because the Afghan groups knew the world would not be very forgiving if they failed to sign on the dotted line. 

            Even though the issue of balancing the divide between the majority Pashtuns and the minority communities of Afghanistan dominated a major part of the discussions, and this featured prominently in the final outcome of the talks, not everyone was satisfied with the result.  The ambitious hope of creating an advisory council such as a ‘majlis-e-shoora’ of about 150-200 Afghans was, meanwhile, abandoned early on in the talks.  “This would have been too much to digest in Bonn,” maintained an Afghan delegate.  “It was difficult enough to arrive at one agreement in the first place.”

            The reservations of the members of the assorted groups notwithstanding, on day nine of the debate an agreement was finally concluded, with Hamid Karzai being designated the de facto chief executive of Afghanistan for a six-month period and key ministries going to the Northern Alliance.

            The crucial question now is, can the new deal hold?  While the architects of the Bonn agreement have expressed optimism – albeit guardedly – and indications are that the US and the UN will keep up the pressure on the players in the Afghan arena, the fate of previous peace accords does not inspire much confidence (see box).  The schisms driven by Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious divide, have, in fact, already begun to present themselves.

            Royalist and chief of Afghanistan’s National Islamic Front, Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani, responded to the new arrangement with skepticism, calling the selection of ministers “unjustified,” and saying that all key slots had been assigned to the  former Rabbani regime ministers while those who had played an active role in the jihad were ignored.

            Anwar ul Haq Ahady, a young Afghan professor of political science at a US university and a son-in-law of Pir Ahmed Gailani, who went to Bonn as member of the Peshawar delegation, was quick to note his displeasure at the outcome of the talks.  “Any position of substance was taken away by the Northern Alliance,” he said, referring to ministries such as interior, foreign affairs and defence being handed over to the dominant non-Pashtun group.  He contended that the only reason the new agreement had been pushed through was on account of the backing of the international community – not because of acceptance by the Pashtun groups.  Doctor Ahady’s criticism was soon endorsed by other Afghans.  “This agreement sidelines the Pashtun groups.  Unless the imbalance is corrected quickly there will be fighting,” warned a former Afghan resistance commander.  “It’s the first time in Afghanistan’s history that the Pashtun members are having to share power in such a way.  Now we are being asked to rewrite our history, and this will be a painful experience,” he said, noting that the 300-year unbroken rein of Afghanistan by Pashtun kings was interrupted only with the ouster of Sardar Daud in the 1978 communist coup.

            Just a day after the Bonn agreement, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, Afghanistan’s senior-most Shia cleric, who is now based in the Iranian city of Qum, summoned his key supporters to discuss the implications of the deal for his followers.  Shia leaders claim they make up about 20-25 per cent of the population in the war-torn country, with most members belonging to the Hazara community, distinct due to their Mongol features – a genetic legacy from the armies of Changez Khan when they invaded the area.  “It’s difficult for this agreement to survive in its current form for too long,” warned Hafizullah Asif Mohseni, Ayatollah Mohseni’s son.  In an interview, just hours after the Bonn agreement was announced, he stated, “Our concern is that there are only four Shias in the 30-member new government.  It’s an under-representation of our community.”

            Powerful Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum was also quick to reject the terms of the accord which did not provide for any representation of his men in the new dispensation.  And former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was completely sidelined under the terms of the Bonn agreement, let his displeasure about the turn of events be known. 

            The future success or failure of the Bonn process will also depend on the UN’s ability to muster enough international financial support to take on the mammoth task of rebuilding the completely devastated country.  UN officials candidly admitted during the talks that the billions of dollars expected in international assistance for Afghanistan would just not materialise unless there was a sustainable peace agreement.  To further emphasise that message, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s chief envoy on Afghanistan, is expected to take up residence in Kabul in the coming months, as the new government takes form.  His objective in doing so may well be to keep emphasising the vital link between a peace deal that holds and global interest in Afghanistan.

            Meanwhile for Pakistan, long accused of interfering in Afghanistan – most recently because of its support for the ill-fated Taliban regime – the outcome of the Bonn peace talks poses a profound challenge.  Islamabad has not only been forced to seriously reassess its long-term Afghan policy, but it must also deal with its own home-grown Taliban – the small coterie of extremist Islamists who continue to threaten revenge against America for its war in Afghanistan, many of whom actually participated in the ‘jihad’ shoulder to shoulder with their Talib brethren across the border.

            Pakistani officials have made it clear that a new beginning has been made by the government of General Pervez Musharraf in respect to its links with Afghanistan, and the international community’s anxieties in this regard are not going to be overlooked.  However, even with the chips down for Islamabad, Pakistani officials remain firmly convinced that the long border between the two countries ensures Pakistan a strategically important position in the region.  What kind of relationship the Pakistan government envisages with the new Afghan setup, however, remains a moot point.  The day the Bonn agreement was signed, local authorities made a major faux pas: conflicting messages emerged from government sources in Islamabad and Iftikhar Murshed, Pakistan’s former point man on Afghanistan who now serves as ambassador to Moscow.

            While the Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar expressed his delight over the formation of a new Afghan government and the foreign office came out with a statement expressing the hope that Afghanistan’s “new interim authority would establish the foundation of a stable, prosperous Afghanistan which is friendly to all its neighbours,” the ambassador to Moscow emphatically disagreed – and did so in public.

            “I can only keep my fingers crossed, but to tell you the truth – and this is purely a personal point of view – I think this is bad news, very bad news.  It is heavily weighted in favour of the Northern Alliance,” Mr Murshed was quoted saying in an interview.

            Any way one looks at it, one thing is certain: it’s going to be a long, rocky road ahead for Afghanistan and all those connected to it in any way.