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republican rout in last month’s US congressional elections
prompted celebrations in many parts of the world, and the announcement
of Donald Rumsfeld’s impending departure proved to be
the icing on the cake for many critics of the Bush administration.
It was more or less foreordained that the House of Representatives
would fall to the Democrats; the Senate was a more difficult
proposition, and seizing control of it was therefore a bigger
achievement for the opposition party. However, anyone who assumes
that the altered balance of power will rapidly translate into
a more coherent and compassionate strategy vis-à-vis
the steadily worsening disaster in Iraq, is likely to be disappointed.
This
is not to say that there are no changes in store. They are mainly
a consequence of two factors.
Since
early 2006 – and in particular the deadly attack on an
iconic Shia mosque in Samarra last February – it has become
increasingly difficult to maintain the mantra that conditions
in Iraq are looking up, as White House spokesmen, administration
officials and George W. Bush himself have been saying more or
less regularly since March 2003. They were never right, but
their pronouncements began to sound particularly ridiculous
as sectarian violence veered towards a free-for-all that to
many American commentators seems more and more like civil war.
At the same time, the realisation has gradually been
dawning on a growing number of Americans that they have consistently
been lied to over Iraq. One suspects that in many cases the
thought wouldn’t have crossed their minds had the conditions
in the occupied country not turned so utterly appalling. They
are now wishing that their nation hadn’t set out to teach
Saddam Hussein a lesson, considering the insinuation that Baghdad
was somehow secretly responsible for the September 11 attacks
turned out to be as much a fantasy as the weapons of mass destruction
that Iraq was supposed to possess. Mind you, the WMD’s
weren’t talked about as a possibility: a relentless chorus
of administration voices, as well as their collaborators in
the media, spent months insisting that stockpiles of chemical
and biological weapons unquestionably existed, and there may
even be a nuclear programme in the works.
Intriguingly, a video has recently surfaced that shows
Saddam and his leading henchmen testing weaponry of a somewhat
more primitive variety in the run-up to the invasion: catapults,
bows and arrows, and Molotov cocktails. As The New York Times’
Scott Shane reported last month: “In the video, Mr Hussein,
wearing a double-breasted gray suit, aims a slingshot, shoots
an arrow at the door using a crossbow (as aides scamper out
of the way) and swings a mock gasoline bomb over his head with
a rope. He urges his aides to get such weapons into the hands
of Iraqis.” Thus, far from deploying WMDs, it seems Saddam
had rather more rudimentary defences in mind. When groups of
resistance fighters eventually sprang up, they proved far more
resourceful in equipping themselves.
None of that gets mentioned very often these days, but
the WMD scare campaign has stayed with ordinary Americans and
it helped to stoke their scepticism about the alternative narrative
that was accorded primacy by the official propagandists once
it became clear that no weapons would be found: namely, that
the war was fought in order to thrust upon Iraqis the gift of
democracy. This myth continues to be maintained by the dwindling
apologists for the conflict, as well as by some of its more
recent opponents. One of the more obvious questions it provokes
is: why were Iraqis alone picked for this privilege? Could it
not simultaneously have been extended to some of its neighbours?
Saudi Arabia, perhaps.
But many Americans have been able to see through the
democracy pretext without pondering the wider issues of geopolitics:
as far as they can tell, the state of Iraq, despite a series
of elections, does not resemble that of a democracy, nor does
it appear, by any stretch of the imagination, to be headed that
way. It is widely suspected that the US played a role in arranging
for the death sentence to be pronounced against Saddam two days
before the Americans headed for the polling booths. In the event,
its influence on voters appears to have been negligible.
This was not a manifestation of the syndrome whereby
foreign policy traditionally takes a back seat in congressional
polls, with local issues to the fore. Exit polls suggested that
a substantial proportion of voters did indeed have Iraq on their
minds as they cast their ballots. Aware of the public mood,
the Democrats exploited the mess in Iraq to the hilt. That was
the easy part. What most of them lacked was an alternative plan.
A number of Democrats favour some form of withdrawal
from Iraq – complete or otherwise, immediate or gradual
– in the short run, and it is only fair to attach a certain
amount of significance to the fact that Nancy Pelosi, the incoming
speaker of the House of Representatives (and the first woman
to hold the post, which will put her two heartbeats away from
the White House), accepts that the American presence in Iraq
is provocative to the insurgents. However, the trouble is that
the Congress has little say in such matters. It could cut off
funds for the war effort, the billions of dollars that the US
spends every month on maintaining a disastrous occupation. But
that option isn’t even likely to be considered in the
short run. It could launch investigations into the corruption
and carpetbaggery that has played a significant role in thwarting
the already meagre reconstruction efforts – but whatever
the value of such moves, they wouldn’t do anything to
ameliorate conditions in Iraq.
Both sides in Washington are eagerly awaiting the recommendations
of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group jointly headed by former
Republican secretary of state, James Baker, and Democratic ex-legislator
Lee Hamilton. One member of the panel was former CIA director
Robert Gates, who resigned upon being nominated as a replacement
for Rumsfeld. (Another is former CIA Middle East expert Ray
Close, who was based in Lahore for some years during the late
1960s.) The Baker commission, as it is popularly known, is expected
to deliver its findings by the middle of December, and a leaked
draft report suggests its main recommendations will include
negotiations with Iran and Syria as a means of reducing the
level of violence in Iraq. A timetable for a phased withdrawal
was considered somewhat less likely, as reports suggested competing
ideas of what it would mean in practical terms were being hotly
disputed among members.
The expectations invested in the study group were always
unrealistic. A broadly acceptable solution to the mess that
the US has created in Iraq requires nothing short of a miracle,
and even James Baker – a long-time friend of the Bush
family whose law firm in Houston once employed George W as an
office boy, and whose services as consigliere came in extremely
handy in Florida six years ago – can’t produce that.
He and other panel members have been holding talks with Syrian
and Iranian diplomats, and the idea of consultations, as well
as full diplomatic relations, with Damascus and Teheran is eminently
sensible. But it does not necessarily hold the key to a solution
in Iraq.
Even that proposal, however, is unlikely to find favour
with elements of the Bush administration, some of whom remain
adamantly opposed to any sort of contacts with Iran, particularly
unconditional ones. A detailed report by Seymour Hersh in The
New Yorker last month suggests that an attack on Iran in 2007
or 2008 still cannot be ruled out. That is, of course, hard
to believe in view of the catastrophe in Iraq. But it would
be a mistake to underestimate the bloody-mindedness of Bush
and his associates.
A growing chorus of prominent Americans now tends to
blame the situation in Iraq more or less exclusively on the
Iraqis. But then, blaming the victims isn’t a recent invention.
After all, three decades or so ago it was not uncommon to hear
that Vietnam wouldn’t have been “lost” had
the vast majority of Vietnamese not been so thankless as to
actively resist the foreign invaders. The “manifest destiny”
attitude goes back a lot further than that of course, and there
are times when it’s hard to resist the impression that
dominant elements in the US military-industrial complex won’t
be completely satisfied until the rest of the world is reduced
to the sort of condition in which the Native Americans found
themselves towards the end of the 19th century, after decades
of subjection to a mixture of mean-spirited deceit and cold-blooded
massacres.
The Vietnamese weren’t willing to be corralled
in an Indochinese “reservation,” and in a slightly
different context Iraq has served to reinforce that same point
in the 21st century. But a clear sign that the appropriate lessons
still remain to be learned can be found in the mantra, popular
mainly among conservative critics of the Bush administration,
that the flaws lie in the conduct of the war, rather than the
very fact that it was waged without reasonable cause.
With more than 3,700 deaths, October was supposed to
have been the deadliest month for Iraqi civilians since the
invasion. November turned out to be even worse. It was mostly
a case of Iraqis killing one another, apparently on sectarian
grounds. But they weren’t doing so in a vacuum: the anarchy
has flourished in conditions created by an invasion that is
thus far believed to have cost 655,000 Iraqi lives, during a
period that now exceeds the extent of American involvement in
the Second World War. Plus nearly 3,000 American lives, which
means Bush now has almost as much blood on his hands as the
9/11 hijackers. And we haven’t even touched upon Afghanistan.
Thousands of Iraqis are said to be leaving the country
every day, slipping into Syria or Jordan – where Bush
was holding talks as late as last month with King Abdullah and
Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri Al Maliki. The Jordanian
monarch had warned a few days earlier that the advent of the
new year could find the Middle East embroiled in three civil
wars: in addition to Iraq, he had Lebanon and Palestine in mind.
While a conciliatory gesture by Israel’s Prime
Minister, Ehud Olmert, raised a few hopes – only a few,
mind you, given the nature and background of the conflict in
question – of some improvement in the siege conditions
that Palestinians face in Gaza and the West Bank, the fraught
situation in Lebanon reached crisis point with the exit of all
Shia ministers from the cabinet of Fouad Siniora, and then took
a turn for the worse with the assassination of the young minister,
Pierre Gemayel, a scion of the country’s most prominent
Maronite Christian family.
Given their apparent influence over Hezbollah, which has been
emboldened by its performance against the might of the Israeli
army last summer, any solution to the strife in Lebanon would
entail Iranian and Syrian involvement. However, it’s all
too easy to err in exaggerating their influence over Hezbollah,
although it’s probably substantially greater than the
hold Teheran exercises over the most formidable of the Iraqi
Shia militias, Moqtada Al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, which is
reported to have expanded eight-fold during the past year. In
both forces there are strong undercurrents of nationalism.
Al Maliki has lately encountered considerable criticism over
his puppet regime’s dismal progress in restraining the
Mahdi Army and other Shia militias and death squads, some of
which operate out of various ministries in Baghdad. One can
only wonder how the inadequately trained Iraqi security forces
can be expected to achieve what the US army has failed to do,
particularly in the face of added complications. For one, Al
Maliki is beholden to Al Sadr, because his survival as prime
minister is contingent on the parliamentary support of Al Sadr
loyalists. Secondly, as many American officials privately acknowledge,
soldiers and policemen in the new Iraq often moonlight as militiamen.
Reports from Iraq about kidnappings and night-time visitations
by death squads frequently note that the perpetrators were dressed
in army or police uniforms. In most cases, that’s only
because they couldn’t be bothered to change out of the
clothes they require for their day jobs.
The flurry of diplomatic activity last month included a visit
to Baghdad by Syria’s foreign minister, during which the
two sides decided to restore relations ruptured in 1982, as
well as a trip to Teheran by Iraq’s president, Jalal Talabani
– hinting at a welcome attempt by the Baghdad regime to
pre-empt the proposals of the Baker commission. But the least
expected – as well as the most significant – journey
of all was the one that Dick Cheney undertook to Riyadh. American
press reports suggest that it wasn’t a US initiative:
the Saudis effectively summoned the vice-president, evidently
to inform him that if American forces pulled out of the Iraqi
quagmire, Saudi Arabia would feel obliged to step in to protect
the Arab Sunnis. If that led to war with Iran, so be it.
Some members of the Bush administration, possibly including
Cheney, are likely to view the latter prospect with relish rather
than consternation: from their point of view, a proxy war against
Iran fought by the Saudis would be preferable to one waged via
Israel. Nor would they object to Riyadh using oil as a weapon
against Teheran, for instance by doubling its output. The fact
that any Saudi-Iranian conflict would be utterly disastrous
for the region is unlikely to give them too many sleepless nights.
That such a prospect is even being contemplated shows what a
sorry pass has been reached in the Middle East as a consequence
of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Attempts by the US to
extricate itself from a mess entirely of its own making might
even have been amusing but for the horrible toll its actions
are exacting. And there is, of course, no coherent exit strategy.
Speculation centres on a plan to increase American troop strength
in the short run, in a final effort to enforce tranquillity
of the graveyard variety, before a drawdown that could see the
occupation force reduced by half by the end of 2007.
Such a move will serve to compound the problem rather than resolve
it. The clouds over Iraq have no silver lining, but the only
serious prospect of dissipating them lies in a complete and
unequivocal withdrawal by the US and its allies, in combination
with a determined diplomatic push, preferably by the United
Nations, to obtain regional consent on non-intervention. The
bloodshed won’t, of course, cease immediately. There may
even be a spike in sectarian violence, but how much worse can
it get. The vast majority of Iraqis are bound to realise sooner
or later that they have to coexist with each other, if not as
compatriots then at least as neighbours.
It would be sheer folly to attempt any firm predictions about
exactly where a total pullout would lead, but it does appear
to be the least atrocious option. Which probably means it is
also the one least likely to be exercised in the short to medium
term, partly out of vanity on the part of the Americans. The
embarrassment of failure could scar the American psyche (and,
possibly, act as a restraint against further imperialist adventures)
for a generation. But then, most Americans – with the
exception of Bush and Cheney – are willing to concede
that “success” on any terms is no longer an option.
And it requires only a modicum of common sense to realise that
when it comes to a crime such as aggravated assault, the longer
it continues, the worse its consequences.
Once it’s all over and some semblance of peace returns
to Mesopotamia, it is likely to take Iraqis at least a generation
to recover from the agonies of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship,
which were – predictably – compounded manifold by
invaders masquerading as the nation’s saviours. And even
that’s an optimistic assumption. As things stand, the
only guarantee is that as long as the brutal occupation continues,
an epic tragedy will continue to unfold wherein, as Shakespeare
might have put it, each new morn new widows howl, new orphans
cry, new sorrows strike heaven on the face. 
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