|
It
is 2004. A FM radio station starts in a hamlet called Mamderhai,
located just beside Mingora, the main business hub in Swat Valley,
along the banks of the River Swat. Maulana Fazlullah initially gives
radio sermons about the practice and principles of Islam. Residents,
especially women, are instantly attracted and find themselves compelled
to listen. After a few months, the maulana starts lecturing against
polio vaccinations, television and education for girls. The local
administration is alerted and asks the maulana to close down the
radio station. The maulana refuses to comply. A traditional jirga
intervenes to hammer out an agreement between the administration
and the maulana. Meanwhile, the maulana establishes a huge madrassah,
apparently with donations from locals. His circle of influence widens,
encompassing the neighbouring hamlets on the right bank of the river.
After
gathering enough strength, the maulana reportedly starts writing
threatening letters to girls' schools and women's colleges ordering
the students and teachers to put on head-to-toe veils. The next
target is CD shops and Internet cafés. Locals start resisting
the maulana in their own way. Nonetheless, terror continues as a
CD market in Mingora and a secondary school in Kabal are blown up.
By August 2007, bomb blasts and suicide attacks become the norm
in the previously peaceful tourist resort known as the Switzerland
of Asia. Fear and terror envelop the whole valley.
The
district coordination officer instructs citizens to abide by the
orders of anonymous warning letters. Schools, colleges, markets,
government offices and the offices of NGOs are closed down. The
political parties, traditional elites and influential section of
the society turn a deaf ear to all these happenings. Socio-political
activists make some efforts, but without any impact.
Meanwhile,
the MMA government in the NWFP resigns and an interim government
takes over in Peshawar. The caretaker chief minister of NWFP calls
a grand jirga. The jirga seems to have unanimously advised the chief
minister to start a targeted operation in the valley, and henceforth
paramilitary forces start actions in October 2007. But the paramilitary
forces fail to rein in the militancy. In the first week of November,
the federal government of Pakistan announces a military operation
in the valley. Tanks, armoured cars and heavy artillery of the Pakistan
army roll in to curb militancy. The common people of Swat seem to
be initially stunned. It is something absolutely unusual and unnatural
for them.
The
mesmerising music of waterfalls, the green, flowery landscape dotted
with sprouting fountains, the snow-capped mountains and the fast-flowing
River Swat have witnessed numerous epochs over the last several
thousand years. Since the Aryans, who migrated to the valley in
the 14th century B.C., till the merger of the valley with Pakistan
in 1969, the valley has seen the diverse lifestyles, different worldviews,
numerous cultural traditions and distinct state institutions of
its many inhabitants. Traditionally, the people of the valley remained
peaceful, liberal and open in all cultural, social and political
aspects. Khurshid Khan, a lecturer in history at Government College
Mingora says, "Mela was the main component of cultural ceremonies
in the valley. The state-sponsored mela on the bank of River Swat
was the most famous event. The Wali (of Swat) would visit the mela.
Dances, circus and many items of entertainment were integral parts
of the mela. Elders always talk about those bygone days. During
Eid ceremonies, besides men, women also used to gather around the
tombs of saints. They used to spend a day in shopping and singing.
The Pakhtun code and state authority gave protection to females
attending melas in Swat."
On
the other hand, the religious class of the valley would behave like
Buddhist monks. Khurshid Khan elaborates: "The people of the
whole valley were the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa. The religious
class had no concern with worldly affairs. That class was only responsible
for leading prayers five times a day, funeral prayers, nikah and
khatm. A maulvi used to spend his life on the income of Sirai land
and charity. He would not be a member of the jirga and lakhkar."
Political
structure was balanced too. "Traditional elites, divided into
two prominent social groups, had to give space to the religious
and the marginalised groups because of the politics of social grouping,"
says Shaukat Sharar, an architect based in Mingora. A 60-year-old
farmer in Spalbandai village, Mingora, says, "There was a network
of roads across the whole valley. Schools, both for boys and girls,
were constructed across the length and breadth of Swat State. I
never heard about shortages of medicines in hospitals during the
state era."
The
judicial system in Swat during the reign of the Wali was quite efficient.
Karim Bakhsh, a 55-year-old farmer of Utrore, near Kalam, says,
"During the era of Wali Sahib, a murderer would be arrested
within 24 hours. The crime rate was low and the Qazi would decide
a case within hours."
In
essence, says Inamullah, a teacher in Bahrain, Swat, the lack of
democracy had its benefits. "The law and order situation was
better due the fact that the state was run by one person. The same
is true for the quantity and quality of the infrastructure. But
human rights were severely violated. Forced labour was very common,
and there was no awareness of civil and human rights. The state
seemed to be enjoying a moderate and even secular profile, but people
were happy to get their cases decided in a short time."
In
their book, Swat: An Afghan Society in Pakistan, Inam-ur-Rahim and
Alain Viaro write, "Though basic principles of justice were
taken from the Islamic judicial system (during the state era), an
appropriate space was kept for local traditions and customs while
deciding the disputes and crimes."
Several
observers believe that the merger of Swat State with Pakistan caused
frustration in the people of the valley. Sultan-i-Room, in his paper
"Merger of Swat State with Pakistan - Causes and Effects,"
says, "With the merger of Swat State, confusion and chaos prevailed.
The litigants did not know where to turn for justice. Quick and
cheap trials and decisions, whether just or unjust, and their proper
execution and implementation came to an end. The prolonged procedures,
undue delay, great expenditures, high bribes, misuse of riwaj (customs)
and the further deterioration of PATA (Provincially Administered
Tribal Areas) highly aggravated almost all the people of Swat.
The
present apparent wave of militancy reported from the Swat Valley
can be traced back to the early '90s. It was a time when the Soviet
Union had just disintegrated. As such, other immediate issues unfolding
in places such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East absorbed the
attention of US policymakers after the Soviet collapse. The hard
core, militarily trained mujahideen from Pakistan and other countries
were desperately looking for new assignments. The same confusion
had, most probably, engulfed the power echelons of the secret agencies
of both Pakistan and the US that had been quite close with these
mujahideen during the Cold War.
Several
authors have observed that some of the mujahideen who had been the
students of Pakistani madrassahs returned to Pakistan, started teaching
in the country's madrassahs and began exhorting the sermons they
had been psychologically tuned into during the Cold War. Some of
them developed their own regimented forces in the shape of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba,
Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhanagvi, besides
Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). The headquarters and
central leadership of all these militant organisations were situated
in the Punjab, but they remained in touch with their counterparts
and former jihadi colleagues in the NWFP.
The
early '90s was also the time when the TNSM started gathering strength
in the suburbs of Mingora town and Tehsil Matta. Some observers
point to three contributing factors that gave impetus to the TNSM-led
insurgency across Swat.
Firstly,
the movement was seen to be stronger in the area where the landed
aristocracy had a firm and longtime hold. Those who joined the TNSM
mostly belonged to landless families. The movement gave them an
opportunity to participate in the power game of the area. Moreover,
the religious groups had always previously been considered inferior
and would not be allowed to have any say in the socio-political
affairs of the area. During the militant movement of the TNSM, the
religious groups started asserting themselves and creating a space
for themselves in the socio-cultural hierarchy. The landless masses
and religious groups of the influenced part of the valley joined
hands under the leadership of Maulana Sufi Mohammad, and together
they became a strong force in a short span of time.
Secondly, the legal code, known as the Provincially Administered
Tribal Areas Regulations, was brought into force in Malakand Division.
Malakand Division was formed into an administrative structure in
which Swat State was placed after its merger with Pakistan in 1969,
along with District Dir, District Buner and District Chitral. The
PATA regulations had allowed all executive, judicial and revenue
powers to be exercised by the local administration alone and specifically
by a deputy commissioner. After a verdict of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan, which sought to abolish the PATA regulations in the early
'90s, the local administration lost most of its cherished powers.
A deputy commissioner of district Dir from then is said to have
been a frequent visitor to Maulana Sufi Mohammad, the leader of
the TNSM.
Thirdly and most importantly, the people of Swat tired of their
experience with the regulations and wished for a judicial system
that would give them instant relief. The TNSM leadership tapped
this desire of the common people for instant legal relief by promising
promulgation of the Shariah law. This earned the TNSM sympathies
of the silent majority of the valley.
The TNSM clashed with the local administration in the early '90s
and had effectively brought the whole administrative structure of
district Swat to a standstill. Later, when the American forces invaded
Afghanistan, Sufi Mohammad had exhorted his followers to join the
Taliban in Afghanistan in their armed struggle against America and
its allies. Hundreds of jihadis under his command crossed the border
and entered Afghanistan. The rest of the story is shrouded in mystery,
but what is known is that Maulana Sufi Mohammad returned from Afghanistan
while most of his mujahideen followers did not. Maulana Sufi Mohammad
is now languishing in a Pakistani jail.
Some observers also believe that the role of the national and international
agencies in the present situation of the valley cannot be ruled
out. They believe that the US might be interested in containing
the march of the Chinese to Gwadar Port and the Karakoram Highway
- the access route to Central Asian oil reserves, which may become
instrumental in keeping US trade interests intact in the region.
The local residents in Matta, Durushkhela and Ningolai told Newsline
that they had seen the militants of Jaish-e-Mohammad and those who
might have come from Waziristan helping the local Taliban in bringing
Upper Swat under their control.
Maulana Fazlullah, the apparent catalyser of the present imbroglio,
is the son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad. He probably has supporters from
the same strata of society, though the present crisis is of a far
larger scale than the one brought about by TNSM in 1994.
It is important for the government to take the traditional elites,
political parties and civil society, including teachers, doctors,
lawyers, journalists and NGOs, into confidence during and after
the operation's end. The government and international donor agencies
have to concentrate on infrastructure development, mechanisms of
equity-based economic sustenance and a judicial system that responds
to the aspirations of the people of the valley. If Pakistan is serious
about blocking the way for the emergence of another Sufi Mohammad
and Fazlullah in the valley, and in the whole Pakhtun belt for that
matter, it has to revert to the people. The economic sustenance,
political empowerment and socio-cultural rights of the people must
be safeguarded if militancy is to be rooted out from the valley
and the whole Pakhtun belt.
|