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It
was, perhaps, the toughest moment for President Musharraf when he
went on national television last month to announce his decision
to outlaw five Islamic militant groups.
The move, in the midst of Indian threats of war and increasing
pressure from the United States to crack down on terrorism, was
meant to set a new direction for Pakistan. For more than two decades, the militant groups
had thrived under the patronage of the military establishment. The time had come to break away from the past,
and it took a military man to do so.
While
it may be true that General Musharraf was moving in that direction
from the beginning, the changed international environment in the
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks undoubtedly precipitated
the action. Can General Musharraf succeed in his fight
against extremism and reverse the political course set by erstwhile
military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq?
It may not be easy for General Musharraf to curb well-trained
and armed extremists, particularly given their continuing links
with a section of the military establishment.
The
kidnapping of an American journalist, Daniel Pearl, allegedly by
the activists of the outlawed militant organisations, and the resurgence
of sectarian killings in Karachi signals a backlash from religious
fanatics against the crackdown. Pearl was taken hostage just 10 days after
President Musharraf’s January 12 speech in what appears to be a
retaliatory action by defiant Islamic militants.
This is the first political kidnapping of a foreigner in
Pakistan’s history involving an extremist group.
Not only is it in retaliation to the military government’s
action against Islamic activists, but it is also meant to send a
signal to the United States that its war against Al Qaeda is far
from over and that its treatment of Al Qaeda prisoners can have
serious repercussions for US citizens.
Most
observers agree that the kidnapping was planned to embarrass General
Musharraf, particularly in light of the fact that it has come at
a crucial time when he is due to meet with President Bush at the
White House, a reward for his response to the crisis in Afghanistan.
Investigations into
the kidnapping so far have revealed that the kidnapping of Pearl,
the South Asia bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal, was immaculately
planned and masterminded by British Muslim, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh,
a senior leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, one of the groups outlawed
by the military government. Sheikh, the prime suspect, is a 28-year-old
militant who was educated at the London School of Economics, then
imprisoned in India for five years after being charged with a case
of kidnapping there. In 1999, along with two other militants, including
Maulana Masood Azhar, he was set free in Afghanistan in an exchange
won by hijackers who had taken control of an Indian Airlines jet
with 155 passengers.
Following
his release, Sheikh apparently never went back to England and instead
joined the Jaish-e-Mohammed organisation formed by his mentor Maulana
Masood Azhar. A breakaway group of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,
the Jaish emerged as a major guerrilla group fighting in Kashmir
and Afghanistan. The group
was responsible for the first suicide bombing in Kashmir when “Bilal”,
a British Muslim, rammed a truck loaded with ammunition into an
Indian army post last year. Interestingly, Sheikh is on the list of 20
men whose extradition has been demanded by India. Jaish has close links with the Taliban and hundreds of its activists
participated in the fratricidal war in Afghanistan. There is strong evidence of Jaish’s close affinity
with another banned sectarian group, the Sipah-e-Sahaba. According to security officials, Jaish activists
have also been directly involved in sectarian killings.
It
is not surprising that the kidnapping of the US journalist has been
accompanied by a resurgence in sectarian killings in Karachi.
At least five people have been killed over the last few weeks,
showing a clear defiance by the banned sectarian group.
Understandably, Jaish was one of the first groups to be placed
on the terrorist list by the United States soon after September
11. Although General Musharraf’s decision to ban
the group and arrest its firebrand leader Maulana Azhar, along with
thousands of other activists, is a move in the right direction,
there remain questions about his government’s capacity to rein in
the Frankensteins created by the establishment itself.
Some reports suggest that rogue elements within the intelligence
agencies continue to maintain ties with the Muslim militant groups.
The arrest of a special branch cop who also happens to be
an activist of the Jaish in Pearl’s kidnapping case indicates the
penetration of jihadi groups in state institutions.
Some reports suggest they have sympathisers in the military
and the intelligence agencies.
The two-decade long ties between the military and the jihadi
groups are not likely to break easily despite General Musharraf’s
commitment. Many observers
believe the action against militant and sectarian groups has come
too late in the day, exacerbating the difficulties for General Musharraf.
India’s
bellicosity and its efforts to crush the self-determination struggle
in Kashmir is another constraining factor in dealing with the problem
of militancy. The military government has already been accused
of buckling under Indian and American pressure and Delhi’s increasingly
hostile attitude has placed further impediments in the government’s
way. It is, however, in Pakistan’s own national
interest to eliminate extremism from society.
Pakistani
military officials maintain that in order to avoid sharpening the
polarisation between the moderates and the conservatives, they do
not want to resort to heavy-handed measures.
“We don’t want an Algeria-like situation in Pakistan with
Islamic militants up in arms against the government,” said a senior
official. However, the Algerian
analogy is not applicable to the situation in today’s Pakistan.
Pakistani “jihadi” forces owe their rise largely to the active
patronage of the establishment and do not have any strong political
base of their own. They thrive simply on violence and a lack of the writ of the state.
It can justifiably be argued that moderate forces in the
country are politically too strong to allow the conservative theocratic
forces to take over.
Another
challenge for the Musharraf government is to regulate the madrassas
that have been the hub of militancy and sectarianism.
A majority of the students in these madrassas belong to the
poorest sections of society and are sent to seminaries because their
parents cannot afford to educate them in private or public schools. Socially alienated, they tend to develop a fierce hatred towards
anything they consider modern or western.
Their education having hardly equipped them to qualify for
a decent job, the hundreds of thousands of graduates from madrassas
across Pakistan have few choices in life.
Over the last two decades, however, many of them discovered
a strong ideological purpose to their existence – jihad.
State
patronage in the form of an “unholy alliance” between the mullahs
and the military which began in the 1980s saw an unprecedented rise
of radical Islam. Huge funding from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
some Gulf countries brought about a massive increase in the number
of madrassas in Pakistan, particularly in the North-West Frontier
and western Balochistan provinces.
Most of them became centres for the recruitment of “holy
warriors” to fight in Afghanistan and against Indian forces in Kashmir.
More than a dozen Islamic militant groups which emerged during
this period gave the jihadis a new sense of identity.
The concept of jihad was taught as a special subject to prepare
the students to fight against “infidels” and for the cause of Islam.
The “jihad” in Afghanistan drew thousands of volunteers from
the madrassas in Pakistan. Government
officials confirm that many madrassas have provided arms training
and students would take time off from their studies to go and participate
in “jihad” in Afghanistan and other places.
The
end of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan has been an unprecedented
setback to the Islamic conservative forces, but it needs firm resolve
on the part of the Musharraf government to fight a decisive battle
against extremism which threatens to tear apart the fabric of Pakistani
society. This is one battle
it cannot afford to lose.
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