|
IF
THERE was any element of surprise in George W. Bush's second inaugural
address last month, it lay in the vehemence with which he reiterated
his administration's international goals. The vulgar triumphalism
was at odds with the fate of what was supposed to be the showpiece
of the neoconservative Project for a New American Century: a Middle
Eastern outpost of "freedom" and "liberty" that
would bring imperialism back into fashion.
The
Iraqis had other ideas, though. Apart from a handful of ambitious
exiles such as Ahmed Chalabi and Iyad Allawi, none of them had expressed
any interest in regime change through an American invasion. Consequently,
Iraq is today in a worse state than it was at any time under Saddam
Hussein's misrule. Of course, no one could expect Bush or any of
his henchmen to acknowledge this, but there was nonetheless some
expectation that the disastrous course of events in the occupied
country would, at the very least, lead to a subtle change of direction
in US foreign policy. It was even rumoured that leading neocons
such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith would effectively be defanged.
None of that has come to pass. It's Colin Powell who has gone, while
Donald Rumsfeld's exemplary services have been retained for a second
term. And it was Powell's replacement, Condoleezza Rice, whose congressional
testimony during confirmation hearings offered an explication of
what Bush's extraordinary stress on extending "freedom"
to "the darkest corners of the world" might mean. The
reputedly erudite Rice, as yet untested as a diplomat, described
Cuba, Burma, North Korea, Iran, Belarus and Zimbabwe as "outposts
of tyranny."
This
expanded version of Bush's "axis of evil" raised some
intriguing questions. In Cuba, the worst human rights abuses have
in recent years been taking place on a US-occupied naval base called
Guantanamo Bay. If that is what Rice had in mind, it shouldn't prove
too hard to liberate Camp X-ray. More seriously, why Belarus and
not Uzbekistan, which harbours an even less palatable regime? Could
it have something to do with the fact that Uzbekistan also hosts
an American military base? And why Iran but not the at least equally
repressive and decidedly less democratic Saudi Arabia?
Iran
is, of course, a special case as far as the United States is concerned.
Among the fanatics guiding Washington's foreign policy agenda, there
were some who at the very outset advocated extending the invasion
of Iraq to embrace neighbouring Iran as well. Last year the stream
of anti-Iranian invective showed signs of turning into a torrent
- with a stress, remarkably, on the same excuses that were cited
as justification for blundering into Baghdad: weapons of mass destruction
and possible links with Al Qaeda. And, as in the case of Hans Blix
and Iraq, there have been insinuations that the International Atomic
Energy Agency's Mohammed ElBaradei is covering up for the Iranians.
Tehran's nuclear ambitions are hardly a secret, and Iran
is by no means the only country to have drawn one lesson in particular
from the fate of Saddam: that with Uncle Sam on the warpath, WMD
would be invaluable as a deterrent. It doesn't necessarily follow
that Iran's nuclear programme is geared towards the production of
weapons. But in the wider scheme of things, that doesn't really
matter. A nuclear weapons programme would not make Iran a legitimate
target; and an attack upon that country under any circumstances
could provoke an even bigger orgy of bloodshed than in Iraq.
Although
reports of the Pentagon drawing up war plans have been circulating
for some time, Seymour Hersh's revelation last month that US forces
have for several months been conducting reconnaissance missions
into Iran was a bombshell. It shattered the complacency of all those
who felt that the American rhetoric was largely bluster aimed at
intimidating Tehran into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. The missions
are apparently aimed at selecting targets that could be destroyed
in an air attack.
Hersh is a highly respected investigative journalist who won the
Pulitzer Prize back in 1970 for exposing the My Lai massacre of
Vietnamese villagers - mostly women and children - by American troops.
Last year he was instrumental in bringing the Abu Ghraib scandal
to light, and subsequently published a book claiming that the abuse
of prisoners was sanctioned at the highest levels. He relies on
a network of well-informed contacts in government ranks, the military
and in intelligence agencies. They go unnamed in his reports, but
the reports, more often than not, are remarkably veracious.
In
another report last year, Hersh revealed that Israeli operatives
were active in Iraq's Kurdish areas, because Israel was convinced
that the American venture in that country was doomed to failure,
and it wanted to take precautions against the likelihood of Iran
influencing the future shape of Iraq.
As is their usual practice in such cases, last month US
government officials ridiculed Hersh's report in The New Yorker
and claimed that it was riddled with inaccuracies, but stopped short
of denying it outright. They also could not be bothered to pinpoint
any of the "inaccuracies".
One of the most troubling
aspects of the report, from this country's point of view, was the
disclosure that Islamabad has been cooperating with the US in this
crazy venture. "[A] former high-level intelligence official
told me," writes Hersh, "that an American commando task
force has been set up in South Asia and is now working closely with
a group of Pakistani scientists and technicians who had dealt with
Iranian counterparts. (In 2003, the IAEA. disclosed that Iran had
been secretly receiving nuclear technology from Pakistan for more
than a decade, and had withheld that information from inspectors).
The American task force, aided by the information from Pakistan,
has been penetrating eastern Iran from Afghanistan in a hunt for
underground installations.
"The official added that the government of Pervez Musharraf
... has won a high price for its cooperation - American assurance
that Pakistan will not have to hand over A.Q. Khan ... to the IAEA
or to any other international authorities for questioning. 'It's
a deal - a trade-off,' [he] explained....
"The agreement comes at a time when Musharraf, according to
a former high-level Pakistani diplomat, has authorised the expansion
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal. 'Pakistan still needs parts
and supplies, and needs to buy them in the clandestine market,'
the former diplomat said. 'The US has done nothing to stop it.'
"There has also been close, and largely unacknowledged, cooperation
with Israel..."
From what one can gather, the plan for military action against Iran
involves only air strikes - apart from the fact that the already
stretched US army cannot spare troops for a ground offensive, a
second gratuitous invasion in the Middle East would also be deeply
unpopular domestically. Initially the idea was to concentrate on
military targets, but then some bright spark suggested that bombarding
the mullahs would probably provoke an uprising, leading to regime
change on the cheap.
An alternative scenario envisages attacks not by the American but
by the Israeli air force. After all, it is Israel that is particularly
paranoid about a potential Iranian nuclear bomb (presumably having
been assured by the US that it has nothing to fear from Pakistan's
arsenal). This luxury is, of course, not reciprocally available
to any country in the region: even close US allies such as Egypt,
Jordan or Saudi Arabia could not possibly persuade it to contemplate
any sort of action against Israel's nuclear capability.
There are perfectly good reasons for hoping that Iran does not become
a nuclear power. After all, nuclear weapons are an abomination,
and their proliferation only increases the likelihood of their use.
But to be consistent in this argument, one must also hold that all
nuclear-armed nations - from the US to Pakistan - ought to rid themselves
of this evil. Far less acceptable is what India tends to deride
as the nuclear apartheid approach: that such weapons are a wonderful
deterrent in some hands and exclusively a means of mass destruction
in others. If Iran cannot be expected to wield such power responsibly,
why should the benefit of the doubt be extended to the comparably
imbalanced regimes in Jerusalem and Washington?
Besides, where in the annals of moves and movements against nuclear
proliferation is the suggestion that possible proliferators must
be exterminated?
As for the assumption that an air force attack on Iran would trigger
off a rebellion against the ayatollahs, a military assault of any
kind would be unjustified even if it were true. Quite apart from
the likelihood of altogether unacceptable "collateral damage",
this is not the way civilised nations are supposed to behave. The
barbarism in Iraq should be serving as a warning, not an encouragement,
to all humankind.
Americans also ought to be aware - but probably are not, given their
reluctance to imbibe the lessons of history - that many Iranians
have never forgiven them for their role in a previous instance of
regime change, when the national-democratic Mossadegh government
was overthrown 52 years ago, and the Shah reinstated. That intervention
eventually created circumstances that allowed the clerics to profit
most from Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's unpopularity. Twenty-six years
on, the mullahs may be deeply unpopular, particularly among the
young, but their comeuppance at the hands of a foreign power would
serve only to replicate the bloodshed in Iraq and postpone the prospect
of Iran re-embracing modernity and progress.
Iranians know how to deal with their tormentors. They've done it
before, and they will do it again. But the last thing they need
right now is another layer of oppression or an untimely outbreak
of obscurantist patriotism.
|