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Though
international pressure may have toned down India’s war rhetoric, the inherent
danger of border clashes turning into a wider conflagration is very much a
reality. Pakistan’s belated efforts to
curb Islamic militant groups has failed to appease India which is using the US
“war on terrorism” to force Pakistan’s hand.
India
began amassing troops along the Line of Control and on the borders with
Pakistan immediately after the December 13 attack on the Indian
parliament. Within two weeks India had
moved more than 49 divisions of troops, as well as a number of missiles into
offensive positions in what is seen as the biggest ever troop deployment in the
area for more than 50 years. “This kind
of Indian military build-up was not in place even during the 1971 and 1965
wars,” says a senior Pakistani military official. Both countries came to the brink of war on December 21 and
December 22 when Indian airforce jets were loaded and put on an offensive alert
during General Musharraf’s visit to China.
“It was a very close call,” says a senior Pakistani military official.
It
is quite apparent that the Vajpayee government is blatantly trying to use the
December 13 attack, for which it blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammed,
to mount a military action in Azad Kashmir.
The Indians went all out to use current international anti-terrorism
sentiments to push Pakistan into a corner and settle the Kashmir issue to its
own advantage. Significantly enough,
Indian belligerence was followed by a statement from a senior Indian general
that his forces were in a position to capture Azad Kashmir. The Indian strategy was apparently based on
the premise that in the prevailing international situation it would be
impossible for Pakistan to use nuclear weapons.
Delhi’s
threat of war has not only brought Pakistan under tremendous pressure, but also
succeeded in rallying international support to pressurise Pakistan to crack
down on Islamic militant groups.
Despite General Musharraf’s support for the US-led coalition, the
Indians have managed to shift the onus on Pakistan to ease regional
tensions. According to highly placed
Pakistani official sources, General Musharraf has not been left with much
choice but to move against those Islamic groups closely linked with the Taliban
in the military government’s most serious crackdown yet against Islamic militancy.
The
action also marks the end of a
two-decade long “unholy” alliance between the Islamic militant groups and the
military. Most of these organisations
which have been fighting Indian forces in
Kashmir have been patronised by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
which has not only provided them guerrilla training, but also weapons and
funding. Now with the ISI abruptly
pulling its support line, these groups have been reduced to little more than
paper tigers. Given the close links
between the militant groups and the government, there should have been no
problem for the military to round them up.
The virtual lack of any resistance from the Islamic militant groups has
also shattered the myth of their perceived clout and influence, clearly indicating
that their very existence was dependent on military support.
Although the crackdown has largely been inspired by pressure from
the United States and the looming threat of war with India,
it also reflects the military government’s new thinking that
its reliance on the Islamic militants for the solution of
the Kashmir issue has been counter-productive.
“There is a growing realisation that militancy has
not yielded any positive results in Kashmir,” says a high-ranking
Pakistani diplomat. “There
is no change in our policy on the Kashmir issue, but there
is a shift in approach. The emphasis will now be on a political struggle
rather than on guerrilla action.”
The ISI’s involvement in the Kashmiri struggle deepened in the mid-’90s
when Pakistani-based groups like Harkatul Mujahideen and Lashkar-i-Taiba became the dominant guerilla
forces that sidelined indigenous Kashmiri groups. There was also an attempt to “Islamise” the Kashmiri freedom movement,
with disastrous long-term effects.
The “guest fighters,” most of them from the Punjab
and other parts of Pakistan, alienated the local Kashmiris
by trying to impose their own interpretation of hardline Islam.
Pleas from local Kashmiri leaders to Pakistan to refrain
from sending in guerilla fighters fell on deaf ears.
Pakistan’s short-sighted policy helped the Indians
twist the Kashmiris’ struggle for self-determination to a
foreign-sponsored terrorist movement and Delhi used the influx
of “foreign fighters” to intensify its state terrorism. The goal of Kashmiri freedom remained elusive
while thousands of Kashmiris were killed. Nothing could have served Indian interests better when the Lashkar
killed two Indian soldiers last year in an attack on Delhi’s
Red Fort and then vowed to extend the war to the Indian mainland.
The rise of the jihadi groups had even more serious domestic implications.
Under the patronage of the military establishment they openly
recruited volunteers giving rise to a new militant culture. Armed jihadi groups virtually became a state
within a state. Given
free rein to flout the law of the land, militant groups were
free to hold public rallies while mainstream political parties
were not. To the shock
of the international community, Maulana Masood Azhar after
his release from an Indian jail in the Indian Airlines hijacking
case, went on a campaign to recruit “half a million” Muslim
volunteers and called for the destruction of India.
All this jingoism and bellicosity that reigned unchecked
was to cost Pakistan dear in the future.
Most of these groups, particularly Jaish-e-Muhammed, were closely
linked with Sipah-e-Sahaba and directly involved in sectarian
violence. The spillover
of Kashmiri militancy into Pakistan has also been cause for
concern for successive governments whose attempts to take
action have seemingly been
held hostage by the ISI.
There is strong evidence that the Jaish was directly
involved in sectarian killings, while spiralling sectarian
violence involving jihadi groups threatened to plunge the
country into a religious war. The militant groups also posed a serious challenge
to General Musharraf’s liberal policies. Despite the military government’s decision to restrict the activities
of jihadi and sectarian groups, the policy was not effectively
implemented for fear of a backlash, while the government’s
inaction was also influenced by concerns that it may harm
the Kashmiri struggle.
The military authorities have arrested 300
militants in a nation-wide sweep over the last one
week. Most of the
detained militants belong to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba,
the groups designated as terrorists by the United States,
and blamed for the attack on the Indian parliament. The crackdown forced Jaish and Lashkar to move their headquarters
to Kashmir, while other Islamic
guerrilla groups have closed down operations in Pakistan
and advised their supporters to go underground to escape the
crackdown. A Jaish-e-Mohammed spokesman said the group
was shifting its headquarters to Kashmir and would confine
their activities to the disputed territory.
He said Jaish leaders would infiltrate Indian-controlled
Kashmir, despite heavy Indian security at the borders.
“We have decided to shift offices to Indian-occupied-Kashmir,”
says Mohammad Abdullah, a Jaish leader.
“We will open our offices on the mountains of Kashmir
and no one can stop us from doing this.” Other groups have taken similar steps to avoid
arrest. “There are no offices of our organisation in Pakistan any more,”
says Yahya Mujahid, a Lashkar-e-Taiba spokesman. Most of the group’s activists have gone into hiding after the arrest
of their leader, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, earlier this week.
According to Pakistani military officials, action against the militants
will continue as their activities still pose a serious threat
to the country’s security.
“We are closely watching and monitoring activities
of certain groups and organisations.
If they are found to be involved in any kind of illegal
activities, action will be taken against them,” says Aziz
Khan, a foreign ministry spokesman.
The government, however, still appears reluctant to
clamp down on other Islamic groups in the face of warnings
from some Islamic leaders who have threatened General Musharraf
with retaliation for what they describe as “treachery,” Amirul
Azeem, a Jamaat-i-Islami leader, said General Musharraf’s
action has “broken the hearts of freedom-loving Kashmiris.”
The General’s action has, however, won the support
of liberal Pakistanis.
The
list of suspected terrorists was delivered to Pakistan the day after the
military government arrested Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba,
the group accused of planning the attack on the Indian parliament. Pakistani officials maintained that many of
the fugitives named by India were not even on Pakistani soil. They have denied the presence of Ibrahim in
the country, though some reports suggest that Ibrahim is living in Karachi
under the protection of Pakistani military intelligence.
The military government appears increasingly concerned about
a possible backlash from the Islamic parties over the latest
crackdown. Extremist
groups are already on the warpath against the military regime,
after General Musharraf abandoned the Taliban and supported
the military action against Osama bin Laden. “Our latest action against militant groups
fighting in Kashmir may give a fillip to Islamic extremists
to whip up opposition against the government,” claims a senior
military official. “It will not be as easy to change our long-standing
policy on Kashmir as it has been to manoeuvre the shift in
our Afghan policy.”
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