|
The
shocking revelation that some Pakistani scientists might have sold
nuclear technology to Iran and possibly to other countries as well
raises serious concerns about the management of our nuclear programme
and policy-making process. What shook the ivory towers of Islamabad
is that the list of suspects included none other than the architect
of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. At least three
top scientists, linked with the country's main nuclear facility
at Kahuta, are being questioned for allegedly breaching nuclear
export controls for either financial or ideological reasons.
International
investigators and western intelligence agencies suspect that Pakistani
scientists were the source of key blueprints, technical guidance
and equipment for Iran's pilot uranium-enrichment plant. Documents
handed over by Iran to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) have revealed a possible transfer from Pakistan of
sensitive information concerning centrifuge technology.
While Iran has not directly identified Pakistan as a supplier,
Pakistani individuals and companies are strongly implicated as sources
of crucial technology that helped put Iran on a fast track towards
becoming a nuclear weapons power. There are also suspicions that
some top Pakistani scientists may have also been linked with the
Libyan and North Korean nuclear programmes.
The
illegal sale of nuclear secrets came to light two months ago when
Iranian leaders handed President Musharraf a list of the scientists
allegedly involved in the sale during his visit to Tehran. Iran
also passed on the information to the International Atomic Energy
Agency after agreeing to open its nuclear facilities for inspection.
The sensational disclosure led to increased pressure on Pakistan
from Washington and international nuclear inspectors to question
Dr A.Q Khan and some of his close aides at Khan Research Laboratories
(KRL), backed by evidence that Pakistan was the source of crucial
technology transfer to enrich uranium for Iran, North Korea and
possibly other nations. New questions about Pakistan's role have
also been raised by Libya's decision to reveal and dismantle its
nuclear weapons programme. Until then Islamabad had firmly denied
that KRL was the source of nuclear proliferation, maintaining that
its stringent command and control system guarantee any leakage of
nuclear secrets. However, the damning evidence out of Iran, left
the Pakistan government with no choice but to come clean. Last month
Pakistani security agencies detained Dr. Mohammed Farooq, a director
at the Khan Research Laboratories, and Yasin Chohan, both key players
in Pakistan's successful nuclear tests in 1998 for questioning.
Dr. Farooq has been a close aide of Dr. A.Q Khan.
Although vigorusly denied by Pakistani officials, some reports
suggest the scientists were also interrogated by the FBI. This is
not the first time that Americans have been involved in the questioning
of Pakistani nuclear scientists. Two other scientists who were detained
last year for their alleged links with Al Qaeda and the former Taliban
regime in Afghanistan were also queried by them. Initially Pakistani
officials maintained the scientists were "undergoing a debriefing
session." "People associated with sensitive programmes
are governed by stringent personnel dependability and debrief programmes,"
said a foreign ministry official. "There are reports about
the many sources from where Iran could have obtained nuclear technology,
including several western companies and individuals. The focus should
be on checking out those sources." However, later the government
admitted that the three scientists, driven by personal greed, might
have sold nuclear secrets.
Investigations have
shown that nuclear secrets were passed on to Iran at the end of
the 1980s, when Dr. Khan was heading the country's nuclear weapons
programme. According to a senior security official the transfer
of sensitive technology and equipment could not have been possible
without the connivance of KRL's top management. Dr. Khan remained
the head of the KRL for more than 26 years before he was sacked
for his alleged links with North Korea's nuclear programme. He is
now advisor to the Prime Minister on science and technology. Investigators
are also collecting details of assets owned by the suspects. "Some
top scientists have accumulated huge wealth and own palatial houses,"
said a senior security official. "We are trying to determine
the source of their wealth."
The blueprints of Iran's nuclear plant, reviewed by the IAEA, depicts
a type of centrifuge that is nearly identical to a machine reportedly
used by Pakistan in the early years of its nuclear programme and
is one of several designs known to have been used for uranium enrichment.
International nuclear inspectors believe the plans and components,
which were acquired over several instalments from the late 1980s
to the mid-1990s, allowed Iran to overcome several major technological
hurdles in making its own enriched uranium, a necessary ingredient
in nuclear weapons.
Acquiring the drawings and a few components was a tremendous boost
to Iran's centrifuge efforts. The scientists apparently used German
go-betweens to sell their secrets to Iran. They were also helped
by two Sri Lankan businessmen based in Dubai when they passed on
details of Pakistani nuclear technology during the late 1980s. Intriguingly,
that was also the period when General Aslam Beg was the Chief of
Army Staff and reportedly advocated the transfer of nuclear technology
to Iran. According to former finance minister Ishaq Dar, General
Beg told Nawaz Sharif that Iran was prepared to pay 20 billion dollars
for nuclear know-how. This raises serious questions about whether
it was possible for Pakistan's top scientists to deal with a foreign
country without the knowledge of the army high command, which controls
the country's nuclear programme.
There are also investigations underway to determine if Pakistani
nuclear technology has spread elsewhere in the Middle East and Asia,
but so far the evidence points largely to the exchange of scientists
with some countries, including Myanmar.
The government said it was determined to purge corrupt scientists
from the country's nuclear programme. "We will not allow any
individual to play with the security of the country," says
a senior official. The question remains whether the government will
broaden its investigation to other elements believed to be responsible
for putting the country's security at stake because of their blinkered
worldview.
It is quite obvious that it was largely international pressure
which forced Pakistan to confront the problem of proliferation.
"President Musharraf wants to reassure the international community
that the nuclear technology pipeline is leaking no more", says
Riffat Hussain, a senior defence analyst. "However, there is
growing demand from the international community for greater transparency
in Pakistan's nuclear programme."
|