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It
came as no surprise to anyone when President Musharraf, on the eve
of the new year, declared that he was not doffing his military uniform.
In his 50-minute harangue on PTV, the General told us how indispensable
he was and how his stepping down from the post of army chief would
be dangerous for the country. It was deja vu all over again. Almost
every military ruler has offered the same line of reasoning to perpetuate
his political stranglehold.
Almost
one year ago, General Musharraf solemnly promised the nation that
he would quit the military and become a civilian leader by the end
of 2004. The pledge was never meant to be fulfilled. What it accomplished,
however, was help Musharraf get the LFO ratified by parliament and
won him crucial time to consolidate his control. Now it is quite
apparent that Musharraf does not intend to step aside even after
2007. Nothing could be more farcical than his claim of restoring
full democracy and bringing political stability to the country.
His decision to retain the military post has exacerbated political
uncertainty and weakened the democratic process. What is more alarming
is the increasing militarisation which threatens the security of
the country.
Musharraf
is completely the dependent on the support of the army and America
for his survival in power. By breaking his public pledge to quit
as army chief, Musharraf has lost whatever credibility he had, while
the move carries serious political repercussions. Holding on to
the dual office will drag the army deeper into the political mire,
and deepen the existing political polarisation. Most observers agree
that General Musharraf's decision to stay in uniform is not likely
to go down well with his military officers who have fully stood
behind him so far. The move is bound to fuel resentment, particularly
among those who would like the country to return to full civilian
rule. The spectacle of their chief in full army uniform addressing
political rallies may certainly raise many eyebrows. "Musharraf
is riding a tiger," says a retired army officer.
Meanwhile,
staunch support from the Bush administration has further boosted
Musharraf's morale. He was also the second leader, after British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has been received at the White House
after President Bush's reelection. There is a clear indication that
Washington wants Musharraf to stay in uniform as long as its war
on terror continues. Democracy is certainly not an issue for the
Bush administration, because a Pakistani leader in military uniform
can certainly deliver far more than a democratically elected one.
It is very obvious that an army general ruling Pakistan does not
trouble the west as long as he happens to be an effective ally in
the war against terror. But this support is not unconditional. Washington
will continue to twist Musharraf's arm on the nuclear proliferation
scandal, which has not died with the action against Dr. Qadeer Khan.
A strong section of the American administration is still not satisfied
with the information provided by the government on the issue. The
screw will start tightening once again when American feels that
Musharraf's utility is over.
Washington's
backing may have given Musharraf a huge boost, but that cannot change
realities at home. Despite the backing of the army and America,
he is floundering. He has spawned a system which is a hybrid of
military and civilian rule. It is certainly not a democracy. So
far the military's backing has provided the system a semblance of
stability, but it is crumbling under its own contradiction. The
civilian dispensation engineered by the military has failed to take
off. The parliament and the cabinet are almost dysfunctional. In
a space of just three months Musharraf has sacked one Prime Minister,
pushed aside a second and appointed a third even before he was elected
from a borrowed National assembly seat. The Prime Minister is just
a showpiece while the military blatantly continues to call the shots.
Musharraf's highly personalised style of governance has blocked
any hopes of a democratic process taking root. He does not seem
to have any trust in the system he himself has created. The parliament
and the cabinet have become irrelevant as decisions on all important
domestic and foreign policy issues are made by the small coterie
that surrounds him. The President in his speech claimed that he
had voluntarily handed over executive powers to the Prime Minister,
but the situation on the ground is totally different. Everyone knows
where the actual center of power resides. It is hard to imagine
a functioning democracy in a situation where the fate of parliament
is determined not by the members themselves, but by a man in military
uniform. There is no succession principle in his system, which will
inevitably lead to a take-over by another general in the event that
something happens to Musharraf.
Musharraf
moved for a rapprochement with the Pakistan People's Party as opposition
to his retaining the military post intensified. The release of Asif
Ali Zardari after he had spent eight years in prison has come after
the negotiations between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf's emissary
reached a crucial stage. The talks that involve an important senior
army officer started a few months ago, but was kept secret even
from senior Muslim League leaders. Shujaat Hussain was taken into
confidence much later. There is still a long way to go before any
deal will be sealed which could help Musharraf sail smoothly, at
least till 2007. The main sticking point at the moment is Bhutto's
demand for the withdrawal of the Pakistan government as a party
in the money laundering case now in process in a Swiss court. The
talks have, however, divided the opposition and diverted the focus
from Musharraf's uniform issue.
Attempts at a rapprochement have come as Musharraf looks to contain
the MMA in the next elections and completely reversed the policy
adopted by the military during the 2002 elections when the MMA was
propped up to contain the PPP and PML(N). The move has also been
encouraged by America, which is not comfortable with the MMA's political
influence in two key provinces - the Frontier and Balochistan. The
deal may possibly lead to the inclusion of the PPP in the federal
and Sindh governments. Another reason behind the negotiations with
the PPP is the establishment's growing wariness with the MQM's activities.
Altaf Hussain's statements during his recent visit to India have
soured its new-found relations with the military establishment.
Musharraf also needs the support of the PPP as he finalises plans
for the construction of the Kalabagh Dam.
The
military's domination in politics has been divisive and has generated
discontent in the smaller provinces. The brewing rebellion in Balochistan
presents a serious threat to the security and stability of the country.
Musharraf has given the green signal for the construction of the
controversial Kalabagh Dam without reaching a consensus among the
provinces. The establishment is fragmented over major issues particularly
on the peace process with India. While Musharraf has taken some
positive steps in easing tensions with India, some of his statements
are highly contradictory. In November he came out with a new proposal
for a solution of the Kashmir issue, but soon started backtracking
after a cool response from India. Most political analysts agree
that it was a serious mistake to make the proposal public when talks
with India had just begun. Interestingly, neither the cabinet nor
the foreign office was taken into confidence before the President
articulated the proposal at an Iftar party. Some senior foreign
ministry officials maintain the public statement made no sense,
when both countries were engaged in back-channel talks. The move
only complicated the issue.
Though Musharraf presented himself as a reformer, promising
to liberalise society, strengthen state institutions and curb religious
extremism, his policies have been full of paradoxes. Following in
the footsteps of past military rulers, Musharraf found his allies
among the most retrogressive social and political forces who are
certainly not in sync with his professed objectives. The military
establishment cobbled together an alliance of the same feudal and
corrupt politicians who have always been ready to be co-opted by
the generals. The majority of the PML(Q) members are turncoats who
joined the army bandwagon after the coup. Political expediency is
still the order of the day, so it is not surprising that the cabinet
has several members who are facing corruption charges. So much so
for the democratic culture that Musharraf claims to have spawned.
His
promise to eradicate religious extremism, too, remains unfulfilled.
The military's reluctance to make a clean break with its traditional
allies among radical Islamic groups, coupled with the suppression
of liberal political parties, has left the country hostage to extremist
elements. Half- hearted measures, largely taken under international
pressure, totally lack conviction. Musharraf's so called vision
of "enlightened moderation" may have brought a marked
improvement in the country's cultural atmosphere and won him applause
from the west, but that is where it ends. On most key issues, he
has backtracked under pressure from his own right wing PML (Q) allies
and the mullahs. The much touted education reforms have long been
stalled after top PML ( Q) leaders and the MMA strongly opposed
changes in the curriculum. The bill against honour-killing has been
so diluted that it has lost any meaningful effectiveness.
Musharraf's half baked measures have failed to eleminate
extremism from society. The resurgence of Islamic extremist groups
is evident in the rising graph of sectarian-based violence. An important
part of Musharraf's plan to combat extremism was to regulate and
reform those madrassas whose role in promoting jihad has come under
increasing international scrutiny. Because of his government's failure
to deliver, to any substantial degree, on pledges to contain the
growth of jihadi networks, religious extremism in Pakistan continues
to pose a threat to domestic, regional and international security.
Many Pakistani madrassas are still providing recruits to the Taliban
in Afghanistan. Musharraf's failure owes less to the difficulty
of implementing reforms, than to the military-led government's own
unwillingness to go all the way. While showing commitment in apprehending
Al Qaeda fugitives, the military-led government has refrained from
taking a tougher position against homegrown extremists and the politics
of expediency has allowed the religious right and Islamic extremists
to expand their base.
The horizontal and vertical fragmentation of society along
political, religious and ethnic lines, which has intensified over
the last few years, poses the most serious problem for both Musharraf's
and Pakistan's survival.
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