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More
than a decade ago when the Cold War was coming to an end, the one
question which perturbed some people, especially those who had stakes
in keeping the conflict going, was: What would they do with their
lives? This is a question that a number of people in Pakistan and
India, too, will ask themselves once peace is restored between the
two countries. And this is most certainly a question that the army
and its intelligence agencies will ask themselves, particularly
those sections in Pakistan that had thrived on the mission of jihad.
The Pakistan Army's involvement with the Afghan mujahideen in fighting
the Soviet troops in Afghanistan is what laid the ground for jihad,
which was then fought on other fronts as well. However, this is
not a conclusion reached by the Indian author, Praveen Swami in
his book titled, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad.
The
recently published book tells the story of the jihad waged by Pakistan
against India, dating back to 1947. Of course, the author does not
view it as a freedom struggle but as an act of terrorism perpetrated
by one state against the other. In fact, Praveen Swami chooses not
to use the word 'militancy,' since this term also includes a non-violent
struggle, which is different from the terror triggered by a combination
of state and non-state actors. Although written from an Indian perspective,
the book provides an interesting insight into the Pakistan Army's
strategy of covert warfare. The book seems to suggest that what
started after 1989 was actually a full-blown strategy put in place
in 1947.
Praveen
Swami's book uncovers an important facet of the Pakistan military's
operational strategy, according to which it systematically planned
to use covert warfare tactics to fight an otherwise conventionally
strong India. Since the conventional military technological gap
between the two adversaries did not allow Pakistan's Army to take
Kashmir forcibly, it opted to use the low-cost and high-efficiency
method of deploying both military personnel and non-state actors
to fight the conflict. This, in Swami's view, was also considered
a relatively safer option because New Delhi could not launch an
attack on Pakistan every time it discovered a secret cell inside
Kashmir engaged in terrorist activities.
According
to this book, the attack by the Mohmand, Afridi, Wazir and Mehsood
tribes in 1947 was a planned action choreographed by General Akbar
Khan. Even Jinnah, Swami states, agreed with the general principle
of the plan; in the Pakistani leader's view, the accession of Kashmir
to Pakistan could not be stopped. In fact, the earlier leadership
was not averse to the idea of capturing Hyderabad and Junagarh since
they believed that Kashmir would, in any case, fall into Pakistan's
lap. It was primarily the Radcliffe Award that upset the plan, which
Akbar Khan then decided to correct through planning the covert operation.
The main problem with the plan was its dependence on tribal warriors,
because, at the time, the Pakistan Army was in the process of reorganising
after 1947. The warriors lacked discipline and instead of heading
straight towards Srinagar, they engaged in loot, rape and plunder
in Baramulla. This allowed the Indian forces to gain time and push
the tribal warriors back.
In
Swami's view, this military fiasco did not, however, stop the army
from continuing with its covert operations inside the now Indian-administered
Kashmir. The author finds evidence of covert activities in 1955
and in October 1957 when an attack on a temple was carried out to
incite Hindu-Muslim riots. The internal discontent was critical
for planning any covert activities.
Interestingly,
New Delhi's politics have never helped improve relations between
the different ethnic communities residing inside Kashmir. This socio-political
weakness was exploited by Pakistan's intelligence in planning Operation
Gibraltar in 1965, says Swami, for which a master cell was set up
in Kashmir in early 1965. The military operation was planned and
executed by Maj. General Akhtar Malik, who was the general officer
commanding of the Pakistan Army's XIIth Division. The general trained
30,000 troops to be dropped behind enemy lines in Jammu and Kashmir.
The problem, however, was that Operation Grand Slam, which was initiated
on September 1, 1965, was launched at the wrong place and at the
wrong time, and provoked massive retaliation by India. In fact,
the plan completely backfired, with India's XIth Corps capturing
362 sq km of Pakistani territory. More importantly, as pointed out
by the author, a Muslim betrayed the plan to India.
The defeat in fulfilling its military objectives, however, did not
deter the Pakistan Army from continuing with its covert activities,
and a secret group called Al-Fatah was established in Jammu and
Kashmir in 1969. More interestingly, the strategy of covert warfare
was supported even by political leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
who publicly lauded the gang responsible for hijacking an Indian
airliner on January 30, 1971, contends Swami. Popularly known as
the Ganga hijacking, the incident was read as Islamabad's explicit
support to the hijackers.
The Pakistan
Army's strategy got a fillip due to the conditions created as a
result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Co-opted by
the US to operationalise a covert warfare in Afghanistan, the Pakistan
Army managed to train about 80,000 insurgents and also developed
a capacity to export insurgents to other places, including Kashmir
and the Indian Punjab. East Punjab was viewed as a theatre of sub-conventional
war where maximum damage could be done. The strategy worked out
fine until India, under the Rajiv Gandhi government, decided to
respond by setting up two offensive desks in the intelligence agency,
the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The two desks, CIT - X and
CIT - J, were responsible for carrying out terrorist operations
inside Pakistan, which then forced the head of ISI, Lt. General
Hameed Gul, to meet his counterpart in RAW and agree on the rules
of engagement as far as the Punjab was concerned. It was agreed
that Pakistan would not carry out activities in the Punjab as long
as RAW refrained from creating mayhem and violence inside Pakistan.
However, both these desks in RAW were dismantled by I.K. Gujral's
government. The Indian government probably realised that encouraging
covert warfare would not only destabilise bilateral relations but
was also dangerous for the peace and stability of the entire region.
Unfortunately, this fact was not understood by the Pakistan Army.
It continued to engage in covert warfare until it reached a dead
end during the Kargil crisis and the 2002 India-Pakistan stand-off,
says Praveen Swami. What the Pakistani strategists failed to understand
was that the stability-instability paradox in a nuclear environment
restrained a covert war against India. Given the nuclear deterrence
on both sides, Pakistan could no longer afford to escalate tension
by fanning insurgency. Although the author does not state this in
his conclusion, the fact is that it is this realisation which seems
to have influenced General Musharraf's decision to put obvious curbs
on insurgency and negotiate peace with India.
Islamabad
has definitely come to a point where it can no longer raise an existing
issue with its adversary by using covert or overt military means,
which means that the army is inclined to sort out the Kashmir issue.
However, the question is: What would the army do with its covert
warfare capability? More importantly, how will it deal with the
jihadis who have been trained for years to fight a war in other
territories? Reading this book, one wonders if it will ever be possible
to produce such a detailed account of the years-long covert warfare
in Pakistan. Perhaps someone close to the establishment might get
access to confidential details in the same manner that Praveen Swami
did when writing his book.
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