One
by one, the chickens are coming home to roost. The strident
manner in which private armies of militants have targeted
the police, the rangers and, increasingly the army,
throughout June and July, and met with spectacular successes
in terms of death tolls, is indicative of their growing
strength and the abysmal failure of the government to
stop them in their tracks.
While
members of civil society, NGOs and the media continued
to draw the government's attention to the proliferation
of militant outfits and their brazen acts of violence,
Musharraf's government looked the other way, and intelligence
agencies were constantly accused of aiding and abetting
them and playing a double game.
Jamia
Hafsa is simply one instance of the unbridled powers
and influence madrassahs have continued to wield under
the ostensible patronage of intelligence agencies and
those in positions of power, notable among them being
the religious affairs minister, Mr Ejaz-ul-Haq.
Why
Haq even described Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his
brother as being "moderate" men.
Ironic that the men who instigated the burning of video
shops and the environment ministry's premises, allowed
students to intimidate women drivers and apprehend women,
including several Chinese employees from a massage parlour-cum-acupuncture
clinic, on charges of prostitution and ordered the kidnapping
of policemen and seizure of their weapons, should be
viewed as "moderate."
But
then like his father, the late General Zia-ul-Haq, "patron
saint" of the jihadis, Haq was known to be an avowed
supporter of the two brothers until very recently and
had bailed them out of tricky situations on several
occasions. Given the nexus between them, one expected
Haq to play the role of a trouble-shooter, but he failed
miserably in his mission - as did the other friend of
the mullah brigade, PML(Q)'s Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain.
According
to a report of the education ministry, ostensibly Haq
and Shujaat have been the main stumbling blocks in the
implementation of the madrassah reforms aimed at mainstreaming
seminaries by introducing formal subjects in their syllabus.
Incidentally,
the ringleaders of the militants have mostly studied
at seminaries that have continued to spout vitriol and
violence, encouraged civil disobedience and handed out
Kalashnikovs to 10- and 12-year-olds.
The
manner in which the students holed up in Lal Masjid
stood up to the combined might of the police, the rangers
and the commandos is ample proof of their training and
the stockpile of weapons at their disposal. Who allowed
them to amass so much firepower in the country's capital?
If
the estimated 1.5 million students registered in the
13,000 seminaries throughout the country are similarly
armed and trained, they could hold the entire country
hostage in pursuit of their goal.
Does
the government have any strategy to deal with this worse-case
scenario?