| It
would come as a surprise to most Pakistanis that the country
has an indigenous Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] industry. In
fact, there are three private entities – East West Infiniti
[EWI], Integrated Dynamics [ID] and Surveillance and Target
Unmanned Aircraft [Satuma] – involved in the manufacturing
of UAVs in Pakistan. In addition, three government enterprises,
the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex [PAC], the Air Weapons Complex
[AWC], and the National Development Complex [NDC] also produce
UAVs.
The
Pakistan government has repeatedly requested the US to send
them drone technology, a request which, according to defense
analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, has been persistently denied because
“we always leak technology.” But what if Pakistan
develops its own drones with a missile delivery system matching
the American Predator?
At
this point, the question of ‘what if’ doesn’t
exist because Pakistan already possesses the capability to develop
its own unmanned vehicles. But there is a big difference between
producing unarmed UAVs, which Pakistan currently does, and the
armed Predator drones which the US has been using in FATA.
Can
Pakistan come up with a UAV carrying weapons?
Dr
Hammad Bin Khaleeq, Satuma’s director in charge of mechanical
design and manufacturing, Dr Haroon Javed Qureshi of EWI, and
Raja Sabri Khan, CEO of Integrated Dynamics, all concur.
“It
is possible,” Khaleeq tells Newsline. “It is not
something beyond our capability. We only need to have support
– financial support as well as time. These things don’t
develop overnight.” He maintains that there have been
huge amounts of investment from the government for the purpose
of developing drones but state entities have failed to deliver
the desired product. “Acquiring and integrating a weapon
in drones is advanced and difficult. But it’s not out
of our reach. If the government wants, the efforts can be put
in.”
Qureshi
confidently explains that if the drone project is headed solely
by private enterprises, “I can assure you that my company,
or, for that matter, Raja Sabri Khan’s Integrated Dynamics,
or Satuma, can perhaps do it in three years. One has to keep
in mind that all three companies have been in this particular
business for 15 years and are well aware of the ground realities.”
However,
Khan is sceptical about the three-year estimate. “I worked
for Suparco from 1987 to 1997, before I started my own company.
Right now, the only constraint in Pakistan developing a predator
type drone is money,” Khan says. He also maintains that
state enterprises lack will and passion, and agrees with Qureshi’s
stance on the government backing commercial firms to develop
such technology. Khan reveals that a minimum investment of $50
million would be required to initiate a drone project along
the lines of the Predator, but it could take as long as eight
years.
According to the
three private enterprises the drone technology in Pakistan is
nowhere near the American Predator. The Predator carries a Hellfire
missile that Pakistan does not have. Instead, Pakistan has the
Baktarshikan and the Tow anti-tank missile, which can strike
as far as 3,000 yards. The maximum payload weight of the Tow
missile is 100lb. The main difference between the Predator and
Pakistani-manufactured drones is the wing load capability and
the engine size. The Predator can carry far more payload weight
[450lb] and can fly more than 20 hours, covering a distance
of 3,700km. The missile capability depends on how much load
the wing can carry. The current technology in Pakistan limits
the companies in terms of how much load per square foot they
can put on the wing.
“There
is a thought process along these lines in Pakistan, but, as
far as real work is concerned, nothing is being done. Several
of the UAV programmes that are now being carried out will have
the capability of carrying at least 150lb.” Khan goes
on to emphasise that his company is not providing Americans
with the drones being used in FATA, a common misconception.
The
Predator (MQ-1) and Reaper (MQ-9) cost approximately $4.5 and
$10.5 million, respectively. Qureshi claims: “We can develop
a drone in half a million or a million dollars, not more. And
it would be cheaper for us to operate the drone any day.”
The
operating cost for a drone is broken down into three elements:
the actual weapon, the human costs and the engineering resources
– which keep the aircraft flying and operational, both
in the field and in the workshops – including their refurbishment
and upgrading, and the people who are actually flying in the
field. Pakistan’s human resources costs are at least 10
times cheaper than those in the US.
Qureshi
expresses his discontent with the military establishment and
its enterprises heading the drone programme, saying that there
is no drive and vision in these organisations. According to
him, all state programmes involving drone manufacturing are
headed by brigadiers. “They are all marking their time.
Their motive is to do something that will result in their promotions.
Soldiers just want another badge on their shoulders.”
A regular speaker at military platforms, he doesn’t mince
his words. “You [military personnel] want development
in military technology, so remember that there is no on-and-off
button in this process,” he tells them to their faces.
“This project should have continuity in research and development.
The best you can do is to leave us alone. Let us develop it
ourselves. Let us operate like a commercial entity.”
The
Predator, the Reaper and all related programmes in the world
were privately driven innovations, claims Qureshi. “None
of them are state-established. They [the companies] come up
with a vision and present it to the state which says, ‘Very
well, how much would it cost to develop this product?’
Whatever amount it is, the state gets that amount sanctioned
and they tell the company to put up matching funds. Suppose
the total developing cost is $50 million, we [the company] put
up 15% and they [the government] give us 85%. These are the
yardsticks one should consider. This project would be evaluated
after two to three years. If you’re not meeting the yardsticks,
the state pulls the plug on you [the business].”
One
could sense the anger in him. He mentions a recent decision
by the Pakistani military establishment that he considers a
blunder. In 2006, the army bought 28 UAVs from EMT, a German
manufacturer, at a cost of $24 million, and the Pak Air Force
bought 24 Italian Galalio Falco’s – medium-altitude
endurance tactical UAVs. Qureshi says that the same kind of
UAVs could have been delivered for $4 million from within Pakistan.
The
civilian government might still be unaware of Pakistan’s
home-grown drone manufacturing capability and industry. Both
Qureshi and Khaleeq claim that they have not been approached
by the civilian leadership to develop drones with missile-carrying
capability.
“I don’t know if they are aware of our existence,
and we don’t care if they do or if they don’t. We
are a private company and we haven’t approached the political
leadership. We don’t interact with politicians,”
Khaleeq says.
When asked if President Zardari is aware of this, Qureshi argues
that he doesn’t know if the president knows or not. “Zardari
himself is standing on one foot. But if the leadership commits
to this project, we can have a drone carrying weapons, made
and operated in Pakistan.” Khan tells me that due to a
lack of financial capital, his company is not moving in the
direction of developing anything of the sort. “We need
the backing of the government,” he urges.
Currently, Pakistani-manufactured drones are closer to the American
Shadow drone programme. Shadow 200 is being used by the US Marines
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shadow has small experimental delivery
systems and relatively less endurance and range. Pakistani manufacturers
have not copied UAV designs; they have been successful in developing
their own UAV models. In addition, there is no doubt that Pakistan
can develop its own UAVs because commercial companies have a
proven track record.
Drones were first produced in 1983 by the Malir Air Defence
School in Karachi. Since then, others have gotten into the act.
EWI, established in 1983, was approached by Suparco in 1993
to develop a UAV. Qureshi, EWI’s founder and managing
director, informs Newsline that the Pakistani establishment
had approached him with a half-hearted effort to develop such
a technology.
“The chairman of Suparco told us in 1993 to develop a
UAV in three months. We declined, as it was out of the question
to develop something of the sort in such a short amount of time.
Then they came back in 1995 and gave us a one-year period,”
Qureshi recalls. “A while later, they ran out of money.”
Coming from a military family, Qureshi has a fair idea of the
ins and outs of the military. His father was a brigadier in
the Pakistan Army. Qureshi, on the other hand, was in pursuit
of bridging the gap between the East and the West in terms of
technological advancement and exchange of information between
people from both regions of the world. This obsession was what
initially pushed him to found East West Bridge, now known as
East West Infiniti.
According to Qureshi, the US military itself is not yet trained
to operate UAVs. The person who operates the Predator [being
used in Afghanistan and bordering Pakistan] is the contractor
who supplies it. The functions of taking off, landing and flying
the drone are carried out by the engineering element. Only the
weaponry is handled by people in uniform. Essentially, the company
that manufactures the drones has the joystick, and the person
in uniform presses a button to release the missile to strike
the target.
EWI initiated its serious UAV business model in 1995. Qureshi
outlines their objective, to develop an unmanned aircraft covering
a distance of 100km at 150 km/h, with an endurance time of four
to five hours. For a UAV to be successful, he explains, one
needs to fly it as slowly as possible, to get good imagery from
the sky.
“We collaborated with the newly-founded company Satuma
in 1995, and formed Satuma Infiniti Technology,” says
Qureshi. “We developed two UAV models and we had a fairly
decent device. Also, every senior military officer was aware
of our products.”
The ferry range of EWI’s UAV was around 400km. “We
gave our last demo in 1999 in Islamabad, two months before the
military coup took place,” he says.
In 2001, EWI changed course and abandoned developing drones
because it was too costly. According to Qureshi, it was costing
his company around Rs 1.5 million a month. Key costs were the
senior employees – PhDs and autopilot experts. Currently,
EWI develops micro-drones and unmanned airships. Hardly two
feet in size and electric-powered, the micro drone is like a
bird-size spy plane. The unmanned airships fly at a ceiling
of 3,000 feet with an autopilot mechanism, and can carry a payload
of 50kg. The sole buyer of this spy plane is Pakistan’s
military.
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