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While
President Musharraf continues to deny that he has any intention
of packing up Parliament or dismissing the Jamali government, Islamabad
is rife with rumours of an imminent political shake-up. The buzz
is not without basis. The President's men are already exploring
a way out of the present stand-off that has paralysed the new political
set-up. The endemic inertia that has gripped the Jamali government,
coupled with the confrontation with the MMA administration in the
Frontier, has provided added fuel for action.
The President's camp is believed to be working on three options:
one, bringing in a new prime minister through an in-house change;
two, the imposition of a French style presidential form of government
in which the prime minister has nominal powers and the removal of
the MMA government in the Frontier. The dissolution of the National
Assembly, is viewed as a last option. "One thing is sure, the
existing state of affairs cannot last for long," says a senior
official. Although any concrete decision is yet to be taken, most
observers believe that a change in the political set-up is just
a matter of time.
Portents of a future arrangement are already visible with President
Musharraf reasserting total control and sidelining Prime Minister
Jamali to activities now restricted to offering condolences and
inaugurating small development projects in his home province, Balochistan.
In the absence of any leadership, there is total disarray in the
cabinet and most ministers look towards the President for direction.
Prime Minister Jamali remains a nominal chief executive as meetings
on important national issues are jointly chaired by the President.
Foreign affairs are the exclusive domain of President Musharraf,
while the cabinet and Parliament are completely excluded from decision-making
on important national security and foreign policy issues. So it
was no surprise when during his visit to Washington, Musharraf announced,
"Pakistan agrees in principle on sending troops to Iraq."
The issue has neither been presented before Parliament for debate
nor discussed in the cabinet that represents a coalition of more
than half a dozen political groups. Significantly, no elected member
of cabinet was included in the presidential team on their visit
to Washington and Europe.
For their part, the President's men complain that Jamali is not
competent to run even routine day-to-day government affairs, let
alone deal with complex political issues. There are widespread talks
about complete paralysis in the prime minister's secretariat, as
decisions even on postings and transfers remain pending for months.
Relations have soured further with Prime Minister Jamali's reluctance
to remove his highly controversial special assistant, Brig (retd)
Mansoor Hamid, and his political secretary, Yahya Munawar. They
continue at their posts, despite a decision to ease them out. Squabbling
within the PML(Q) ranks and the rift among the coalition partners
seems to have further weakened Jamali, who was never President Musharraf's
first choice to begin with. Jamali's fall-out with Chaudhry Shujaat
Hussain, who was responsible for his election as Prime Minister,
has further alienated him from the party. Cabinet ministers are
publicly venting their frustration, accusing Jamali of a total lack
of leadership.
An in-house change with a new prime minister, preferably one close
to the President, is being considered as the most desirable way
to deal with the present paralysis. Shaukat Aziz, the high profile
finance minister who was the only cabinet member to accompany the
President on his Washington visit, is seen as the front-runner for
the job. However, there are some roadblocks in the way. Aziz will
not be welcomed by a large number of PML(Q) and other coalition
members who would prefer to see a politician from within their ranks
in the top job. He will also have to win a National Assembly seat.
Commerce minister, Humayun Akhtar, who was Musharraf's first choice
for the job, and Jahangir Tareen, a prominent industrialist and
a PML(Q) National Assembly member from Rahim Yar Khan, are also
being considered as possible replacements for Jamali.
Although a change of face may help in improving the government's
image, it will not resolve Musharraf's main problem of taming the
strong opposition in the National Assembly, which has challenged
his legitimacy. The combined opposition of the PPP, MMA and the
PML(N) has blocked his address to the joint session of Parliament
and crippled regular parliamentary proceedings. The President's
refusal to compromise on the LFO issue has dashed all hopes of reconciliation.
All efforts by the ISI have failed to bring its old Islamic allies
back to the fold. The MMA's move to impose Islamic Shariah and Hisbah
laws in the Frontier has further aggravated the situation, while
Musharraf's tough warning to the MMA that Talibanisation will not
be tolerated, has brought the confrontation to a head.
The MMA government moved to enforce a harsh Taliban-like Islamic
rule in the NWFP after it introduced new laws that will bring the
province's education, judicial and financial system in line with
Shariah. The package of Islamic laws passed by the provincial assembly
promises a rule based on Quranic laws and a ban on what it describes
as "obscenity and vulgarity." The government also plans
to set up a "Vice and Virtue Department" to punish those
found violating the new rules and establish Islamic courts dispensing
summary justice.
The implications of the new Islamic laws could have even more serious
ramifications and has brought the Frontier administration in direct
confrontation with the federal government. The move to create a
Vice and Virtue Department and a system of so-called Islamic justice
will come into conflict with the country's laws and the Constitution.
The department is modeled on the religious police under the former
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Under the new law a station official
in each district of the province, will be responsible for promoting
religious observance. Many observers believe the new Islamic system
conflicts with the Constitution and challenges the powers of the
central government. Islamabad issued a strong warning to the provincial
administration, that it would not tolerate lawlessness and said
the situation in the region demanded the federal government's intervention.
A top level meeting chaired by President Musharraf decided to adopt
a tougher stance against the hardline Islamic administration to
limit the effects of radical Shariah laws and the move to establish
religious police. As a warning the federal government sacked the
provincial chief secretary and the police chief. Islamabad is also
concerned about the Islamic government's support for those Taliban
remnants that are regrouping in the border region to fight against
American and Afghan government forces. There has been a marked surge
in attacks blamed on the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan,
since the MMA came to power in the Frontier.
Another reason behind the tough stance taken by Musharraf is the
worsening dispute between the NWFP administration and the local
governments. Last month all 24 district mayors in the province tendered
their resignations to President Musharraf, complaining that the
MMA government had infringed on powers guaranteed to them under
the devolutionary reforms introduced by the President last year.
All these district government are controlled by anti-Islamic alliance
parties. The resignations were only taken back after President Musharraf
intervened.
Many observers believe the confrontation between the Islamic parties
and the President is bound to worsen after his Washington visit.
Hailed by President Bush as America's crucial ally in the war against
terrorism and extremism, Musharraf's statement that Pakistan has
agreed in principle on sending troops to Iraq and his suggestion
that Islamabad should consider recognising Israel have intensified
the clash. Musharraf's promise to the United States to stop all
infiltration of Islamic militants across the Line of Control has
also brought him under attack from Islamic groups who accuse him
of selling out to Washington. Musharraf's turnaround on the policy
of supporting the Taliban and his support for the United States
had already strained the longstanding relations between the military
and the mullahs, and the new developments, both in the foreign and
internal arena, are bound to take them into an all-out war.
For more than three decades, the mullahs and military were part
of an unholy alliance. The military-mullah alliance expanded and
gained strength during General Zia's military rule, when there was
a complete convergence of interests between the religious right
and the military. The military and Islamists had a common enemy
- the mainstream liberal parties. General Zia's brand of Islamisation
was fully backed by radical Islamic groups who also recognised the
military as the source of central authority and guardian of state
power.
The mullah's usefulness for the military goes beyond domestic policies.
Islamic parties were also the military's partners in the Afghan
Jihad and later, supported the conservative Taliban regime. The
regional and international climate of the 1980s favoured this alliance.
Despite his liberal image, General Musharraf initially continued
to support the Taliban which helped to maintain the alliance. The
changed world post-September 11, forced General Musharraf to pursue
a two-track policy to gain international and domestic legitimacy.
In the interest of self-preservation and to safeguard the military's
institutional position, he abandoned the Taliban. With Pakistan
once again a frontline ally, his administration actively assisted
the US against Al-Qaeda and Islamic militants. The subsequent development
strained, but did not sever the military's links with the Islamists.
It was tacit support from the military regime, which helped the
MMA to achieve its spectacular success in the elections, albeit
confined to only the Frontier and Balochistan provinces.
Subsequent political and international developments, however, appear
to have resulted in the complete breakdown of the military-mullah
alliance with the two erstwhile allies now firmly on the warpath.
There are clear signs that the confrontation may lead to the removal
of the Frontier government and efforts are already underway to manipulate
its ouster.
President Musharraf, meanwhile, is already playing on the back foot
as he takes on the MMA. He has no political ally in his fight for
legitimacy. His refusal to accept the sovereignty of Parliament,
coupled with the politics of expediency has alienated him from the
liberal section of society. His present political support comes
from corrupt and opportunistic politicians. But can he depend on
them? Though the military may be fully behind him on his international
policies, the situation may change radically if Musharraf fails
to skilfully steer his way through the present political crisis.
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