Tension gripped Karachi and life in the city came to a
grinding halt on Friday, May 18,when stick-wielding, turban-clad
students from various seminaries took to the streets to demonstrate
their muscle power. The
protest came in the wake of the assassination of Maulana Saleem
Qadri, chief of the rapidly
growing fundamentalist organisation, the Sunni Tehreek.
Qadri, a high-profile Muslim cleric of the Barelvi school,
was ambushed, apparently by a team of six well-trained assassins
riding three motorbikes while he was on his way to Noorani Masjid
in Rasheedabad no 7 for the Friday congregation. According to eyewitnesses, when the Maulana’s
double cabin van slowed down due to a speed-breaker, the assailants
sprayed it with bullets from three sides – right, left and front.
Says an eyewitness, “They fired for at least seven to 10 minutes,
after which they fled. No
one had time to retaliate.”
Qadri and five others were killed on the spot, and three
others, including his six-year-old son Bilal Raza, and eight-year-old
nephew, Ahmed Raza, were wounded.
The dead include Anis Qadri, 23, Mohammed Altaf Junejo,
40 (Qadri’s nephew and brother-in-law), Ibrahim Qadri, 30, van
driver Abid Baloch, 30, and police constable, Hafeez Qadri. Mysteriously, the corpse of one of the alleged
killers, who was later identified as Arshad alias Polka, an activist
of the Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), was also found in the vicinity
of the Qadri killing soon afterwards, although the cause of his
death remains unexplained.
Maulana Saleem Qadri’s family migrated to Pakistan from
Gujrat in India in 1947. He was born in 1960 in Pan Mandi near Nanakwara
in Karachi. He started his political career as an activist of
the All-Pakistan Mohajir Students Federation (APMSO), the student
wing of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).
Later, he disassociated from the APMSO and gravitated towards
Sunni sectarian groups. Initially
he became a disciple of Maulana Ilyas Qadri (Dawat-e-Islami).
Soon, however, he distanced himself from Ilyas Qadri’s
missionary outfit, and in 1992 launched his own organisation known
as the Sunni Tehreek. He was placed under house arrest thrice, and
served time in jail on four occasions on assorted charges, including
murder. At the time of
his death, several cases registered against Qadri at different
police stations were still pending.
Qadri leaves behind him two wives, seven daughters, two
sons, a 65-year-old mother and two brothers.
Thousands of others, however, also mourn him.
His funeral was attended by over 30,000 people – one of
the largest turnouts at a funeral ever witnessed in the country
in recent times.
As the news of the Maulana’s death spread, hundreds of
religious students whose spiritual guru he was, took to the streets.
Sources said that some of these youths were so emotionally
charged, that when a doctor on duty at the Civil Hospital where
Qadri’s corpse was brought asked, “Has Saleem Qadri been killed?”
the young men started to thrash him for daring to use the world
‘killed.’ “He is martyred,”
they chanted. Terrorised,
the doctors at the hospital’s mortuary fled.
Wielding sticks, the students, some of whom wore masks,
also erected barricades, lit bonfires and pelted vehicular traffic
with stones, with the law enforcement agencies acting as silent
spectators. Even the staff of the fire brigade refused to work out of fear.
In an attempt to stem the violence, the local administration
finally deployed police guards at hundreds of mosques all over
Karachi, and to preempt attacks on other religious leaders, communicated
a message to all of them to avoid attending public meetings without
security guards.
Although the sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shias
has left at least 457 people dead in 127 known cases of religious
terrorism across the country since the military takeover in October
1999 – 53 of them in March alone – Qadri’s assassination is the
first high-profile case of intra-Sunni terrorism.
There are several theories about Qadri’s murder and, surprisingly,
not once has any Shia organisation been named in these.
One case scenario is that Qadri was killed by one of his
own. A few years ago, there was a split within the Sunni Tehreek
when Saleem Qadri’s deputy, Saleem Raza Qadri deserted him and
formed his own faction of the Tehreek.
According to sources, these increasingly hostile factions
have clashed with each other on many occasions, and the conflict
between the two finally led to the murder of Saleem Raza Qadri,
the leader of the breakaway faction, last year. Says a source, “After Raza Qadri’s murder Maulana
Saleem Qadri tightened his security manifold. He bought four luxury cruisers to seat extra guards. Ironically, it was in one of these that he
was murdered.”
This background apart, there is a substantial evidence
to support another view – that Qadri was the victim of the ongoing
Barelvi-Deobandi conflict.
Virtually the entire jihadi cadre of religious elements
in the country belongs to the Deobandi school of thought, while
the Barelvis, including the Sunni Tehreek, have traditionally
abstained from jihad and anti-Shia militant activities. The Barelvis do, however, engage in ‘politics
of the mosque.’ The Sunni
Tehreek, for example, has had a long-standing conflict with Deobandi
groups over the control of various mosques in the city, and over
the collection of donations.
A case in point is the ongoing tussle in Baldia town, Karachi,
between Maulana Qadri’s followers and Deobandi activists over
the possession of the Jamia Rasheedia mosque, located barely one
kilometre away from where Maulana Qadri was shot.
According to residents of the area, the mosque was under
the control of the Sunni Tehreek, despite the fact that the majority
of the residents of the area belong to the Deobandi school.
Sunni Tehreek activists took possession of the mosque a
few years ago on the ground that it was built by Rasheed, a Barelvi.
In one of the sporadic outbursts of violence in the course
of the battle for the mosque, unknown assailants killed the pesh
imam of the mosque last year. To avoid further bloodshed, the authorities
later appointed an official ‘imam’ at the mosque, and stationed
two police guards at the premises.
This did not, however, resolve the issue.
“Often both groups would offer separate prayers at the
mosque simultaneously, which would lead to renewed tension,” says
a senior police official. He adds that this situation is not unique to
the Jamia Rasheedia, with serious conflicts having broken out
at several mosques between activists of the two Sunni sects.
The Deobandi-Barelvi conflict acquires a new twist when
seen in the light of the ongoing battle between the extremist
Deobandi organisation, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Barelvi
Sunni Tehreek. The discovery
of SSP activist Arshad Polka’s bullet-riddled corpse barely a
hundred yards from the scene of the crime would lend credence
to SSP involvement in the murder.
However, it not quite as crystal clear as the police would
like to have one believe.
Arshad was identified as an SSP activist and a resident
of Patel Para from the identity cards and other documents recovered
from the wallet found on his person.
The autopsy conducted on Arshad’s corpse has established
that he was not shot by a bullet fired from the gun of any of
Qadri’s guards and the police contend that Arshad Polka was accidentally
killed by his SSP colleagues – the assassins – in ‘friendly fire.’
There is however, another theory – that Arshad was intentionally
shot by someone elsewhere and his body was dumped near the scene
of the murder to make it look like an SSP hit.
Says a source, “The second theory is lent credence by the
fact that Arshad was carrying his papers with him when recovered.
Criminals don’t usually carry their identity cards when
they’re out on the job. And when it’s a major operation like this
one, there’s even less likelihood of the perpetrators carrying
identification papers.”
Members of Arshad’s family say he left home on Friday at
about 11.30 a.m. “He told us that he was to meet some friends
and would return home in time for lunch after Friday prayers,”
says one of his relations. They
however, express ignorance about the identity of the friends Arshad
was to meet. Police have rounded up some of Arshad’s family
members and a few dozen SSP activists for interrogation, but despite
police contentions, no concrete evidence has emerged linking him
with the Qadri murder.
“The recovery of Arshad’s body at the scene of the incident
has, in fact, added to the confusion rather than help solve the
case,” says one of the police officials on the Qadri murder investigation
team.
There is, however, a consensus in police ranks about the
fact that the Qadri killing appears to be aimed at creating trouble
in the city — whatever other objectives it may also have served
simultaneously. Says an
official, “The killers seem to have selected the day and time
of the hit carefully. Since
the majority of the students of religious seminaries congregate
in assorted mosques for the Juma (Friday) prayers, the chances
of a riot erupting following the murder were very high – and this
is precisely what the murderers wanted.”
Meanwhile, the leaders of the Sunni Tehreek have given
the government an ultimatum to “arrest Maulana Saleem Qadri’s
killers or face the consequences.”
Sources in the police say this is easier said than done. They maintain that even if the police manages to establish that
Qadri’s death is an outcome of the rivalry between the Sunni Tehreek
and the Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, it will be difficult to go
public with the news because this could have serious internal
repercussions.
More cynical observers contend that the likelihood of the
police solving the case at all remains bleak.
Says an observer, ’“The perpetrators of the Al-Falah and
the Al-Murtaza mosque massacres last year remain at large.
In fact, how many high-profile murders cases have ever
been solved? In several instances, even if the authorities have identified the
killers, they have refused to apprehend them due to the politics
of expediency.” Indeed,
why should this case be any different?