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There is a widespread belief that many Al-Qaeda and Taliban
officials fleeing Afghanistan have found sanctuary in Pakistan's
tribal areas with the help of sympathetic Pashtun tribesmen. However,
it is hard trying to locate their hideouts given the region's wilderness
and the administrative hurdles created by the semi-autonomous status
of the tribal areas. The inability of the US and Pakistani intelligence
agencies to net any Al-Qaeda or Taliban member in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until now demonstrates the enormity
of the task.
Getting into the unadministered parts of the FATA was no easy
task for the Pakistani military. The US military operations against
Al-Qaeda in Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan presented the Pakistan
government with an opportunity to open up hitherto inaccessible
areas such as Tirah valley in the Khyber and Orakzai tribal agencies.
The delicate issue was handled by the NWFP governor, Lt Gen (Retd)
Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and Corps Commander Lt Gen Ali Mohammad
Jan Aurakzai, a tribesman from Orakzai agency, with caution and
some ingenuity. The tribal people, who in the past opposed the construction
of roads and opening of girls' schools, were promised special development
funds and the solution of their problems. They were also told that
the US could start bombing places where the Al-Qaeda and Taliban
officials were hiding as was done in Afghanistan. It was a classic
carrot-and-stick approach and it worked. A large military contingent
was deployed during the Tora Bora operation in Khyber and Kurram
tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan and a number of Al-Qaeda and
Taliban members were captured while crossing over to Pakistan. Many
of them were able to sneak into Pakistan undetected and some managed
to escape from custody in Kurram agency, but the Pakistani soldiers
and militiamen deployed on the border achieved to a large extent
what the US had asked for.
The Pakistanis were clearly unhappy doing the US bidding, but the job
was done and Pakistan could claim that it had done its bit as part
of the international coalition against terrorism. One positive aspect
of the operation was the arrival of Pakistani soldiers and militiamen
to remote tribal areas that had never been infiltrated. Their presence
also brought much-needed development activities to the tribal borderlands,
and a special aid package to be executed by the military was put
into practice. Though many tribesmen were unhappy that their sovereignty
was gradually being eroded, others thought it was a blessing in
disguise as the government had committed huge funds for the development
of their remote and under-developed valleys.
In the next phase, Pakistani troops moved into the north and south
Waziristan tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan's Paktia, Paktika
and Khost provinces. Border security was intensified to stop Al-Qaeda
and Taliban fighters moving to Pakistan after fleeing the US-led
allied forces combing of the three Afghan provinces during their
search-and-destroy mission.
The deployment of the Pakistani soldiers and militiamen began during
Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot mountains near Gardez, about
70 kms from the border, and continued as the allied troops began
sweeping the Afghan mountains and valleys close to the Durand Line.
The figure of Pakistani troops involved in the operation on the
border was quoted as anywhere between 8,000 to 40,000 and 60,000.
However, Islamabad started hinting that it would have to withdraw
these troops from the western border with Afghanistan for deployment
on the eastern borders with India in view of the belligerent statements
emanating from New Delhi. This was the last thing the US wanted
to hear because it knew only Pakistani troops would be able to operate
in the tribal areas without causing much provocation among the fiercely
independent and religious-minded Pashtun tribes. The American need
to salvage its 'war on terrorism' in the region should explain hectic
US efforts to prevent war between India and Pakistan.
While sending in its own forces to the tribal belt was bad enough,
the government found itself in an even greater quandary when the
US demanded that its intelligence and telecommunication operatives
be allowed to join the hunt for Al-Qaeda and Taliban members in
the tribal areas. The earlier US success in tracking down Al-Qaeda
men in Faisalabad in central Punjab through telephone intercepts
and the capture of over 50 suspects, including bin Laden's close
aide Abu Zubaida, bolstered the Americans confidence about handling
the job. In fact, the successful Faisalabad mission strengthened
the hands of the US while pressing Pakistan to allow a bigger number
of American telecommunication and intelligence experts to operate
in the country. Pakistan eventually relented but did not make the
information public. In fact, government spokesmen kept denying the
presence of US operatives in the tribal areas.
Unlike his spokesmen, General Musharraf in keeping with his hallmark
forthrightness, conceded the presence of some American telecommunication
experts in FATA. In any case, by this time the US presence in the
area was no longer a secret because of several sightings of Americans
in the north Waziristan tribal agency bordering Afghanistan. The
general did try to downplay the significance of this development
by claiming that the number of American telecommunication experts
in FATA was in single digits, but reports in the US media and eyewitnesses
in the tribal areas contended the number of Americans on duty was
much higher. The general also failed to mention that among the Americans
operating in the FATA were some intelligence specialists.
The arrival of the American operatives in the tribal areas was a
disturbing development. Although the President and his spokesmen
and ministers had acknowledged from the outset that the US was allowed
the use of Pakistan's airspace and offered logistics support and
intelligence-sharing in its campaign against terrorism in neighbouring
Afghanistan, they had taken pains to clarify that there were no
American troops in Pakistan. In fact, it was stressed that only
Pakistani troops would conduct search operations in the tribal areas.
The belated admission by the general demonstrated how Pakistani
rulers took decisions having far-reaching consequences without taking
the nation into confidence. Strangely, the political administration
in the north and south Waziristan continued to deny the presence
of American operatives in the area even after the candid admission
by the President.
When asked about the Pakistani failure compared to the US success
in tracking down the wanted men in Pakistan, General Musharraf had
commented that larger resources enabled the Americans to pay their
informers handsomely and receive better intelligence. It was a tacit
admission of the inability of Pakistani intelligence agencies, despite
their vast numbers, to do a good job. One reason of their failure
could be the politicisation of the intelligence agencies, their
ever growing use to monitor the activities of political opponents,
and them being put to work for the interest of the rulers instead
of the state.
Americans have been spotted by tribesmen in Miranshah and Razmak
in north Waziristan and Wana in south Waziristan. An abandoned vocational
college in Miranshah, where the Americans were reportedly put up,
came under rocket attacks a few times but all missed their target.
One of the rockets hit an adjacent government-run degree college
and partially damaged its boundary wall. The rocket attack was a
manifestation of the resentment among the tribal population against
the presence of Americans in their area. It also underscored the
kind of problems Pakistan would face in case Washington forced it
to allow its men a free hand to operate in the volatile tribal belt.
The rocket attacks followed the joint raid by Pakistani forces and
US operatives on a madrassa run by former Afghan mujahideen leader
Mulla Jalaluddin Haqqani, who also served as a minister of tribes
and Frontier affairs in the Taliban government, in Darpakhel near
Miranshah. Haqqani, it may be added, is the most wanted man on the
US hit-list after Osama bin Laden and Taliban supreme leader Mulla
Mohammad Omar. His experience of guerilla warfare against the Soviet
occupation troops in Afghanistan during 1979-89 has made him a dangerous
man for the Americans. In fact, the growing number of guerilla attacks
on US and allied forces in Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces in
southern Afghanistan are partly attributed to Haqqani. The US military
has made several futile attempts to kill or capture Haqqani and
killed scores of innocent people in the process. Among those killed
were young Taliban studying in another Haqqani madrassa near Khost,
and one of his brothers-in-law in his house that was rocketed in
Gardez.
The raid on Haqqani's madrassa did not achieve anything except making
public the presence of US operatives in north Waziristan. The US
helicopters flying overhead during the raid and the presence of
Americans at the time of the raid were too obvious to be missed
by the locals. In any case, it was naïve to expect Haqqani
or any senior Taliban or Al-Qaeda officials to hide in a madrassa
that would surely have been on the US and Pakistani hit-list right
from the beginning. Haqqani and his supporters knew that they were
no longer welcome in Pakistan. Already, the Pakistan government
had withdrawn some of the favours it had extended to Haqqani for
years, including houses provided to him and his family members in
Miranshah.
The brief arrest of certain Pakistani clergymen in north Waziristan
and their interrogation also inflamed sentiments. The clergy, mostly
loyal to Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) - the
most pro-Taliban religious party in Pakistan - and sections of the
tribal population held protest rallies to condemn the raids and
demand the pullout of US operatives from north Waziristan. The JUI,
joined by certain other religio-political parties, later staged
countrywide protest rallies to denounce the American military presence
in the tribal areas. Maulana Fazlur Rahman told Newsline that General
Musharraf had allowed US soldiers to operate freely in Pakistan
after telling the nation that they were being offered logistics
support only. "It could have serious consequences because the
tribal people will never willingly allow the US or other foreign
troops to operate in their area. Raids on seminaries are unacceptable
and will be resisted," he warned. Other religio-political parties
also condemned the presence of the US agents in the tribal areas
and demanded their removal. The religious scholars and the tribal
elders, however, agreed to let Pakistani soldiers search suspected
seminaries for Al-Qaeda and Taliban officials.
Tribal elders and clergymen also joined hands to announce punishments
to local tribesmen helping the US in its raids on seminaries in
the tribal areas. Violators were threatened with a fine of 50,00,000
rupees (about 90,000 USD), demolition of their houses and expulsion
from the tribal areas.
The clumsy handling of the situation by the authorities didn't help.
The protests spread to the settled district of Bannu when Mufti
Iltimas, who taught American Talib, John Walker Lindh for some time
in his madrassa, and his colleague Khizar Hayat were taken into
custody by Pakistani intelligence sleuths and brought to Peshawar
to be interrogated by Americans apparently belonging to the FBI.
A number of tribal homes were raided by a huge number of militiamen
after being singled out as suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban hideouts
in the FATA. All this was demeaning and provocative for the tribal
people and it only fuelled anti-US and anti-Musharraf feelings in
the area.
The case of Maulvi Nauroz explained the shoot-in-the-dark approach
adopted by the American and Pakistani intelligence officials hunting
Al-Qaeda and Taliban members. He was picked up from his Gulshan-i-Ilm
(Garden of Knowledge) seminary in north Waziristan on suspicion
of being either an Arab or an Afghan. He was neither of the two.
Enquiries in his native Dir district in the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP) revealed that he was a bonafide Pakistani citizen.
He thus had to be released, but only after his incarceration had
engendered widespread resentment among his fellow religious scholars
and hundreds of their pupils.
The arrest of several young Sudanese receiving training at the Peshawar
Flying Club also caused much heart-burning in parts of Pakistan.
Apparently on an FBI complaint, the Sudanese trainee pilots were
apprehended from their rented homes and put through a thorough interrogation.
It seems all Arabs, or more specifically, Muslims, training to become
pilots have become suspects after it was learnt that the hijackers
who flew passenger planes into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon
last September had trained at flying clubs in the US. The Sudanese
were found innocent eventually and were freed. All have now returned
to Sudan and it is unlikely that any other Sudanese will enrol in
the Peshawar Flying Club, or any other flying club in Pakistan,
in the future.
The hunt for Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders was later extended to
south Waziristan. Militiamen from the Frontier Corps, whose officers
are drawn from the Pakistan army, conducted search missions in Wana,
the headquarters of south Waziristan, and the nearby town of Azam
Warsak, to nab suspects and send a strong message to the people
not to host Al-Qaeda and Taliban members. Mostly Afghan refugees
were taken into custody and freed after interrogation. The searches
were apparently made at the request of Americans operating in the
area. Not a single wanted man has yet been apprehended in the tribal
areas, but the Americans remain confident about the ability of their
telecommunication and intelligence specialists to locate the suspects.
Though the Musharraf government has allowed some Americans to operate
in the tribal areas and in the rest of the country, it does not
want a large US presence for fear of problems at home. It has been
trying to deflect the relentless US pressure - applied through diplomatic
channels and indirectly - by leaking information to the American
media that it is willing to do the needful, i.e. conduct raids on
suspected hideouts identified by the American telecommunication
experts. It has also been highlighting its limitations in undertaking
operations in the tribal areas that have been traditionally autonomous
and are populated by freedom-loving Pashtun tribes. The Americans
must have known that the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line
had blood ties, a largely conservative life-style, and a history
of resisting foreign interference in their affairs. Given this backdrop,
the current operation will inevitably turn the tribals even more
anti-US.
For better results, the US would like to have a free hand to deal
with the Al-Qaeda anywhere in the world, more so in Pakistan due
to its contiguity with Afghanistan. The pressure on the US to deliver
in its war on terrorism in Afghanistan must have mounted due to
its inability to capture bin Laden, Mulla Omar and other top Al-Qaeda
and Taliban officials despite resort to massive military operations.
Washington believes General Musharraf's role is crucial in nabbing
the wanted men and denying them sanctuary on Pakistani soil. The
earlier US success in forcing the Musharraf government to do its
bidding in America's war on terrorism in Afghanistan has whetted
Washington's appetite to demand greater compliance from Islamabad.
General Musharraf, confronted with growing international pressure
and domestic opposition and weakened by the lack of credibility
of his distastrous referendum, will have to come up with newer excuses
to keep the presence of US operatives in Pakistan to a minimum.
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