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The
grisly attack carried the hallmark of a well knit terrorist group.
Some gunmen took up positions on the balcony of a two-storey house
on Quetta's congested Liaquat Road, while another group mingled
in the procession. A huge explosion sent a massive shudder through
the mourners. Hell broke loose as the armed men opened indiscriminate
machine-gun fire and lobbed grenades into the procession of hundreds
of mourners crammed in the narrow lane. Two suicide-bombers detonated
themselves in the middle of the procession . Their bodies dangled
from the balcony over the electricity wires. The carnage in Quetta
on the tenth of Muharram left at least 44 people dead and scores
of others wounded.
It was the third time in the past six months that Quetta
has been drenched in blood by religious extremist attacks. In July
last year, the city was the scene of one of the deadliest acts of
sectarian violence when attackers armed with machine-guns and grenades
stormed a Shia mosque killing 50 people praying inside. An earlier
attack in June killed 13 police trainees from the Hazara community.
It is quite evident that the administration did little to prevent
the spate of violence perpetrated by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, an outlawed
extremist group. It is quite intriguing how these heavily armed
terrorists continue to operate with impunity despite the government's
claims of having destroyed their network.
The
latest incident in Quetta coincided with the bomb attacks on Ashura
processions in the Iraqi cities of Baghdad and Karbala, which left
more than 200 people dead, but there is no obvious link between
the violence in Iraq and Pakistan. The Quetta bombings are indicative
of the sectarian war that rages within Pakistani territory. The
surge in sectarian violence and acts of terrorism raise serious
questions about President Musharraf's much-trumpeted war on religious
extremism. It has been more than two years since the military leader
pledged to reform Pakistani society and root out Islamic extremism.
His call for an end to the jihad culture and religious obscurantism
won him support at home and abroad. But his lofty promises have
remained unfulfilled.
Two years down the road, the country continues to be held
hostage by extremist elements. The resurgence of Islamic extremist
groups is evident in the rising graph of sectarian violence, which
has even hit regions like Balochistan where such attacks were previously
unknown. The number of deaths in sectarian violence rose to 250
in 2002 and were more than 110 last year. Quetta, which has become
a hot bed of Taliban activity, has become the main centre for religious
terrorism. Instead of acknowledging the underlying cause for the
climb in sectarian violence, the government as usual, has laid the
blame on "external forces".
Following
the suicide attacks on a Quetta mosque last year, the government
insisted that there was no sectarian conflict in the province and
the attacks were an attempt by the Indian intelligence agency, RAW,
to undermine the security of Pakistan. Their claim backfired when
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi accepted responsibility for the attacks. A video
tape sent by the group to some newspapers showed that the two suicide
bombers were madrassa students. No action was taken against the
madrassa the suicide bombers came from.
Most political observers do not rule out the possibility
of links between the Quetta attacks and the resurgence of the Taliban.
The connection becomes more probable after an investigation showed
that Dawood Bindani, a close relative of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
and Ramzi Yousuf, was the prime suspect in last year's attacks.
Khalid, a close associate of Osama bin Laden, had reportedly spent
a lot of time in Quetta before he was arrested from Rawalpindi in
March last year. Ramzi Yousuf, his nephew, was arrested in Islamabad
in 1993 for his alleged involvement in the 1990s Trade Center bombing
plot. Their families came from Balochistan province. Bidani is still
absconding, along with the other accused.
With
some extremist groups operating freely, most observers had anticipated
the latest Quetta attack. The government's inaction and policy of
cover-up have largely been responsible for the failure in curbing
extremist violence. "The failure to deliver, to any substantial
degree, on pledges to reform madrassas and contain the growth of
jihadi networks, means that religious extremism in Pakistan will
continue to pose a threat to domestic, regional and international
security," said a report published by the Brussels-based International
Crisis Group.
In
his famous speech on January 12, 2002, Musharraf presented a comprehensive
plan to combat Islamic extremism and terrorism. A major part of
his strategy was to ban sectarian and militant organisations and
to regulate and transform those madrassas whose role in promoting
jihad has come under increasing international scrutiny. He also
promised to ban the use of mosques and madrassas in spreading religious
and sectarian hatred. "No individual, organisation or party
will be allowed to break the law of the land," he declared.
However,
all those pledges remained largely rhetorical and seemed to have
been made under international pressure. The half-hearted measures
which have so far been taken, have lacked conviction. Despite the
ban, most sectarian and militant groups continue working under new
banners. Some of their leaders were temporarily detained, but none
of them were tried in a court of law, even those against whom cases
were pending. The example of Azam Tariq exposes the government's
lack of sincerity in curbing religious extremism.
While many politicians were prevented from fighting elections
on patently frivolous grounds, the Sipah-i-Sahaba leader, accused
of sectarian killings, was allowed to contest from jail. He was
freed after he agreed to join the pro-Musharraf alliance in the
National Assembly. To retain Tariq's support the government ignored
the non-bailable warrants of arrest issued against him by anti-terrorism
courts. He was later killed apparently in a revenge attack by a
rival group. Similarly Maulana Azhar Masood and leaders of other
outlawed militant groups, were only detained for a few months under
the Maintenance of Public Order, although their activities clearly
violated numerous articles of the anti-terrorism laws.
Some activists of another outlawed group, Jaish-i-Mohammed,
were allegedly involved in the assassination attempt on Musharraf
in Rawalpindi on December 25. During the investigation it was revealed
that one of the suicide bombers, Mohammed Jamil, came from a militant
training camp in Azad Kashmir which had continued to operate despite
strict government closure orders. The inefficiency and failure of
our intelligence agencies can also be assessed by the fact that
it was the Indian intelligence which had warned Musharraf of the
first attempt on his life when the assassin tried to blow up a bridge
over which the presidential cavalcade was passing. Indian intelligence
apparently picked up the communication between the militants.
Though the government has recently cracked down on those
new groups which had replaced the outlawed outfits, most political
observers are doubtful whether these half-baked measures will succeed
in the absence of a coherent long-term strategy. It is easy enough
for the militants to operate under new banners when their leaders
are moving around freely.
Despite Musharraf's promise to reform the madrassas and eradicate
extremism, the issue does not seem to be on the government's priority
list. To date no regulation has been formulated to make it mandatory
for madrassas to register with the government . No national syllabus
has been developed and no rules on the funding of madrassas has
been adopted. Most observers agree that without any legal mechanism,
or a long-term strategy in place, the government cannot prevent
the flow of funds to unregulated madrassas and other religious groups
involved in extremist activities.
The
move to regulate thousands of madrassas appears to have stalled
because of the administration's failure to stop their funding from
Pakistanis working abroad, as well as from foreign Muslim charities.
The International Crisis Group report has revealed that madrassas
receive more than 90 billion rupees every year through charitable
donations. The amount is almost equal to the government's annual
direct income tax revenue.
Most of the madrassas, which in the past also received government
funding, now rely solely on private charity. Ninety-four per cent
of charitable donations made by Pakistani individuals and business
corporations go to the religious institutions. Though most donors
do not support the politics of religious parties, they feel that
Islamic education and the preservation of Islam are the most worthy
choice for their donations. The biggest source of financing for
madrassas is external - from Muslim countries as well as private
donors and Pakistani expatriates.
The government's failure to curb the jihadi madrassas is
largely responsible for fueling Islamic extremism. Many of the Islamic
schools continue to provide recruits for jihad in Afghanistan and
Kashmir. While Musharraf has repeatedly downplayed the link between
jihad and the madrassas, most religious schools continue to preach
jihad as an essential aspect of Islam. After the failed attempts
on Musharraf's life, the administration launched raids on some jihadi
madrassas, but such half-hearted and piecemeal measures will hardly
help improve the situation. "Musharraf's failure owes less
to the difficulty of implementing reforms than the military-led
government's own unwillingness," says Samina Ahmed, director,
International Crisis Group.
In order to retain international support, the Musharraf government
has shown their commitment to apprehend Al Qaeda fugitives. There
is, however, little evidence of it taking a tougher position against
homegrown extremists, many of whom are associated with the Islamic
groups that it needs for its own survival. The Musharraf government's
politics of expediency has allowed the religious right and Islamic
extremists to expand their bases. And this poses the most serious
threat to Pakistan's internal security.
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