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The
common Pakistani is jubilant because for the first time since 1988,
he got a chance to vote out a government and party which were booted
in by the GHQ. Rarely do Pakistanis get such an opportunity; normally,
regimes are voted in but booted out. Relatively free and fair elections
were held this time round because the army stepped back and allowed
political forces greater space than usual. However, this does not
mean that the army is ready to restructure its role and play second
fiddle to political governments.
The
world inside and outside Pakistan is hoping to see a change in the
political future of the country and the institutional balance between
the military and democratic forces. This expectation is not just
linked with the elections but with what the new army chief General
Ashfaq Pervez Kayani undertook, even before the country went to
the polls. For instance, his decision to withdraw serving officers
from civilian departments or stopping his officers from meeting
politicians are being viewed as positive moves. He has also talked
about dis-investing the army's stakes in two organisations, the
Frontier Works Organisation and the National Logistics Cell.
The
debate on whether the military is ready for a change must be viewed
in a historical perspective from the standpoint of the organisation's
strategic role and the structure of higher defence management. For
years, the military's primary focus were external threats. This
began to change under Musharraf, who shifted the emphasis to internal
security. But this does not necessarily mean that the external security
function no longer exists. In fact, many argue that the dominance
of the PML-Q in the Balochistan Assembly is due to the elections
being boycotted by the Baloch nationalists and the importance of
the province for the military establishment. The state cannot afford
to have slogans of Baloch nationalism or provincial autonomy being
raised in Balochistan, especially when it is believed that most
of the trouble that exists in the province is being fomented by
India.
The
military establishment will let go of total control of politics
only when it reviews what it views as the country's internal and
external threats and is willing to downsize and reduce its role
in the strategic management of the state. The military-strategic
calculation will not change until and unless policymaking is firmly
controlled by the civilian authorities. There are two issues as
far as such a shift is concerned. Firstly, the military does not
have confidence in the civilians, especially politicians, to run
the state judiciously. Although military personnel all over the
world are highly suspicious of politicians, the problem becomes
much more intense in a polity where the armed forces have traditionally
enjoyed greater power.
Secondly,
Pakistan's ally, the US, would be even more nervous about transferring
the power of decision-making to civilians in today's world, infested
with problems of terrorism and the corporate world's desire for
greater expansion. Venezuela, for instance, is an example of why
the US would be nervous of allowing political forces to dominate.
The calculations of civilian regimes can be totally different from
those of military regimes.
A
corollary of the above argument is that shifting the balance in
favour of the civilian dispensation becomes a more difficult task
as long as the political actors do not formulate a proper plan for
negotiating with the military generals. Thus far, there is no concrete
plan except for back-door negotiations.
The
deficiency in the political circles would make it much harder for
General Kayani to reverse the clock, even if he intends to change
the civil-military relations balance in the country. The issue here
is of institutionalising the shift rather than having something
temporary.
For
the new army chief it is important to make the shift, at least temporarily,
because he is confronted with the issue of low morale of his men.
There is the war on terror, which has divided people in the society
and the state. Then there is the issue of the poor image of the
military due to the policies of Musharraf. General Kayani could
possibly make the shift in the short-term. Another two to three
years of not involving his institution in politics will do the trick
of restoring the reputation of the armed forces.
In
fact, the country's history is a reminder of the fact that the military
has always supported free and fair elections whenever it faced a
crisis. For instance, the 1971 elections were free and fair because
the military was severely demoralised. Later, in 1988, it supported
free and fair elections because it was demoralised due to the loss
of several senior generals alongwith General Zia-ul-Haq in a mysterious
air crash. Now, it is confronted with the task of restoring the
image of the armed forces, which has got a lot of flak for its increasing
visibility in politics, economy and society.
Temporary
adjustments do not necessarily mean a long-term change. From a historical
perspective, one can see that a series of professional generals
does not necessarily result in establishing a tradition of professionalism
and subservience to civilian power. After 1988, for instance, there
were four army chiefs who chose to stay away from politics but then
they were replaced by a politically ambitious general. What is the
guarantee that it will not happen again?
The
eight years of Pervez Musharraf have brought about a change in the
tone and tenor of the officers cadre. They view themselves as power
brokers, and as a powerful institution which has the right to involve
itself in politics due to what it views as inept political leaders
and incompetent civilians. General Kayani might struggle to bring
about a change, but a real transformation cannot take place unless
his organisation sees some advantage in steering clear of politics
and letting go of the distribution of national resources.
What
would constantly threaten the process of improving the civil-military
relations balance in the country is the presence of Pervez Musharraf
at the helm and the prospects of future instability. The former
general will always try to undercut and destabilise the political
government, especially when it takes a confrontational position
on various issues with Musharraf.
Furthermore,
the health of the economy will play a vital role in determining
the relative strength of the civilian dispensation. If, for instance,
the internal financial institutions do not appreciate the sensitivity
of the new government and force it to adjust prices to meet the
international price index or punish it by withholding financial
assistance, the journey to a strong democracy will become difficult.
Poor economic progress could create a situation where the army finds
a ready justification to intervene directly or indirectly, after
the organisation has gained some of its lost confidence.
The
geo-political scene in the region has changed after 9/11. The US
might learn to deal with a civilian dispensation, which does not
necessarily mean that it would pitch for a stronger civilian dispensation.
In the US, there is special concern regarding what role the new
government will play in fighting the war on terror. The issue of
the restoration of judges is linked with this. If the next government
takes a position which is seen as impeding the results of the war
on terror, Washington may want to play on the side of the military,
as it has always done in the past.
In
the game of restructuring civil-military relations in the country,
there are, unfortunately, more snakes than ladders. The problem
is highly complex and may not get resolved through the resolve of
one general or one politician.
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