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An expanded ISAF may be the best bet for keeping the peace
in Afghanistan’s urban centres.
Almost
halfway through the six months allocated to it by the Bonn agreement, the
Karzai administration has failed to assert its control beyond the capital,
Kabul. Rival military commanders
repeatedly clash and openly reject the centre’s authority in the north and the
east. In the west and the south,
traders and travellers are, once again, at the mercy of local strongmen and
criminals. Chairman Karzai’s hold is tenuous even in Kabul where International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel have come under attack. On February 14, Afghan aviation and tourism
minister, Abdul Rahman, was murdered at Kabul airport. The same week, locals clashed with Afghan
security personnel and international peacekeepers at Kabul’s football
stadium.
As
the security situation deteriorates, Karzai has repeatedly urged the
international community to expand the size and the mandate of the international
security force beyond Kabul. US
Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld is, however, averse to an expanded ISAF
role and has recommended the reconstruction of the Afghan national army and
police force instead. The United
States, the United Kingdom and Turkey have agreed to reconstruct a national
Afghan army while Germany has offered its services in re-establishing an Afghan
national police force.
A
national army is symbolically important for Afghanistan’s political
reconstruction. The logistics and the
political pitfalls of creating a viable and legitimate national military are,
however, formidable. It could take the
United States and the United Kingdom between six months to a year to train and
induct even a modest 50,000 strong military.
While anything more ambitious would take even longer to construct in an
uncertain political climate, a small force would be incapable of restraining
regional commanders and their militias.
More
importantly, contending Afghan factions could contest the legitimacy of such a
force since powerful but controversial personalities in Karzai’s administration
including defence minister Faheem, deputy defence minister Dostum, and interior
minister Qanooni will play a major role in shaping its composition and
missions. Moreover, southern and
eastern commanders, who have successfully manipulated the US military to settle
scores with their rivals, are equally likely to induct their handpicked
candidates into an US/UK-trained Afghan military. An externally sponsored and domestically controversial military
could therefore lack internal legitimacy.
It would therefore fail to extend the authority of the state beyond
Kabul.
Until a future
Afghan government has the popular backing and consent to reconstruct
a multi-ethnic and representative military, the international community,
in particular the United States, should support Karzai’s demands
for an expansion of the size and mandate of the 4,700 International
Security Assistance Force. Even
a 30,000- strong ISAF could strengthen the interim administration’s
authority and that of a post Loya Jirga Afghan government by protecting
vital communications routes and keeping the peace in major urban
centres. Urgently needed
economic reconstruction efforts are already suffering because of
internal violence as important donors such as Japan ground their
Afghan reconstruction teams. Unless urgent international action
is taken, domestic tensions will continue to mount and Afghanistan’s
political reconstruction could also become the casualty of an all-out
civil war.
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