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Although various independent Gallup surveys ahead of the referendum
indicated a decline in General Musharraf's popularity graph, and
all national and international media organisations as well as independent
observers reported a lacklustre turnout in the referendum, the Election
Commission of Pakistan (ECP) nevertheless reported the turnout to
be as high as 71 per cent. According to the official figures released
by the ECP, some 97.5 per cent of people gave a verdict in favour
of General Musharraf, while a mere 2.5 per cent rejected his candidature.
"What people cannot do, can always be achieved through 'angels.'
Let's accept reality and say, 'farishtay zindaabad ' (long live
the angels)," was the response of an incredulous journalist
when he heard the final results.
As per the 1998 census, there were then 61.2 million people
18 years of age and above in the country, a number estimated to
have increased to 61.9 million at present. A total of 87,074 polling
stations and 163,641 additional polling booths were set up across
the country and 414,356 public sector employees appointed to carry
out electoral duties on polling day. The entire country was designated
one constituency and all citizens aged 18 and above were deemed
eligible to vote by establishing their identity through any reasonable
means. "A total of 43,907,950 votes were polled, out of which
42,804,030 were in the affirmative, while the rest - 833,676 - said
'no'. These numbers translate into a 71 per cent voter turnout -
the highest in the history of Pakistan," announced Chief Election
Commissioner, Justice (Retd) Irshad Hasan Khan.
Although General Musharraf's victory was a foregone conclusion,
the entire exercise had been designed to ensure that the turnout
would be large enough to put the desperately-sought seal of legitimacy
on his office. To this end, the government resorted to every possible
gimmick in the book; from hobnobbing with corrupt and criminal political
elements in the country and holding public meetings at state expense
to placing the entire state machinery at the disposal of a few individuals
in order to guarantee him a thumping majority. As if this were not
enough, the voting age was reduced to 18 years for the referendum
and then, in one cavalier stroke, the precondition of confirming
voters' eligibility through national identity cards and electoral
lists was also waived. Last, but not least, hundreds and thousands
of nazims and councillors were threatened with withdrawal of government
support if they did not muster support for the referendum within
their constituencies.
Employing logic remarkably similar to US President George
Bush's 'you are either with us or with the terrorists' rhetoric,
General Musharraf launched his referendum campaign by drawing unambiguous
battle lines between himself and his opponents. "We have to
draw a clear line from today and see who is supporting our reforms
and who is against our policies," he announced at his first
public meeting in Lahore to which, according to credible reports,
thousands of public sector employees had been forcibly bussed.
It is little wonder that the last one month, ever since preparations
for the referendum got underway, has seen a certain disillusionment
set in among the public. General Musharraf's popularity on the domestic
front had seen an exponential increase in the aftermath of the events
of October 12, 1999, when, in his characteristically forthright
manner, he pledged "to set the system right" and bring
in "real democracy at the grass- roots level." A majority
of the population, the segment he termed the 'silent majority,'
again rallied around him post 9/11 when he chose to ally himself
with the so-called international coalition against terror. The referendum,
his latest move on the political chessboard, and the manner in which
it has been handled has, however, forced many of his erstwhile supporters
to reconsider their position.
Under normal circumstances, candidates in elections bear the
electioneering expenses themselves. It was argued that as the government
in this case was itself holding the referendum, it should be responsible
for the expenses incurred in the process. According to reports,
the government spent at least 100 million rupees for over a dozen
public meetings held by General Musharraf across the country. Sources
in the federal ministry of finance stated that it had released a
special grant of 25 million rupees for each province to be used
for the printing and display of posters, banners, placards, hoardings,
flags and other such paraphernalia during these rallies. And this
excludes the expenses, again incurred by the federal government,
which were involved in placing promotional ads in the national and
vernacular press and in running the election campaign in the electronic
media.
Last year, the ECP had spent 1.2 billion rupees on the local
bodies elections, which were held in three phases all over the country.
"With a greatly increased number of polling stations and polling
booths in the referendum, this exercise has been at least twice
as expensive as the local bodies elections," says an insider.
According to him, the ECP had initially estimated the cost of holding
the referendum at a little over two billion rupees, including the
printing of 70 million plus ballot papers, election staff's allowances,
transportation of ballot papers, and setting up of polling stations
and polling booths. "The government, however, had to spend
a substantial amount more because it later decided to increase the
number of polling stations and booths to make it convenient for
people to vote in greater numbers," said the same source. The
allowances for election staff in the referendum had also been increased
from the 200 rupees given in previous elections to 400 rupees each,
plus another 200 rupees for meals.
Apart from the cash input, the government also initiated dialogue
with every political party that assured it of its support. The task
of holding parleys with various political parties was reportedly
assigned to the country's premier intelligence agencies. Says a
source, "These agencies made contact not only with individuals
who have political clout but also those in mainstream political
parties who have corruption cases pending against them and who could
thus be blackmailed into submission." A case in point: a few
weeks ahead of the referendum, a PTV team arrived in Sukkur and
filmed the property of a local politician believed to have amassed
billions of rupees through corruption during his party's two terms
in power. Shaken by this incident and fearing impending arrest,
he was seen frantically discussing the matter with his party colleagues.
His panic dissipated only after at least two nazims in Sindh, who
were given tickets by the PPP on his recommendation, announced their
support to Musharraf in the referendum, despite the party's unequivocal
decision to boycott the referendum. "In Punjab, more than in
any other province in the country, there are many corrupt politicians
who have not been charge-sheeted for their ill-gotten gains and
they were sitting ducks for such tactics," contends a source.
However, in the run-up to the referendum, the secret service
agencies and Musharraf did not always see eye to eye. For instance,
they were, from very outset, opposed to the idea of holding any
dialogue with the MQM (A). Despite their reservations, says a source,
General Musharraf went ahead and entered into negotiations with
the party. "The government's main concern was that in the light
of its antagonistic relations with both the PPP and the PML (N),
it was all the more important to cut a deal with the MQM, the third
largest party in the country with a proven track record of motivating
the masses in Karachi," says an insider. The MQM's support
for the referendum came at a heavy price; the government was obliged
to release at least 100 hardcore party activists from jail. "With
cases of a heinous nature pending against many of them, they could
not simply be set free, so they were released on parole," revealed
a source.
While the government had to acquiesce to the MQM's demands
in exchange for the party's cooperation, it employed arm-twisting
tactics against the nazims to ensure their fealty. This approach
was hardly in keeping with the government's claim to have achieved
a milestone in 'devolving power to the grass-roots level' when the
local councils were elected barely a year ago. With nazims still
struggling to run the newly instituted local councils, their essential
lack of power was clear for all to see when they were bluntly told
that their political future depended upon their success in drumming
up support for the referendum.
The nazims and local councillors in all 306 districts in the
country were directed by the provincial governments to use their
own resources for the campaign. According to some reports, between
20,000 to 50,000 rupees were given to each of the union council
nazims for campaigning on Musharraf's behalf. "This has once
again revived the old culture of loot and plunder of the public
exchequer," claimed a source.
According to him, a protest rally was actually taken out by
the nazims of some of the union councils in Hyderabad district in
Sindh, complaining that the amount of 20,000 rupees given to them
for election campaigning was not enough. The protesting nazims were
demanding that they too be given 50,000 rupees each as had been
put at the disposal of some of their counterparts or else they would
be unable to bring their voters on polling day. "A constant
refrain with the nazims from the inception of the union councils
has been the dire shortage of funds to run even their day-to-day
business, but no notice was taken of their complaints. For the first
time, for the purposes of the referendum, they were showered with
funds in advance to muster support for Musharraf," he contends.
Sources disclosed that the chief executive's secretariat in
Islamabad sent directives to the governors of the four provinces
asking them to report those nazims found to be stingy in their cooperation
with local authorities in the referendum. According to these sources,
the provincial governments have already recommended action against
various recalcitrant district nazims all over the country. One such
letter, No: 3GS/2002/3230, issued by the NWFP's provincial home
department on April 23, requests the federal government to initiate
action against Azam Khan Afridi, a nazim of Peshawar district, for
lack of cooperation during the referendum. Afridi, who belongs to
the PPP, is reported as having proved himself to be anti-referendum
by not extending unconditional political, financial and moral support
to General Musharraf.
Similar recommendations have also been made against the nazim
of Multan district, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, for his refusal to release
funds worth six lakh rupees for Musharraf's rally in Lahore. Reportedly,
Multan's district coordination officer had spent the amount from
his own pocket for the rally, but when the summary was sent to Qureshi
to compensate the coordination officer from official funds, he refused
to oblige.
The fact is that the majority of nazims were left with essentially
a Hobson's choice. "The allocation of funds, the implementation
of schemes, virtually everything pertaining to the local government,
is in the hands of the provincial and federal governments, so the
only realistic option they had was to support the referendum,"
says a source.
Although the government had left no stone unturned to increase
voter turnout on the day of the referendum, it remained, as expected,
low and devoid of the enthusiasm usually found on an election day.
Polling booths had been set up in every nook and corner of the country,
including railway stations, airports, prisons, even hotel foyers,
which offered free cookies and tea for those who came to cast their
votes. "The entire machinery was geared towards attracting
the greatest number of voters possible," says an official.
Apparently, the decision not to announce a public holiday
on April 30 was taken in order to compel the approximately five
million public sector employees in the country to vote in the referendum.
There were also instances in which employees were instructed by
their superiors to vote in favour of President Musharraf or else
face the consequences. Says a low-ranking employee of Karachi Port
Trust, "When I went to cast my vote, one of our officers told
me that the name and number on my identity card will be noted on
the counterfoil of the ballot paper and that if I stamped 'no',
my vote could easily be traced to me and I would be in trouble.
Realising that one vote against him would not prevent General Musharraf
from remaining president, I chose to stamp 'yes' and avoid creating
problems for myself."
Independent observers have reported a host of irregularities
such as blatant multiple voting and the casting of votes by obviously
ineligible individuals. According to an international news agency,
at one such station in Karachi, a woman claimed to have cast her
vote no less than 50 times, while one newspaper printed a photograph,
whose authenticity, it must be said, could not be verified, of pre-pubescent
schoolgirls merrily having a go at the ballot books and stamps.
Many cast multiple votes simply for a lark and to see whether they
could get away with it. Generally speaking however, those professing
support for Musharraf were allowed to vote more than once, even
if they possessed no identification papers. There were no electoral
lists to complicate matters and at many of the polling booths, particularly
at the fag end of the day, the personnel were not demanding identification.
Wrote columnist Ayaz Amir in Dawn, "A young friend of mine
proudly told me that in front of Municipal Library he had stamped
135 ballots as a mark of his love for General Musharraf. His mother,
an active lady, had stamped another hundred, his sister, all of
14 years old, 150. Only fatigue rather than anything else had cut
short their exertions."
A presiding officer disclosed that although the total number
of votes actually polled at his polling station in Karachi was 125,
he, alongwith the other election staff, had increased it to 900
by closing time. "We had no problems until 6 p.m. Then in came
the local SHO with three other police constables and asked us how
many votes had been cast. When we told him the number, he simply
told us that we were required to multiply the 90 by 10 and ensure
that the 'yes' vote was around 98 per cent," he said, adding
that they were warned that unless the ballot boxes contained that
many votes, they would not be accepted at the returning station.
"We therefore had no choice, but to stamp the remaining votes
ourselves."
The office bearers of the Sindh Teachers Association had even
more serious allegations of official high-handedness to report.
According to them, in many cases where teaching staff was appointed
at the polling booths, they were beaten up when they declined to
violate basic electoral rules. In one such case, Professor Shahid
Ahmed of Premier College in Karachi was badly roughed up by the
SHO of Taimuria police station, M. Tahir, when he refused to comply
with his demand to stuff the empty ballot boxes after stamping the
ballot papers with the help of the rest of his staff. Subsequently,
when he filed a written complaint against the concerned police official,
he was threatened with dire consequences if he decided to pursue
the case. Says Professor Siraj Ahmed Siddiqui, an office bearer
of the Association, "There are so many cases that have been
reported to us from all over the province in which the teaching
staff has been insulted and manhandled for not 'cooperating' with
the local administration." The Association has asked the affected
teachers to formally submit the complaints against the treatment
meted out to them. "Once we receive the complaints we will
not only make these facts public, but also call a strike in protest,"
said Professor Siddiqui.
Despite the lack of data as to the exact number of eligible
voters in the wake of the right of franchise being extended to everyone
over the age of 18, the ECP claimed that the turnout was as high
as 71 per cent. Independent observers, however, taking into account
the irregularities in the course of the polling, estimate the figure
at between 10 to 15 per cent. The opposition parties meanwhile,
insist the turnout was no more than six per cent and have demanded
that General Musharraf construe this as a verdict against him and
step down from the presidency.
Analysts, meanwhile, cite various reasons for the low turnout
in the referendum, the principal one being the boycott by the mainstream
political parties - even the MQM withdrew its support to the referendum
at the last minute - and the general public's lack of interest in
day-to-day governance as another. "Like every government in
the past, the present regime tends to make tall claims, while the
common man hardly benefits from any reforms," says a senior
journalist, who believes that as far as the masses are concerned,
the problems of economics and law and order, far from improving,
have continued to multiply manifold.
Farce or otherwise, the first phase of Musharraf's legitimisation
of his tenure is now over. And if this was a taste of things to
come, analysts have already begun to question the credibility of
the forthcoming general elections in October. Their apprehensions
are based on the constitutional provision that requires Musharraf
to seek the future parliament's mandate for the confirmation of
his tenure as president. This would only be possible if he ensures
that the next general elections will return a malleable parliament
that is prepared to play second fiddle. Given the manner in which
the entire state machinery was harnessed to carry out the referendum
exercise, the possibility that the new parliament will be elected
through free and fair means seems remote. And in the words of one
observer, "A tainted electoral process will only produce an
unstable government, and we have seen what happens to unstable governments."
Resorting to such tactics will dash hopes for the country's democratic
future - the very fact that had, in the first place, compelled Musharraf
to step in 'reluctantly' on October 12, 1999.
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