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Picture
this: not a hundred Osama bin Ladens, as the Egyptian president
predicted, but a dozen or so Hosni Mubaraks. Ostensibly benevolent
despotisms shrouded in the hijab of bourgeoise democracy. An American
base or two in every country. Completely privatised natural resources.
A McDonald's at every other corner. Universal - perhaps even compulsory
- access to CNN and Fox. A clutch of disarmed Palestinian bantustans
masquerading as an independent state. Israel, not only left with
no enemies to worry about, but empowered to act as the regional
enforcer, with Zalmay Khalilzad serving as the chief liaison officer.
And an uninterrupted flow of oil, its quantity and price determined
not in Riyadh or Baghdad, but in Houston.
This shocking and awesome vision of the Middle East is vaguely
what the so-called neo-conservatives in Washington have in mind,
and at least some of them hope to get there before the end of the
decade.
Why "so-called"? Because their adopted nomenclature doesn't
accurately reflect their nature. The only prominent member of George
W. Bush's administration who could be described as conservative
is Colin Powell. The rest of them - including Dick Cheney, Donald
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, even Condoleezza Rice - are fairly radical
in terms of what they hope to achieve.
The combination of racist perceptions with imperialist fantasies
suggests that neo-fascists would be a more appropriate appellation.
The older members of this gang can trace their provenance back to
the Nixon and Ford administrations - and it is surely no coincidence
that the idea of directly controlling Middle Eastern oil dates back
to the mid-'70s, a period when the rising cost of fuel severely
rocked western economies. The rest of them are veterans of the Reagan
presidency, and they tend to idealise Ronnie. They found his ideological
extremism inspiring, but he was hobbled by Alzheimer's and charmed
by Mikhail Gorbachev.
Their agenda did not make sufficient headway during the Clinton
years, which is why they were incredibly keen to elevate Dubya Bush
to the White House. They realised he was more or less like a blank
slate, particularly in the sphere of foreign relations. Crucially,
there was no longer a Soviet Union to worry about. They still required
a trigger, and along came Osama to lend a helping hand.
Less than two years on, Afghanistan has been de-Talibanised, but
remains unstable. For some strange reason, democracy and prosperity
did not automatically follow the war. And now Iraq has been de-Saddamised
- and thrust into chaos. Thousands of Afghans and Iraqis were killed
in the process, but that's not supposed to be much of a tragedy
- they were being "liberated" from tyrannies, after all.
That is not what we were told, to start with, though. Afghanistan
was attacked to destroy Al-Qaeda and capture its leadership; chasing
away the Taliban was a bonus. If the primary purpose has been achieved,
we are being kept in the dark about it. Likewise, the assault on
Iraq was ostensibly intended to seek and destroy all of Saddam Hussein's
weapons of mass destruction that posed such a dire threat to the
United States. Strangely enough, however, hardly anyone mentions
those elusive weapons any more. The script has changed: the death
and destruction was all in freedom's name: to facilitate widespread
looting, including the theft of priceless historical treasures.
And self-flagellation in Karbala by hundreds of thousands of Shias.
How ruthless it was of Saddam to deny them that pleasure.
One of the chief differences between the war over Kuwait and the
present aggression is, that in 1991 the Americans decided against
marching into Baghdad because they had no idea what may follow the
ouster of the Baathist regime; they appear to have been equally
clueless in 2003, but decided to go ahead anyway.
And they did so with the connivance of other Arab governments. Although
the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Arab League both
passed unanimous resolutions condemning the war shortly before it
began, US forces used Kuwaiti, Qatari and Jordanian soil as a launchpad
for the ground invasion, while the air war was conducted from a
command centre near Riyadh. Kuwait even permitted its island of
Faylakah to be used by the Israeli military for giving lessons in
urban warfare to US troops.
Arab unity has, of course, never been anything more than a myth,
and it was shattered comprehensively at the League session in Sharm
El Sheikh when Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah
exchanged unpleasantries, and again when Iraqi and Kuwaiti ministers
exchanged insults at the OIC moot in Doha. Now the demand for an
American withdrawal has been voiced, but the US knows better than
to pay any attention.
It seems to be more concerned about Syria and Iran. Rumsfeld has
given the evil eye to both these countries, amid official American
denials of any plan to invade either. But, although North Korea's
Kim Jong II has been trying his level best to attract Washington's
attention away from the Middle East, it appears unlikely that US
troops will be pulled out of the Gulf theatre for as long as "unfinished
business" remains.
That, of course, entails guaranteeing Israel's security. Notwithstanding
its stores of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the Jewish
state is uncomfortable with the idea of coexisting with the current
regimes in Syria and Iran, and perhaps even Libya (which holds a
special place in the minds of the Reagan administration alumni,
who fondly recall the bombing raids mounted to cow the Colonel in
the days when Rumsfeld was personally encouraging Saddam to step
up his aggression against Iran).
Although Bashar Al Assad took an uncompromising stand on the Iraq
question, he has, assiduously, tried to avoid any other provocation.
Syria has leaned on the Lebanese Hizbollah to resist from attacks
on Israel, and when the US claimed that members of Saddam's coterie
may be on the road to Damascus, it was quick to seal its border
with Iraq. Assad has also been cooperating in the hunt for Al-Qaeda
members.
Iran, too, has been reasonably quiescent. Notwithstanding
its formal opposition to the Iraq war, Saddam's departure has broadly
been viewed with relief. However, the ayatollahs couldn't possibly
be complacent about being hemmed in from all sides by states with
American bases: Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and now Iraq.
On the other hand, US pressure benefits the most conservative elements
in Iran in their tussle against the relatively liberal tendencies
personified by Mohammed Khatami.
Meanwhile, the Shia
resurgence in Iraq offers them an opportunity to extend their influence.
But neither faction of mullahs is interested in a military confrontation
with the Great Satan.
Libya remains unpredictable, but in recent years Gaddafi has done
little that could be construed as provocative. Other prominent Arab
countries are either already under American tutelage (Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco) or more or less off the radar (Algeria). Sudan may, at
a stretch, satisfy the criteria for inclusion in the Axis of Evil,
but its poverty will likely suffice as a deterrent against invasion.
The Gulf states customarily pay lip service to Arab nationalism,
but their primary loyalty is to the US. And that leaves Saudi Arabia.
There are plausible reports of US contingency plans to occupy the
oilfields in the event of the Saudi status quo being threatened.
Although Prince Abdullah resisted pressure to allow American bases
on Saudi soil to be used in the aggression against Iraq, there can
be little question that this gesture was primarily a sop to public
opinion. It's no secret, after all, that the House of Saud is closely
aligned with Washington. The relationship reached its apogee during
the terrorist drive against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
but Riyadh also proved to be an eager co-conspirator when, for example,
the Reagan administration wished to send arms and money to the Contras
in Nicaragua despite a congressional ban.
In the eyes of the present US administration, this constitutes grounds
for gratitude but not necessary long-term loyalty. Add to that,
the fact that Saudi Arabia has the world's largest proven crude
reserves, and a recipe for regime change ominously begins to emerge.
There are extremely serious risks involved, of course. Bin Laden's
primary motivating factor, after all, was the American presence
in his native land. Almost no Muslim would look kindly upon US guards
at the gates to Makkah or Medina. Besides, the US is well aware
that the most obvious alternative to existing regimes, not only
in Saudi Arabia, but right across the Arab world, is elements inclined
to interpret Islam even more illiberally than the devoutest of incumbents.
It's worth remembering, though, that not all neo-fascists perceive
Islamic fundamentalism as a threat. It seems much more frightening
to liberal elements in the Middle East than it does to the likes
of US Attorney-General John Ashcroft, who has made common cause
with Iranian and Sudanese representatives at UN conferences on women's
rights, for example. Besides, the US has a long history of backing
extremist organisations in the Muslim world. It is military threats
and opposition to private enterprise that the US objects to, not
socially repressive political arrangements.
If the Arabs truly want to be liberated, they will have to do it
themselves. The best that can be hoped for in the circumstances
is that Arab intellectuals will rise to the challenge of offering
a path to the enlightenment that Islam so desperately requires.
That is their only possible defence against long-term hegemony.
At the same time, it is conceivable (although not terribly likely),
that the US will recognise the mess it has created in Iraq, and
hand over the nation-building task to the United Nations. The latter
does not have much of a track record in this sphere, but it may
just succeed in hammering out a power-sharing arrangement a' la
Lebanon between Iraq's Shia, Kurdish and Sunni communities, while
ensuring that the profits of war do not accrue to multinationals
associated with the Bush gang.
Fat chance? Perhaps. Not least because the Americans appear to be
taking most of their cues from Israel. In that case, it could be
years, even decades, before the Arab world is able to rise to a
challenge at least as grievous as the ones it faced, not very impressively,
in 1948 and 1967. In such a scenario, one will have to look to Europe
and perhaps Latin America for resistance to the ugly, almost Hitlerite
Project for a New American Century devised by the Bush administration's
Wolfowitzes, Khalilzads and Dick Perles.
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