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"It
is often forgotten that Pakistan is one of the world's most ethnically
and linguistically complex states," says Stephen Cohen, as
he begins the chapter on 'Regionalism and Separatism' - an issue
that has acquired a flaming reference against the backdrop of the
Balochistan crisis - in his new book, The Idea of Pakistan. The
chapter focuses on the political incongruity of repeated military
interventions and domination of the Punjab. What this really means
in a statistical sense is graphically underlined by Cohen, one of
the most astute American experts on South Asian affairs who has
a unique insight into the armies of the two nuclear neighbours.
Consider this excerpt: "The focal point of Punjabi domination
was and remains the army. Seventy-five per cent of the army is drawn
from three Punjab districts (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Campbellpur)
and two adjacent districts in the NWFP (Kohat and Mardan). These
districts contain only nine per cent of Pakistan's male population.
The officer corps is drawn from a wider, more urban base, but is
still predominately Punjabi, often the sons of junior commissioned
officers. Pakistan's air force and navy are drawn from a much wider
base."
Nuggets
like this are spread across the entire text of The Idea of Pakistan.
Though Cohen has sought to examine the ways in which the idea of
Pakistan intersects with present realities, his book is essentially
a history of Pakistan. At a time when Pakistan has become an enigma
for the world, and its relations with the United States poses many
questions about its future, this book would serve as an excellent
introduction to a country that is sometimes considered a dangerous
place in the world.
As a strategic partner of the United States in their global war
against terrorism, Pakistan raises some pertinent concerns for the
US. At the top of the American agenda, of course, is terrorism,
but Cohen has identified and reviewed three more: Pakistan's nuclear
programme, the issue of democratisation, and the country's potentially
hostile relationship with India. Add to this, the concern for Pakistan's
identity as a moderate Muslim state -an identity that is being challenged
by Pakistan's own Islamists.
Cohen
raises the question about what America's options are with regard
to Pakistan and concludes his book by saying, "Americans must
remember that although Pakistan will pursue its own vital interests
as it sees them, an opportunity may exist to incrementally shape
Pakistan's future in a direction that is compatible with important
American (and Pakistani) interests. Pakistan has demonstrated an
ability to resist America in the case of its nuclear programme,
its provocative policy on Kashmir, its tolerance of domestic extremists,
and its support for the Taliban. In each case, Washington was unable
to persuade Pakistan that these policies threatened vital Pakistani
interests, as well as American ones. Before writing Pakistan off
as a hopelessly failed state that its critics believe it to be,
Washington may have one last opportunity to ensure that this troubled
state will not become America's biggest foreign policy problem in
the last half of this decade."
Hence,
according to Cohen's analysis there is some hope for us. He argues
that it is too early to write Pakistan's epitaph. Envisioning the
next five to eight years, Cohen offers a number of possible outcomes:
a continuation of today's oligarchic Establishment; the emergence
of a liberal, secular democracy; the rise of an Islamist state;
a new political order rising from a divided state; and a nation
recovering from a major war with India. The most plausible scenario,
he suggests, is that "in five years, Pakistan will be pretty
much what it is today." Incidentally, this reminds one of a
joke attributed to Faiz Ahmed Faiz. Many years ago, a group of intellectuals
were discussing the worst case scenario for Pakistan and fears were
expressed about the country lapsing into anarchy or breaking up.
But Faiz reportedly interjected, saying, "Something even worse
can happen. It will continue as it is."
However, Cohen's account surveys monumental changes, particularly
after 9/11. He does not offer opinions; instead, he summarises the
relevant facts and attemptes to analyse them. This has made his
book a valuable and essential read for those who want to understand
the various complexities of Pakistan's eventful existence. The book
offers a solid history of Pakistan that only an observer of Cohen's
highly regarded academic background could put together with such
skill and lucidity.
Though
the book has covered events that took place until the last months
of 2004, it was completed before President General Pervez Musharraf
formally reneged on his promise to doff his military uniform by
December 31, 2004. Still, Cohen used the current situation as his
point of reference as he toured South Asia to promote the book.
He first went to India in January and at a function at the India
International Centre, he said that he had no doubt that political
reforms could save Pakistan. Political reforms and a rediscovery
of Jinnah's idea of a Pakistan that is "secular and friendly
with India" is the best case scenario for Pakistan in the 21st
century, he added. At the book launch in Lahore at the end of February,
Cohen said that the Pakistan army must figure out a way to retreat
from politics and allow politicians to govern the country so they
can learn from their mistakes without fearing another military takeover.
Cohen, presently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is
perhaps the most knowledgeable observer of Pakistan and the effort
that he has invested in writing the book is truly impressive. He
has alo written acclaimed histories of the Indian and Pakistani
armies. He begins his preface with the sentence: "It has taken
me 44 years to write this book - the length of time I have been
studying Pakistan (and India)." At the same time, he notes
that the United States, unfortunately, has only a few true experts
on Pakistan, and knows remarkably little about this country.
He
says in his introduction that, "Much of what has been written
is palpably wrong, or at best superficial. Over the years, it has
become difficult to conduct research in Pakistan's deteriorating
security environment, and support for such work has dried up. Little
wonder, then, that the views cover a wide spectrum, with 'rogue
state' at one extreme - some would call it a potential nuclear Yugoslavia
or even the most dangerous place in the world." Fortunately,
Cohen knows Pakistan well and his analysis is very perceptive. We
should take him seriously, and so should the US in defining its
policy towards Pakistan.
Cohen
has comprehensively covered Pakistan's history in terms of themes
like: the idea of Pakistan; the state of Pakistan; the army's Pakistan,
political Pakistan; Islamic Pakistan; regionalism and separatism;
demographic, educational, and economic prospects; Pakistan's futures;
and American options. The last three chapters stand out because
of their discussion of what might happen in Pakistan in the near
future and how the United States might influence the outcome. Cohen
has argued that the US should seriously engage Pakistan but not
submit to the tactic of the country's rulers who tend to threaten
that if something were to happen to them, the Islamists would take
over. They negotiate with a gun to their head. It amounts to saying,
'If you don't help us, we will commit suicide.' Cohen sees little
risk of imminent collapse, so America could be tough on some issues.
Looking at the possible futures of Pakistan, Cohen expresses
justified concern about Pakistan's education system. In his view,
it is abysmal by all standards. While the elite have access to good
private schools and their children can study abroad, the public
education system for the masses has almost collapsed. The primary
education system is decrepit, but what Cohen finds more alarming
is the condition of the university system and feels that it is "beyond
redemption."
Despite
the relatively bleak picture that Pakistan projects, Cohen has identified
a number of silver linings. Taking note of the fact that Pakistan
has four times followed a "cycle of military intervention,
military government, military misrule, a return to civilian government,
civilian floundering, and renewed intervention," Cohen argues
that this does not mean "that the future must look like the
past." With each new cycle, he says, fewer and fewer parties
are willing to play the role of 'King's party' and be manipulated
by the armed forces. He recalls that in 1965, all of the political
parties supported Ayub Khan's provocative policies towards India.
In 1971, all the West Pakistan parties supported the army as it
dealt with East Pakistan. But now, "Pakistan's parties have
shown a degree of independence from the army and the Establishment,
and a number of them have linked support for Pakistan's strategic
polices with changes in the army's domestic political role."
In
the same discussion, however, we find him suggesting that "Pakistan's
parties are further from power now than they have been for many
years." Why? Because even when there is "growing discontent
with the army's direction of Pakistani foreign policy, and some
criticism of its changes to the constitution, there are no issues
on which all the parties are aligned on the same side." This
is coupled with their rivalry and "the army's greater capacity
to manipulate elections and electoral coalitions."
As
Cohen explains it, the only civil-military strategy that will work
in Pakistan, "short of a revolution, military defeat, or ideological
transformation," is one in which a 'staged' transfer of power
and authority takes place over a period of years, spanning the tenures
of more than one prime minister, and more than one army chief. But,
as he explains in a later chapter, it is questionable whether the
conditions for such a shift will arise soon.
Consequently,
Pakistan, in the near future, "will be a state-nation lodged
between a weak democracy and a benevolent autocracy." But can
it remain in this uneasy position indefinitely? Cohen has drafted
a chart to summarise Pakistan's probable and less probable futures,
looking at various scenarios and rating their probability as well
as their political and strategic impact. It is a very instructive
chart and takes account of the various possibilities, from the continuation
of the Establishment-dominated oligarchic system to a divided Pakistan.
Many
informed readers in Pakistan will find discussions that sound familiar
in this book, but they can still learn from it and enhance their
awareness of the policy alternatives that the existing circumstances
have thrown up. Obviously, Cohen has a deeper focus on the US-Pakistan
relationship. For him, the most difficult question is whether the
United States should address Pakistan's deeper problems to prevent
it from becoming a rogue state. Here is, thus, a message for the
rulers of both countries. In the past, short-term gains took priority
over long-term concerns but The Idea of Pakistan argues that ignoring
long-term concerns could have grave consequences.
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