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Why
is India a democracy and not Pakistan? This, by all means, is a
very important question. And it has justly stimulated a lot of debate
in response to the publication of the second book in the Cross-border
Talks Series that is meant to explore relations between India and
Pakistan.
The
format chosen in this series being edited by David Page is simple
and sensible: one Indian and one Pakistani scholar are invited to
project their separate perspectives on a given subject. After the
first title, Diplomatic Divide, we now have the seminal issue of
democracy. In Divided by Democracy, India's Meghnad Desai and Pakistan's
Aitzaz Ahsan have dealt with the question posed at the outset.
Expectedly,
reviews published in Pakistan have generally concentrated on the
case that Aitzaz has argued to explain the desecration of the idea
and practice of democracy in Pakistan. Being a senior politician
and author of a very perceptive interpretation of the crisis of
Pakistan's identity (The Indus Saga and The Making of Pakistan),
he is eminently qualified to explain our deviations from the path
of democratic dispensation. We should also not mind the fact that
his analysis is likely to be influenced by his political affiliations
and his intellectual commitment to the Indus Saga theory.
But
Aitzaz's task, in spite of his formidable credentials, is too daunting.
A discussion of Pakistan's democratic experience opens a Pandora's
box of interpretations that relate to not just the account of what
we have made of our freedom but also to how the demand for Pakistan
was conceived and pursued before Partition became a reality.
Unfortunately,
it is more difficult in Pakistan to conduct a rational discourse
on sensitive issues. Our unresolved contradictions seem to have
encouraged a kind of 'doublethink' in the minds of our intelligentsia.
One expression of this is the raging conflict between the religious
and liberal elements in the country and the inability of the rulers
to sort it out in the context of any specific scheme of governance.
Be that as it may, Divided by Democracy provides a thoughtful
comparison of two countries that should have been united in their
historical experience. After all, as David Page has pointed out
in his introduction, Meghnad Desai's account of the development
of Indian democracy begins in the nineteenth century when Indian
politicians sought the introduction of Westminster-style institutions
in India. In many ways, the Founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
was as inspired by the British model as the Congress leaders.
So
why has India succeeded in establishing democracy and why is Jinnah's
Pakistan forever struggling to become a democracy? I have raised
this question again because the fact that India is now recognised
as a functioning democracy is as intriguing as Pakistan's political
digressions. At this point, I am reminded of observations Strobe
Talbott had made in his book, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Demoracy
and the Bomb. Published last year, it is an account of the negotiations
that the United States had held with India after India's nuclear
tests in May 1998.
This is how Talbott expressed his thoughts: "Indian democracy
has always been a mystery bordering on a miracle, not so much because
of how it works as because it works at all. In many respects, India
seemed destined, even designed, never to be a democracy, or to fail
if it ever tried to become one. For centuries it was a victim of
invasion from the north-west. Then it was the large colony of a
small island off the coast of Europe. Its independence coincided
with a bloody and divisive conflict over partition. Its hierarchical,
caste-based social order was - and will be as long as it lasts -
at odds with the very idea of political equality. Its economic order
permits the acquisition of fabulous wealth alongside abject poverty
on a massive scale. Add to those factors the uninspiring record
of other countries that broke free of colonialism after World War
II only to wallow in authoritarianism for decades afterward, and
Indian democracy would have seemed far from a sure bet in 1947."
Another
source of amazement, for common observers, are the differences that
emerged between the two countries even when they came, in a sense,
from the same womb, that of British India. A list of what divides
them may not be as extensive as the record of their similarities.
Much of the impulse for the ongoing peace process comes from this
inherent cultural and social affinity. In fact, the change of attitude
that has developed between the two Punjabs has been described by
one commentator as the "end of the sixty-year-old civil war
of the Punjabis."
However,
Aitzaz has underlined "some essential and primordial differences
between Pakistan and India, which led to the divide called Partition."
Here, he refers to his theory of the two regions - the Indus region
and what is now India. But why were the Muslims of the minority
provinces in the forefront of the freedom movement? Besides, why
were the oppressed Muslims of Bengal the dominant rationale for
the creation of Pakistan?
Interestingly,
Aitzaz has rightly pointed out that "the effect of divergence
and difference of religion, dogma and ritual between the Hindus
and Muslims in the partition of the subcontinent is frequently exaggerated."
He has also conceded that despite many apparently irreconcilable
causes of tension and conflict, "harmonious and peaceful coexistence
between the communities remained the rule rather than the exception."
It was the Raj that began to create a communal Hindu-Muslim divide
in Bengal and initiated policies that were meant to "create
a major regional disparity between the Indus region and the rest
of India." This emphasis on Indus-India disparity tends to
distract Aitzaz somewhat from concentrating on the drift that, as
enshrined in the politics of the Muslim League, led to the creation
of Pakistan.
At one level, the demand for Pakistan was embedded in the principle
of democracy - allowing Muslims in provinces in which they were
in a majority to vote for it. At another level, the demand made
on the basis of religion could be seen as an escape from democracy
because permanent majorities and permanent minorities had to be
retained in the two countries. In addition, any justification for
dividing a country on the basis of religion could be extended to
further divisions on the basis, for instance, of ethnicity, language
or sect. That is how we have to come to terms with the separation
of East Pakistan.
Coming
back to the question of why India is a working democracy, one might
think that the task assigned to Meghnad Desai, an economist of international
repute who has spent the last 40 years at the London School of Economics,
is more difficult. However, he has done a good job in developing
the thesis that it was the wise leadership of the Congress, particularly
of Nehru, that steered the adoption of a constitution that chose
universal adult franchise.
This, as Meghnad puts it, "was a revolutionary step just because
nothing in Indian history justified it." It defied the entire
structure of Hindu society. Compare this initiative with how the
Islamisation campaign remains a barrier to modernity in Pakistan.
India chose a modern democratic republican framework. It is also
worth remembering that Dr Ambedkar was one of the principal architects
of that constitution. He had risen from untouchable status and there
was a time when no one would sit next to him or work with him.
Yes, "it was a happy accident" that Nehru lasted long
enough to ensure that the new democratic polity took deep roots
during the first 17 years after Independence. Meghnad rightly notes
that "Pakistan by contrast did not have this good fortune."
Yet, Nehru's contribution did not rest only on his longevity. He
was "the first among post-colonial leaders to lead a large
country and he stayed a democrat." To further underline Nehru's
role, Meghnad suggests that "having had nearly two decades
of a democratic leadership at its start, India got addicted to democracy."
There were, of course, some other crucial factors to protect democracy
in India. The Indian judiciary, though appointed by the executive,
is independent by tradition and practice. Interestingly, Meghnad
gives credit to the fissiparous tendency within the Congress - typical
of Indian society. "Inasmuch as it brought together diverse
factions, it also fell foul of their desire for self-assertion,
especially that of the ambitious regional satraps who represented
some of these factions."
Meghnad
begins his essay with a reference to elections held in May 2004
that have specifically brought "India and its democracy to
global attention."
Congress and its coalition
of 18 parties had won by a narrow margin against all expectations.
It was the fourteenth general election with upward of 600 million
voters in 28 states and three union territories. It was conducted
peacefully and fairly, using electronic voting machines and voter
identity cards.
This is how Meghnad underscores this achievement: "Everything
worked in a clockwork fashion in a country where the locals are
the first to deride their own ability to organise even a small event
efficiently. Yet India conducted an election with more modern equipment
and fewer doubts about the legitimacy of the process than, for example,
the USA in 2000 or even 2004."
The credibility of the electoral exercise is, for me, the foundation
of democracy. This is one area in which Pakistan has never been
able to succeed. We have noted how Meghnad has commenced his essay
with an analysis of the May 2004 Indian elections. Let us compare
this with the opening lines of Aitzaz's composition: "When
I was asked to contribute to this volume, I was a shade apprehensive
and unsure. More questions than answers rushed to mind. Perplexing
questions. How would one categorise Pakistan's political system:
dictatorship or democracy, liberal or fundamentalist, civil or praetorian?"
And the questions continue. In fact, question marks that are invested
in Aitzaz's essay would add up to a big number. But the title of
his essay, 'Why Pakistan is not a democracy' does not use a question
mark. On the other hand, Meghnad has one: 'Why is India a democracy?'
I need not dwell on Aitzaz's arguments in any detail because we
are so familiar with them and they are so obvious and, also, very
valid. Thus, he says, "while India in its first decade had
one prime minister and several army chiefs, Pakistan had several
prime ministers and one army chief. Stability in the one office
and instability in the other institution naturally reflected upon
their power denominations inter se."
Aitzaz has touched upon all aspects and sources of Pakistan's political
derelictions. After India was projected as a hostile enemy, the
issue of Pakistan's survival was linked with a powerful army and
a justification for the "otherwise illegitimate military rule."
The refusal of the ruling elite to introduce meaningful land reforms
is seen as "one of the most debilitating factors in the progress
and development of the political system in Pakistan."
Aitzaz has summarised the role of the superior judiciary with some
necessary details. According to him, the judiciary has been consistent
and constant in one respect: "It has always legitimised authoritarian
and military interventions in the political structures of Pakistan.
Not once has it invalidated the incumbent regime of a military adventurer."
All these, to be sure, are very depressing thoughts. In his conclusion,
however, Aitzaz has made a brave attempt to show optimism. Here
are the last lines of his essay: "The fact that even military
dictators are convinced that full suffrage elections are unavoidable
and inevitable is testimony that the spirit of democracy in Pakistan
is indeed irrepressible. I believe that one day it must prevail
to the fullest extent by wresting complete supremacy and sovereignty."
Thank you, Aitzaz, for pointing towards the rainbow on a distant
horizon.
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