|
Tribesmen,
led by pro-Taliban militants, evicted Uzbek fighters from Wana in
South Waziristan after clashes between the two sides continued for
over a month, and their military commander, Maulvi Nazeer Ahmad,
claimed victory on April 20. Attention quickly shifted to the adjoining
North Waziristan tribal region amid speculation that a similar operation
could take place in its Mir Ali tehsil, where the Uzbeks were reportedly
present in significant numbers.
Satisfied
with the outcome of the latest battle in South Waziristan, the government
made no effort to conceal its joy over the defeat and eviction of
the Uzbek militants from Wana. It readily deployed Pakistan Army
and the paramilitary Frontier Corps troops in strategic positions,
vacated by the fleeing Uzbeks and their tribal supporters. The tribal
offensive against the Uzbek fighters was hailed as a popular uprising,
sparked by atrocities allegedly committed by the foreigners in Wana
and nearby villages. The government argued that its much-criticised
peace agreements with the tribal elders and militants had paid off
as the tribesmen rose against foreign fighters under the terms of
these accords.
There
is no doubt that the victory of Maulvi Nazeer's men strengthened
one group of militants at the expense of the other, which was largely
made up of Uzbek fighters and their tribal accomplices. Maulvi Nazeer
publicly expressed his appreciation for the Afghan Taliban, and
refuted allegations about the presence of top Taliban leaders in
Pakistan by claiming that they were all based in Afghanistan. The
32-year-old commander, holding his first-ever press conference,
was earlier caught unawares by a group of experienced reporters
who had travelled from Peshawar to Wana and grilled him by asking
tricky questions. In reply to one such question, he naively said
Osama bin Laden or any other foreigner was welcome to come and stay
in Wana if they pledged to abide by the local tribal culture and
traditions. He later resorted to damage control by pointing out
that he had no links with bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad
Omar, and was unaware about their whereabouts.
Maulvi
Nazeer, who had fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan, was, however, careful in his subsequent
interviews not to cause any further embarrassment to the government.
He said his men had no intention of enforcing Shariah in the areas
under their jurisdiction in Wana, since they lacked the resources,
and that this should best be left to the government. He also maintained
that the tribal fighters would not set up any parallel administration,
courts or private prisons and would abide by all agreements made
with the government. He warned all sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai Wazir
tribe inhabiting Wana that harbouring foreign militants would pose
serious consequences for them. He also issued a warning to neighbouring
tribes not to allow use of their soil for any retaliatory or vindictive
action against the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe as this could trigger tribal
wars in South Waziristan. There was real concern among the Wana
tribes about acts of terrorism by the Uzbeks and local tribesmen
still aligned with them.
Though
Maulvi Nazeer is now an ally of the government and has helped it
to rid Wana of Uzbek militants, he made it clear that he would not
be sending his fighters to fight the Uzbeks and their tribal supporters
in neighbouring North Waziristan. In fact, he has no intention of
operating outside Wana, in the rest of South Waziristan. The eviction
of Uzbeks and foreign militants from the Mahsud tribal area in South
Waziristan would be the responsibility of the government. The authorities
would have to convince some Mahsud tribal commanders to replicate
the Wana strategy in their area. Baitullah Mahsud, the most powerful
pro-Taliban commander in that area, is unlikely to play the kind
of role played by Maulvi Nazeer. He was publicly blamed by President
Musharraf for sending fighters to Afghanistan against US-led coalition
forces, and warned him to desist from the practice. The President
also disclosed at a press conference in Rawalpindi in February that
twice the Pakistan Army came close to eliminating Baitullah Mahsud.
Ironically, the peace accord that the government signed with him
in February 2005 is still intact. The governor of NWFP, Lt Gen (Retd)
Ali Mohammad Jan Aurakzai, sent a jirga of tribal elders and ulema
to find out if Mahsud was still willing to abide by that agreement.
The
case of Maulvi Nazeer illustrates the complexity of the situation
in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He lives in Wana,
and is the commander of the tribal militia comprising armed men
from almost all the sub-tribes of Ahmadzai Wazir. But he also owns
land and other properties in Birmal area, near the Pakistani border
in Afghanistan's southern Paktika province, and in Kandahar. He
has dual nationality and has fought alongside the Taliban against
the US-led coalition forces. He does not want to criticise the Taliban
and their supreme leader Mullah Omar, and would not have picked
up the gun to drive out Uzbek militants from Wana had they refrained
from interfering in tribal affairs and becoming involved in kidnappings,
beheadings and other crimes. Backing him and his armed men to rid
Wana of Uzbek fighters would, therefore, not appear an ideal solution
to the problem for the government. At best, it is a temporary solution
fraught with risks.
The Uzbeks haven't left Pakistan after suffering defeat in Wana.
The death-count of 100-200 Uzbeks appears exaggerated, and was never
backed by any evidence. Independent accounts of the fighting in
Wana put the total number of deaths at not more than 50, and this
figure includes both Uzbeks and the tribal fighters. Maulvi Nazeer
subsequently confirmed reports that the Uzbeks and their tribal
comrades left Wana as part of an understanding between the two sides.
There were credible reports that the Afghan Taliban played an important
role in ensuring that the Uzbeks were given a safe passage out of
Wana. Most of the Uzbeks shifted to other parts of South Waziristan,
or in most cases headed for North Waziristan. Despite claims by
some government functionaries, there is no evidence that the Uzbeks
crossed over to Afghanistan to join the Taliban ranks. One of the
biggest complaints of Maulvi Nazeer and his supporters was that
the Uzbeks didn't want to wage "jihad" in Afghanistan;
instead, they wanted to fight the Pakistan Army and establish an
Islamic state in Wana. He claimed that the Pakistani ulema, who
tried to mediate between him and the Uzbeks, gave up the on the
task when the tribesmen narrated stories of Uzbek atrocities before
them. Justifying his uprising against the Central Asians, hitherto
treated by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes as guests, Maulvi Nazeer offered
to debate the issue of eviction of Uzbeks from Wana with any religious
scholar in the light of Islamic teachings.
The overbearing Uzbeks, led by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) head Tahir Yuldashev, may have become a nuisance for the government
and the Wana tribes, but the punitive action against them is unlikely
to impress the US and Afghan governments or NATO. As one Western
analyst put it, the Uzbeks weren't much of a threat to the US-led
coalition forces because they rarely crossed over to Afghanistan
to fight alongside the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Their association with
Al-Qaeda was also unclear and unimportant. In western capitals,
the real Al-Qaeda primarily comprised Arabs associated with groups
led by bin Laden, Dr Zawahiri and Sheikh Omar Abdur Rahman. There
was no mention of any action against Arabs and other foreign militants
reportedly hiding in South Waziristan during the recent fighting
in Wana. The US and its western allies would have liked the Wana
tribes and the Pakistan government to evict Arabs from the area
because they believe bin Laden and some of his Al-Qaeda lieutenants
are hiding in Waziristan. That hasn't happened, and may not happen
in the near future. In the circumstances, the US military will likely
continue to launch attacks on Pakistani territories.
|