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Student
leader, Trotskyite, historian, journalist and playwright manqué,
Tariq Ali reached iconic status for his raucous, rabble-rousing
anti-Vietnam protests. We, who much to the mocking mirth of our
friends, marched in solidarity into Grosvenor Square, looked on
with no small measure of pride, as this handsome Pakistani took
centre stage. That was the year of the protests in Chicago at the
Democratic Convention and of the birth of the famous Chicago Eight.
Throughout the intervening years, Tariq Ali has produced a shelf
load of historical fiction, essays, TV films and is a much sought-after
speaker. In all this time he has maintained his radicalism, even
if it is inevitably mellowed and measured.
He
has recently published this indictment of the late Agha Hasan Abedi
and his creation, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI). Tariq Ali has chosen a subject that in this country resurrects
distressing memories and over which clouds of confusion and concern
remain. This selection is all the more perplexing in that there
is no significant current interest in the history of BCCI - today's
entry-level collegiate was hardly born the year the bank was closed
and the acronym is more likely to conjure up the Indian cricket
authority rather than this bank. In any case the central character
passed away some time ago. So why travel back down this well-worn
road?
BCCI
was set up in 1972 by Agha Hasan Abedi and a close-knit group of
confidantes, after the nationalisation of his previous venture,
the United Bank. The funding came primarily from several Arab emirates,
the staff from UBL and his international acceptability from a 25%
partnership with the global giant, Bank of America (BoA). The Luxembourg
Banking Commission made it clear that the license was being given
to BoA.
According
to Swaleh Naqvi, Abedi's trusted and loyal No.2 (and confirmed in
interviews with many key players, both loyal and dissidents), they
envisioned a truly global organisation fuelled by emerging petrodollars
- "a World Bank, a global bank for the Third World." It
was to be achieved by a meteoric expansion into the developing world
and through the introduction of real customer service concepts in
markets dominated by complacent postcolonial near-monopolies. The
bank was to be managed by bankers, mainly from Pakistan, charged
with the culture and ethos delineated by Abedi.
Back
in the seventies, in those bleak days of misapplied socialism, the
career path for an ambitious Pakistani led only to state-managed
enterprises, entailing vigorous sifarish and an introduction to
a culture of licenses, nepotism and sycophancy. Foreign investment
dwindled to a trickle and the opportunity for fulfilling employment
in multinationals or even progressive local outfits was scarce.
BCCI, with its shiny chrome and glass interiors meticulously created
by a Lebanese designer, and young men in smart suits, oozing enviable
team spirit, culled from the best and the brightest.
From
its bases in London and the Middle East, BCCI expanded into Africa
in the seventies and further afield in Asia by the eighties. By
1980, BCCI had 150 branches in 46 countries and set about expanding
into the Americas, North, Central and South. The US was to prove
to be that bridge too far.
In
the latter half of the eighties, terminal illness struck- both literally
and figuratively. Its founder suffered a debilitating heart attack
and in the US, authorities initiated a multiple attack. The bank
was vilified as the greatest fraud of the century, as a shopping
centre for criminals, the merchants of sleaze and corruption, a
haven for drug money, a pimp for potentates and a criminal enterprise
violating US banking regulations. Opportunistic journalists, of
which Tariq Ali was the most prominent, clambered on to the bandwagon.
In 1981, he wrote three unsigned articles published by the New Statesman,
which are appended in this TV script. Then through a film The BCCI
Story in 1991 for Channel 4 and now, over a quarter of a century
later, with the publication of a long-forgotten TV script buried
in his filing cabinet.
What
then is the motive? Drama or possibly vendetta? If conceived as
a drama, even with the demands of sound-bite sensationalism, perhaps
Tariq Ali should study the craft of the writers of such excellent
TV dramas as Inspector Morse or House of Cards. In the early part
of the last century, William Archer in his seminal work, Playmaking,
lays down two immutable rules for any dramatic work. Quoting Aristotle,
he says a play should have a beginning, a middle and an end, a fundamental
requirement that Tariq Ali seems to avoid as one is hard put to
fathom a story or a theme. Secondly, Archer advises, "The story
which is independent of character - which can be carried through
by a given number of ready-made puppets
is essentially a
trivial thing." The only person in this story, however, slanderously
portrayed, and who inspires attention is the character of Abedi
himself. The rest are 'ready made puppets' and the story is essentially
'a trivial thing.'
Tariq
Ali does not shroud Abedi alone with evil but, unable to restrain
his own politics, imputes base corruption to officials of the Bank
of England and collusion by a number of official agencies to subvert
the investigation of the bank. On the soft targets of Pakistanis
and Arabs, it is open season.
The story covers the discovery by a journalist, Amanda (the could-be
central protagonist), that the CIA was instrumental in the formation
of the bank, supported the bank's involvement in drug-trafficking
and money-laundering, which was financed Abu Nidal, the world's
No.1 terrorist - and then Amanda is mysteriously killed. The end.
The action moves at break-neck speed - a total of 160 scenes, comprising
mainly entries and exits from rooms, hotels and bars. Not being
an expert on scripts, I again turn to Archer. "What then is
the essence of drama if conflict be not it? What is the common quality
of themes, scenes and incidents, which we recognise as specifically
dramatic? [T]he essence of drama is crisis." You will be hard
put to find any crisis in this story. Glib, populist with a full
measure of acknowledgement to baser instincts - salacious Arabs
feeling up young men, a salacious Arab with a naked hooker, venal
Pakistani thugs undoing belts as they strip naked the whistleblower's
wife, and other such clichés.
If
not dramatic enterprise, what then could be the motive? Tariq Ali's
exposés of over 25 years of BCCI operations comprise details
of the structure of the bank shareholdings, its culture and ambitions,
peppered with innuendoes over its shadowy intent. Does he then aspire
to a Michael Moore-on-banking status, a voice for the voiceless
victims? Or is there some residual grudge over his own relationship
with the bank or 'the banker for all seasons?' Abedi is projected
as a villain, a Bhagwan Rajneesh-type megalomaniac, personally corrupt
and ruthless. He doesn't appear a lot in the script, but his villainy
is pervasive.
Does
this portrait ring true? In over 100 hours of interviews with BCCI
employees, executives, directors and clients, some of whose careers
lay shattered, others whose businesses suffered, some who had to
resort to legal action for the recovery of monies, I came across
not a single person who spoke of Abedi in other than reverential
terms. Not one spoke of a culture of expediency, short-termism or
officially endorsed unprofessionalism, let alone corrupt practices
in the bank. Not a single charge amongst the many indictments against
Abedi, Naqvi and many others comprised charges of self-enrichment.
So
what is there to support the villainous evil enterprise theory?
In October 1981, Tariq Ali wrote in the New Statesman about Mr Masood
Asghar, who had resigned from the group. "Asghar threatened
to sue... against the advice of friends, he returned to Pakistan.
One morning a group of soldiers burst in and Asghar was beaten and
raped."
This
story has been repeated in Truell/Gurwin's False Profits (1992)
and Beaty/Gwynne's The Outlaw Bank (1993). Tariq Ali considers this
foul act against Asghar relevant enough to be repeated in the script,
verbatim, from the mouth of the DA's deputy, just to reinforce the
notion of pervasive evil. My curiosity aroused, and I hunted down
Masood Asghar and spoke to him about his relationship with Abedi
and BCCI. Herewith verbatim.
Masood
Asghar: "Mr. Abedi was the most gracious man I ever met. He
gave me nothing but respect. His final words to me when I called
on him to say goodbye was 'come to me if there is anything I can
do for you.'"
I persisted: "And what about stories of the alleged rape that
have been repeatedly published?" Masood Asghar laughs: "That
story was my own fault. After a dispute had arisen between some
bank officials and myself on the interpretation of terminal benefits
in my contract, I initiated legal proceedings. At that time, a friend
from the bank phoned me from London and asked how I was doing. 'Yaar,
the bank is buggering me around,' I replied. And so the story began!"
This then comprises the authenticity of evidence to support the
supposed evil nature of the enterprise!
What then should be made of the bagful of other charges heaped on
Abedi and the bank? Unanimous in their praise for and defense of
Abedi, those interviewed were equally vocal in their indictments
of Abedi's megalomania, his bizarre ramblings on metaphysics and
spiritualism, his cynical acquisition of people and the bank's legerdemain
in accounting. Many other organisational features, both of structure
and form, were highlighted that were serious enough to justify regulatory
intervention but not to close down the bank.
The Bank of England (BoE) was purportedly instructed by the then
prime minister, John Major, to close the bank in order to protect
the depositors. That was the single most dangerous action likely
to damage those self-same constituents. But what were they being
protected from? Since the closure, efficient management by the liquidators
has permitted the return of 81% to the UK depositors and, it is
likely, that payment in full will be made even after over $1 billion
have been spent on 'liquidation costs'. In the rest of the world
not a single depositor lost their money. Under an agreement with
the liquidators, the majority shareholder (Abu Dhabi) paid over
$2 billion to cover the dues of the depositors and that commitment
had been unequivocally made by the ruler of Abu Dhabi prior to the
bank's closure. On July 4, the ruler's representative flew to London
to commit financial support to the proposed restructuring of the
bank. At that meeting, not a word was mentioned of the BoE's intent
to close the bank the following day.
BCCI's sins of false accounting, reckless lending and defalcation
of the employees' welfare benefits have been well documented but
have been dwarfed subsequently by events at Enron, WorldCom, One.Tel
and Northern Rock, among other well known corporations who took
down billions of public money. BCCI, with the help of its principal
shareholder, turned out to be solvent.
I cannot answer the question as to why this prolific and highly
respected voice of our times should, at this point, wish to be part
of the continuum of BCCI-bashing. The library of exposés
feeding the hunger for sensationalism is large. Truell/Gurwin's
False Profits is meticulous in detail; Beaty/Gwynne's The Outlaw
Bank, is more cerebral but miserly with the truth and generous in
fantasy; and Adam/Franz's A Full Service Bank details the sting
operations against BCCI in Miami . In the preface, Tariq Ali informs
us that "the real story has yet to be told." What then
is still left to be told?
Can
it ever be determined that Abedi's vision of a 'South ' World Bank,
independent of Western control, funded by petrodollars, and organised
for the development of the Third World was anathema to the West?
Will the story of a myriad of dedicated, hardworking professionals,
who carried unfairly a stigma not of their own making, ever be told?
Will an even-handed analysis of the real motive for destroying the
bank ever be exposed? Unlikely. Western minds are made up, eyes
are closed and the deaf don't hear.
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