Amidst western fears that during the regional security crisis in South and Central Asia, nuclear material may leak into the hands of terrorists, Pakistan’s apex Nuclear Command and Control Authority (NCA) met on October 23 in Islamabad to reiterate that its nuclear weapons are in safe hands and there is no chance of their being blown up accidentally or trickling down to the religious fanatics.

            President Pervez Musharraf is not only confronted with western suspicion but also criticism from the internal religious lobby, with the former doubting the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear safety mechanisms and the latter accusing the General of selling them off to the USA.

            Chairing the NCA meeting, General Musharraf said that he had reassured world leaders that Pakistan’s strategic capability was fully safeguarded and there existed no possibility whatsoever of its falling into the wrong hands.

            And to the people of Pakistan, he reaffirmed that the country’s strategic assets were the cornerstone of the country’s national security and there was no question of any compromise on the nuclear programme.

            The NCA consists of federal foreign and interior ministers, the chairman joint chiefs of staff committee, the three service chiefs, senior scientists and other senior army officers.

            In the recent spate of public protests, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, declared General Pervez Musharraf a ‘security risk,’ saying that the military ruler had bargained away the country’s security and nuclear programme in exchange for a few dollars, and had failed to withstand US pressures.  Another former senator and religious leader from the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, Maulana Hafiz Ahmed, claimed that the government had agreed to hand over its nuclear installations to the US.

            American defence analysts, on the other hand, fear that in the face of sustained US-led allied attacks on Afghanistan, unrest could boil over in Pakistan.  They also believe that those strains could be reflected in the Pakistan army and there is a threat that Afghan sympathisers in the military might seize control of nuclear weapons.

            According to Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, the greatest risk is a fissure within Pakistan’s military caused by officers sympathetic to the Taliban.

            Michael Krepon, a nuclear weapons specialist at the Henry L. Stimson Centre, agrees that the potential for unrest creates pressing concerns.  “Such officers getting out of control would be the ultimate nightmare,” he says.  Krepon adds that in peace time we would have high confidence in the capacity of the military to protect the weapons.  The moot question is what happens when you are not in a peace time situation and the great strains placed on the country are reflected in the military.

            Two recent media reports, one regarding the arrest of former two nuclear scientists by security agencies and the other, a Times story datelined October 26, which quoted western intelligence sources claiming that Osama bin Laden had obtained nuclear materials illegally from Pakistan for possible use in the terrorism war, have been refuted by Pakistan’s Foreign Office.  A Foreign Office spokesman said, “These reports are absurd,” and that Pakistan had possessed the nuclear material for the past 15 years with no untoward incident occurring during this period.

            He said that Pakistan has a unilateral commitment to the international community that it will not transfer technology or materials of a sensitive nature, including nuclear material, to any other country or entity.  He said that Pakistan had an impeccable record of honouring its commitment.

            Regarding the reported detention of two nuclear scientists by the government, the official spokesman, Riaz Mohammed Khan, denied that the scientists had been detained or arrested on the charge or suspicion of passing on nuclear-related material or information.

            The scientists, Bashiruddin Mehmood and Chaudhry Majeed, from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had formed a charity organisation after their retirement – Tamir-i-Nau Afghanistan – to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghan  refugees.

            The government, he added, had taken a policy decision to ascertain the credentials of all the non-governmental organisations active in Afghanistan and, as a part of that policy, certain questions had been asked about their NGO.

            Pakistan established the Nuclear Command and Control Authority (NCA) headed by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf in February last year .

            There are also reports that before allowing the US-led air strikes on Afghanistan, the Pakistan government had taken strict security measures by establishing around eight no-fly zones, mostly over its sensitive security installations.  Any aircraft violating them would be shot down.

            In this situation, the security experts consider the NCA meeting pivotal, saying that in the changed regional scenario a review of strategic plans was imperative.  The NCA is responsible for policy formulation and exercises employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organisations.

            It comprises the Employment Control Committee and Development Control Committee as well as the Strategic Plans Division.  Since its inception, the NCA has held around four meetings.

            Observers say that the current international concern is not that Pakistan sign the NPT (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty) or CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), which are irrelevant, but how to instal a credible command and control authority.

            Therefore the US approach has been that instead of coercing Pakistan to sign these treaties it should be asked to enact some strict official nuclear safety regulations.

            Last year, we saw not only the inception of the NCA but also more stringent export control over the trade of radioactive material.  These controls seem to be working.  Maria Sultan, a nuclear analyst at the Institute of Strategic Studies, a government funded think-tank, says that Pakistan has never been accused of selling nuclear material in the international black market.

            After the September 11 terrorist attack in the US, the American interest in installing improved safety mechanisms has been renewed.  Officials sources say  a six-member team of US military officials, led by Brigadier General Kavin Chilton, visited Islamabad in the last week of September and held talks with Pakistani officials about improving security and installing new safeguards on its nuclear weapons sites and at its nuclear power plants.

            The US under secretary of state for economic, business and agriculture affairs, during his visit to Islamabad in the second week of October, said that despite offering all out economic support to Pakistan, US concerns over weapons of mass destruction would continue as the US is responsible for ensuring global security.  Recently, these concerns have been echoed by US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who offered Pakistan “technical assistance” in safeguarding its nuclear assets.

            Maria Sultan brushes aside these western fears, dubbing them unfounded.  She said that, according to western analysts, this is a ‘high risk, low probability’ scenario.  The very structure of Pakistan’s NCA does not allow such a worst case scenario.

            She maintains that, “Pakistan’s command and control system is based on a central authoritative system, therefore there is a lesser potential of accidental launches or misuse.  Secondly, there is overlapping of military, political and scientific set-ups and its nuclear material is under multi-layered custodial control.  Lastly, Pakistan does not have its nuclear capability in Push Button State.  It would need a lot of synchronisation with a larger number of personnel.  Hence the possibility of some rogue element taking control is simply impossible.”

            Maria elaborates, “Unlike the US there is no nuclear button in the hand of one person or one organisation.  If the threat of nuclear terrorism is to be considered a viable option, any power which has the capability of producing nuclear fissile material even for civilian use is a source of threat.”

            “In any case, Pakistan does not have a large number of civilian nuclear power plants that can be taken over by terrorists.  And Pakistan has not deployed its nuclear weapons.”

            Zafar Jaspal, a strategic expert working with the think tank IPRI (Islamabad Policy Research Institute), says that the issue of NCA’s credibility could be addressed at two levels.  “First the organisational set-up.  To that, the answer is yes.  But when one makes a comparison with the other NWS (Nuclear Weapon States), particularly with high tech states, Pakistan needs modern technology to make it foolproof.  To make it more effective, Pakistan needs technological assistance from the developed world.”

            The ‘command and control structure’ is defined as an arrangement of facilities, personnel, procedures and means of information acquisition, processing, dissemination and decision-making used by national command authorities and military commanders in planning, directing and controlling military operations.  In the nuclear context, a safe and reliable command and control system is the centrepiece in the design for stable deterrence.

            Regarding western doubts about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, Jaspal questioned, “Who are the suspicious ones?  Their record shows that they want to cap, reverse and finally eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability.  There is no change in this mindset.  It’s only natural that they should express their fear.”

            Maria added that these doubts relate to the rationality aspect of the nuclear decision makers in Pakistan, not to our capability or the elements to secure it.  Suspicions are based on the biased concept that deterrence is more viable among the five nuclear weapon states than in South Asia on account of factors such as the crisis between India and Pakistan.  But the recent history of crisis between India and Pakistan has shown that the system worked credibly in 1999, when both countries were on the verge of war. 

            In 1988, Pakistan and India agreed not to attack each other’s nuclear installations.  The CBM is still in place, and both sides continue to exchange a list of their nuclear installations every year.

            To further strengthen nuclear safety measures, Maria said that the US could provide Pakistan with permissive action links (coding devices/locks to prevent unauthorised use of nuclear devices), AWACS (early warning radar systems) to give Pakistan more time to think before reacting and software for C4I (command, control, computer, communication and intelligence).  The US laws, however, do not allow sharing such nuclear-related information with other countries.

            On October 17, the US House of Representatives passed a bill giving authority to President Bush to waive all military and economic sanctions against Pakistan.  For the first time in a decade, Pakistan will be entirely free of US sanctions.  But even this measure does not allow transfer of much needed technology to Pakistan.

            Jaspal said that ways can be found to assist any state for nuclear safety purposes.  “For instance, there are dual use technologies, like supra computers, which can be used for military as well as non-military purposes.  After the lifting of sanctions, dual use technologies are transferable, under the pretext of peaceful use.  If the US is interested in helping out, there should be no difficulty.  They can introduce a waiver in their domestic foreign assistance act on the grounds that they wish to avoid the accidental use of nuclear weapons.  In any case, the Bush administration is not concerned about the violation of international treaties and agreements when the violation suits its own interests.”