It was a break that the Northern
Alliance could scarcely have thought would come their way. Defeated repeatedly by the Taliban in the
battlefield and demoralised by the recent assassination of its military leader
Ahmad Shah Massoud, the opposition coalition could not believe its luck when it
was approached by the US to form a strategic partnership to topple the Taliban
regime. Not surprisingly, the Alliance
decided to grab the opportunity with both hands, going so far as to even
express support for a US attack on Afghanistan, particularly aimed at bases
belonging to the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, and offering to cooperate in
executing any such plan.
The
Northern Alliance, or the United Front as it now prefers to be called, is
mainly composed of non-Pushtun groups who claim to represent the minority
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkomans.
The Tajiks, who are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after
the majority Pushtuns, are led by deposed president Professor Burhanuddin
Rabbani and by Massoud’s successor, Mohammad Faheem.
Abdul
Rasheed Dostum and Abdul Malik, both former communist militia generals who
joined the mujahideen in April 1992 to trigger the fall of President Dr
Najibullah’s regime, represent the Uzbeks in the Northern Alliance. The small Turkoman community which does not
have a leader or military commander of note, is also therefore lumped together
with the Uzbeks. Meanwhile, the Shiite
Hazaras in the coalition are a fractious group led by numerous leaders, among
them Abdul Karim Khalili, Ustad Mohaqqiq, Sheikh Asef Mohseni and Hussain
Anwari.
The
only Pushtuns in the Northern Alliance are Professor Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf,
who led the fundamentalist Ittehad-i-Islami during the Afghan jihad, and former
governor of the eastern Nangarhar province, Haji Abdul Qadeer. However, neither currently wield much clout
as military leaders because some of their commanders have thrown in their lot
with the Taliban. Of the two, Professor
Sayyaf, who can speak Arabic, has more men under his command because is still
in a position to pay them from the donations he received from wealthy Arab
benefactors. Haji Qadeer’s Eastern
Shura, on the other hand, dissolved after suffering defeat at the hands of the
Taliban, and he has been unable to cobble together a force that can fight the
Taliban either in his native province Nangarhar or in the adjoining Laghman and
Kunar provinces. Given these
circumstances, it can be safely said that Professor Sayyaf and Haji Qadeer’s
presence in the Northern Alliance does not render it a nationwide and
representative coalition of Afghanistan’s numerous ethnic, religious and
linguistic groups.
Conscious of its limitations, the Northern Alliance
hastened to forge a united anti-Taliban front with former Afghan king Zahir
Shah. It sent
a delegation led by its deputy foreign minister Mohammad
Yunis Qanuni, to speak with representatives of the ex-monarch,
who is a Pushtun, and strike a deal to establish a coalition
interim government in case the Taliban regime collapses.
The two sides also agreed to form a joint supreme
council and convene a Loya Jirga, a traditional Afghan
grand assembly, to elect a leader and take decisions
on the crisis facing Afghanistan.
However, subsequent events suggest that the Northern
Alliance and Zahir Shah’s men have different interpretations
on what was agreed by the two sides. The Northern Alliance has been arguing that half the representatives
in the joint supreme council would be its nominees with
the remaining half nominated by the former king.
Zahir Shah’s representatives meanwhile, stung
by criticism levelled by supporters for hastily signing
an agreement with an alliance that lacks Pushtun representation
and stands discredited for its performance while in
power in Kabul for four-and-a-half years during 1992-96,
were giving a different interpretation to the said accord.
These differences could exacerbate in the coming
days if more Afghan military commanders and notables,
including some from amongst the Taliban, join the Zahir
Shah-led coalition and start pressing their claims for
a share in the future government set-up.
Meanwhile,
the post-September 11 performance of the Northern Alliance in the battlefield
has been disappointing, despite claims that it was stepping up its military
activities against the Taliban. With
past bitterness and traditional rivalries bedevilling their relations with each
other as they seek to wrest control of vast stretches of territory lost to the
Taliban in recent years, most of the opposition factions and commanders have
been fighting isolated battles against the Taliban in different parts of the
country. Notwithstanding the changed political scenario and the fact that the US,
Russia and other countries determined to overthrow the Taliban have reportedly
started supplying them with new weapons and other resources, these opposition
groups have been unable to coordinate and intensify their military activities.
The
over 200 foreign journalists who flocked to the four provinces – Badakhshan,
Takhar, Parwan and Kapisa – fully or partially controlled by the anti-Taliban
alliance in Northern Afghanistan in the hope of seeing some action have yet to
report any military operations.
The
active frontlines pitting the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces against each
other are in Takhar, Samangan, Bamiyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Ghor, Badghis and Kunar
provinces. In Takhar, which borders
Tajikistan, the Taliban control the provincial capital Taloqan, as well as
large chunks of area in the Farkhar and Khwajaghar districts. However, troops
loyal to slain opposition commander Massoud still hold parts of Takhar,
especially the routes that lead to Badakhshan and Panjshir Valley. Massoud’s men offering stiff resistance to
the Taliban in Parwan and Kapisa provinces in the Shomali plains north of
Kabul. There have been suggestions that
the US may aid the Northern Alliance to seize the whole of Shomali area and
push back the Taliban to Kabul city to enable its military aircraft to safely
use the Bagram airbase situated there.
In
Samangan province and in parts of Saripul and Balkh, much of the anti-Taliban
campaign is spearheaded by Uzbek warlord Dostum, who returned to Afghanistan
some time back after an extended hiatus in Turkey, whose government extends
support to Afghans of Turkish origin.
However, Dostum cannot expect any backing from rival Uzbek warlord Abdul
Malik, who revolted against him in 1997 following a brief alliance with the
Taliban.
In
Bamiyan and Darra-i-Souf, the Taliban are engaged in fighting Shiite factions
such as Hezb-i-Wahdat and Harkat-i-Islami. These groups, comprised of Hazaras
who trace their antecendents to the Mongols, receive active military and
financial support from Iran. The tough Hazara fighters now control Yakawlang,
the second biggest town in the province after Bamiyan town, and are in a
position to cut off Taliban supply lines to northern Afghanistan.
In
Ghor and Badghis provinces, opposition forces largely claim allegiance to
former Herat governor Ismail Khan. The
Taliban have found it difficult to put down the revolt in Ghor and are faced
with frequent insurgencies by Ismail Khan’s supporters in certain outlying
Badghis districts such as Qadis.
However, they have until now succeeded in holding the provincial
capitals, Chaghcharan in Ghor and Qala-i-Nau in Badghis. The threat to Herat, the biggest city in
western Afghanistan and of much strategic importance due to its proximity to
both Iran and Turkmenistan, has also not materialised as yet.
On
the other hand, in the mountainous parts of Kunar province bordering Pakistan’s
Dir district and Bajaur tribal agency, the Taliban have been facing problems in
flushing out opposition commanders Malik Zareen, Kashmir Khan, Jehandad Khan
and Hazrat Ali. Hazrat Ali largely
operates in an area forming part of the eastern Nangarhar province. Kashmir Khan, a former mujahideen commander
loyal to Hezb-i-Islami head Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, had earlier entered into a
ceasefire with the Taliban. Hikmatyar’s
recent announcements offering to fight alongside the Taliban regime in
resisting a US attack on Afghanistan has prompted Kashmir Khan and other
Hezb-i-Islami commanders to stop fighting the Taliban.
An
assorted group of commanders hold a chunk of territory in Nimruz province in
the triangle where the borders of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan coincide. Whether the Taliban deliberately chose not
to capture and hold this strategic area where drug-trafficking, gun-running and
other illegal activities were said to be rampant or whether they were unable to
do so is uncertain. For reasons best
known to them, the Taliban and their opponents in this area have maintained a
tacit ceasefire here.
Although
there are a number of active frontlines spread out all over the country, the
Taliban have until now held their own in all these places. While the population in some of these places
is clearly hostile toward the Taliban, they have been helped by the fact that
the opposition commanders too are discredited and therefore unable to exploit
the situation to their advantage.
Moreover, for the fractious components of the Northern Alliance to agree
on a single leader and coordinate their military activities seems an uphill
task. Although Faheem has replaced the late Massoud, it is doubtful whether he
commands the respect and loyalty of even his own fighters in the Shura-i-Nazaar
organisation. As for Ismail Khan, who
defied even the late Massoud, it is unlikely that he will unquestioningly accept
Faheem’s command. Dostum and the Shiite
leaders Khalili and Mohaqqiq too would have to swallow their pride before they
consent to fight as part of a Faheem-led Northern Alliance.
Senior
mujahideen leaders such as ousted president Professor Rabbani, Professor Sayyaf
and Haji Qadeer too are part of the Northern Alliance but their role is largely
political rather than military. In
fact, Professor Sayyaf’s loyalties have reportedly become suspect after two
Arabs recommended by him assassinated Massoud while posing as journalists.
While
the Taliban regime may not be able to survive for long, the faction-ridden
Northern Alliance does not inspire hope that it will be able to provide
stability by filling the power vacuum.
Complicating the situation further is the fact that the coalition’s
various leaders have different patrons, including Russia, Iran, India,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose often conflicting interests they have to keep
in mind in return for the arms and funding they receive. The US too has now entered the fray and its
contribution in the shape of weapons and other resources is bound to inject a
new factor into the workings of the Northern Alliance. One result of this latest developement is
the strange spectacle of rivals such as the US and Iran backing the same
alliance in Afghanistan on the basis of their common hatred for the
Taliban. The irony of the situation is
further compounded by strong Iranian opposition to a US attack on Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance also has to contend with
bitter opposition from Pakistan, with which it has had hostile relations for
years.
These convoluted aspects of the larger picture
mean that even if the Taliban are ousted from power,
there is no guarantee that Afghanistan would have a
government that can function smoothly to inspire confidence
and ensure durable peace.