Cover Story

Divide and Rule

The faction-ridden Northern Alliance, whose leaders are deeply mistrustful of each other, cannot ensure a durable peace if the Taliban fall from power.

By  Rahimullah Yusufzai

 

             It was a break that the Northern Alliance could scarcely have thought would come their way.  Defeated repeatedly by the Taliban in the battlefield and demoralised by the recent assassination of its military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, the opposition coalition could not believe its luck when it was approached by the US to form a strategic partnership to topple the Taliban regime.  Not surprisingly, the Alliance decided to grab the opportunity with both hands, going so far as to even express support for a US attack on Afghanistan, particularly aimed at bases belonging to the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, and offering to cooperate in executing any such plan.

            The Northern Alliance, or the United Front as it now prefers to be called, is mainly composed of non-Pushtun groups who claim to represent the minority Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkomans.  The Tajiks, who are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the majority Pushtuns, are led by deposed president Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and by Massoud’s successor, Mohammad Faheem.

            Abdul Rasheed Dostum and Abdul Malik, both former communist militia generals who joined the mujahideen in April 1992 to trigger the fall of President Dr Najibullah’s regime, represent the Uzbeks in the Northern Alliance.  The small Turkoman community which does not have a leader or military commander of note, is also therefore lumped together with the Uzbeks.  Meanwhile, the Shiite Hazaras in the coalition are a fractious group led by numerous leaders, among them Abdul Karim Khalili, Ustad Mohaqqiq, Sheikh Asef Mohseni and Hussain Anwari. 

            The only Pushtuns in the Northern Alliance are Professor Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who led the fundamentalist Ittehad-i-Islami during the Afghan jihad, and former governor of the eastern Nangarhar province, Haji Abdul Qadeer.  However, neither currently wield much clout as military leaders because some of their commanders have thrown in their lot with the Taliban.  Of the two, Professor Sayyaf, who can speak Arabic, has more men under his command because is still in a position to pay them from the donations he received from wealthy Arab benefactors.  Haji Qadeer’s Eastern Shura, on the other hand, dissolved after suffering defeat at the hands of the Taliban, and he has been unable to cobble together a force that can fight the Taliban either in his native province Nangarhar or in the adjoining Laghman and Kunar provinces.  Given these circumstances, it can be safely said that Professor Sayyaf and Haji Qadeer’s presence in the Northern Alliance does not render it a nationwide and representative coalition of Afghanistan’s numerous ethnic, religious and linguistic groups.

            Conscious of its limitations, the Northern Alliance hastened  to forge a united anti-Taliban front with former Afghan king Zahir Shah.  It sent a delegation led by its deputy foreign minister Mohammad Yunis Qanuni, to speak with representatives of the ex-monarch, who is a Pushtun, and strike a deal to establish a coalition interim government in case the Taliban regime collapses.  The two sides also agreed to form a joint supreme council and convene a Loya Jirga, a traditional Afghan grand assembly, to elect a leader and take decisions on the crisis facing Afghanistan.  However, subsequent events suggest that the Northern Alliance and Zahir Shah’s men have different interpretations on what was agreed by the two sides.  The Northern Alliance has been arguing that half the representatives in the joint supreme council would be its nominees with the remaining half nominated by the former king.  Zahir Shah’s representatives meanwhile, stung by criticism levelled by supporters for hastily signing an agreement with an alliance that lacks Pushtun representation and stands discredited for its performance while in power in Kabul for four-and-a-half years during 1992-96, were giving a different interpretation to the said accord.  These differences could exacerbate in the coming days if more Afghan military commanders and notables, including some from amongst the Taliban, join the Zahir Shah-led coalition and start pressing their claims for a share in the future government set-up.

            Meanwhile, the post-September 11 performance of the Northern Alliance in the battlefield has been disappointing, despite claims that it was stepping up its military activities against the Taliban.  With past bitterness and traditional rivalries bedevilling their relations with each other as they seek to wrest control of vast stretches of territory lost to the Taliban in recent years, most of the opposition factions and commanders have been fighting isolated battles against the Taliban in different parts of the country. Notwithstanding the changed political scenario and the fact that the US, Russia and other countries determined to overthrow the Taliban have reportedly started supplying them with new weapons and other resources, these opposition groups have been unable to coordinate and intensify their military activities.

            The over 200 foreign journalists who flocked to the four provinces – Badakhshan, Takhar, Parwan and Kapisa – fully or partially controlled by the anti-Taliban alliance in Northern Afghanistan in the hope of seeing some action have yet to report any military operations.                                    

            The active frontlines pitting the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces against each other are in Takhar, Samangan, Bamiyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Ghor, Badghis and Kunar provinces.  In Takhar, which borders Tajikistan, the Taliban control the provincial capital Taloqan, as well as large chunks of area in the Farkhar and Khwajaghar districts. However, troops loyal to slain opposition commander Massoud still hold parts of Takhar, especially the routes that lead to Badakhshan and Panjshir Valley.  Massoud’s men offering stiff resistance to the Taliban in Parwan and Kapisa provinces in the Shomali plains north of Kabul.  There have been suggestions that the US may aid the Northern Alliance to seize the whole of Shomali area and push back the Taliban to Kabul city to enable its military aircraft to safely use the Bagram airbase situated there.

            In Samangan province and in parts of Saripul and Balkh, much of the anti-Taliban campaign is spearheaded by Uzbek warlord Dostum, who returned to Afghanistan some time back after an extended hiatus in Turkey, whose government extends support to Afghans of Turkish origin.  However, Dostum cannot expect any backing from rival Uzbek warlord Abdul Malik, who revolted against him in 1997 following a brief alliance with the Taliban.

            In Bamiyan and Darra-i-Souf, the Taliban are engaged in fighting Shiite factions such as Hezb-i-Wahdat and Harkat-i-Islami. These groups, comprised of Hazaras who trace their antecendents to the Mongols, receive active military and financial support from Iran. The tough Hazara fighters now control Yakawlang, the second biggest town in the province after Bamiyan town, and are in a position to cut off Taliban supply lines to northern Afghanistan.

            In Ghor and Badghis provinces, opposition forces largely claim allegiance to former Herat governor Ismail Khan.  The Taliban have found it difficult to put down the revolt in Ghor and are faced with frequent insurgencies by Ismail Khan’s supporters in certain outlying Badghis districts such as Qadis.  However, they have until now succeeded in holding the provincial capitals, Chaghcharan in Ghor and Qala-i-Nau in Badghis.  The threat to Herat, the biggest city in western Afghanistan and of much strategic importance due to its proximity to both Iran and Turkmenistan, has also not materialised as yet.

            On the other hand, in the mountainous parts of Kunar province bordering Pakistan’s Dir district and Bajaur tribal agency, the Taliban have been facing problems in flushing out opposition commanders Malik Zareen, Kashmir Khan, Jehandad Khan and Hazrat Ali.  Hazrat Ali largely operates in an area forming part of the eastern Nangarhar province.  Kashmir Khan, a former mujahideen commander loyal to Hezb-i-Islami head Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, had earlier entered into a ceasefire with the Taliban.  Hikmatyar’s recent announcements offering to fight alongside the Taliban regime in resisting a US attack on Afghanistan has prompted Kashmir Khan and other Hezb-i-Islami commanders to stop fighting the Taliban.

            An assorted group of commanders hold a chunk of territory in Nimruz province in the triangle where the borders of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan coincide.  Whether the Taliban deliberately chose not to capture and hold this strategic area where drug-trafficking, gun-running and other illegal activities were said to be rampant or whether they were unable to do so is uncertain.  For reasons best known to them, the Taliban and their opponents in this area have maintained a tacit ceasefire here.

            Although there are a number of active frontlines spread out all over the country, the Taliban have until now held their own in all these places.  While the population in some of these places is clearly hostile toward the Taliban, they have been helped by the fact that the opposition commanders too are discredited and therefore unable to exploit the situation to their advantage.  Moreover, for the fractious components of the Northern Alliance to agree on a single leader and coordinate their military activities seems an uphill task. Although Faheem has replaced the late Massoud, it is doubtful whether he commands the respect and loyalty of even his own fighters in the Shura-i-Nazaar organisation.  As for Ismail Khan, who defied even the late Massoud, it is unlikely that he will unquestioningly accept Faheem’s command.  Dostum and the Shiite leaders Khalili and Mohaqqiq too would have to swallow their pride before they consent to fight as part of a Faheem-led Northern Alliance.

            Senior mujahideen leaders such as ousted president Professor Rabbani, Professor Sayyaf and Haji Qadeer too are part of the Northern Alliance but their role is largely political rather than military.  In fact, Professor Sayyaf’s loyalties have reportedly become suspect after two Arabs recommended by him assassinated Massoud while posing as journalists.

            While the Taliban regime may not be able to survive for long, the faction-ridden Northern Alliance does not inspire hope that it will be able to provide stability by filling the power vacuum.  Complicating the situation further is the fact that the coalition’s various leaders have different patrons, including Russia, Iran, India, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose often conflicting interests they have to keep in mind in return for the arms and funding they receive.  The US too has now entered the fray and its contribution in the shape of weapons and other resources is bound to inject a new factor into the workings of the Northern Alliance.  One result of this latest developement is the strange spectacle of rivals such as the US and Iran backing the same alliance in Afghanistan on the basis of their common hatred for the Taliban.  The irony of the situation is further compounded by strong Iranian opposition to a US attack on Afghanistan.  The Northern Alliance also has to contend with bitter opposition from Pakistan, with which it has had hostile relations for years.            

            These convoluted aspects of the larger picture mean that even if the Taliban are ousted from power, there is no guarantee that Afghanistan would have a government that can function smoothly to inspire confidence and ensure durable peace.

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