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The
Hudood Ordinances were promulgated in 1979 by Zia-ul-Haq in his
drive towards Islamisation. The laws came into focus in the early
'80s when the first punishments for stoning to death and whipping
were awarded. So began the crusade for the repeal of the Hudood
Ordinances, spearheaded by Women's Action Forum (WAF). But while
civil rights groups have over the years played a pivotal role in
helping to dilute the negative effects of the Hudood Ordinances,
none have been successful in achieving their repeal.
The
Hudood Ordinances are a compilation of five laws dealing with the
offences of theft and armed dacoity; qazf (bearing false witness);
use and trafficking of drugs and consumption of alcoholic beverages;
rape, abduction of women and zina (adultery and fornication and
the mode of executing the punishment of whipping under the Hudood
Ordinances). Of these, the Zina Ordinance that deals with the offences
of rape, abduction of women, prostitution and adultery is the most
controversial.
The Zina Ordinance makes adultery and fornication an offence.
Under this Ordinance, "a man and a woman are said to commit
zina if they wilfully have sexual intercourse without being validly
married to each other." Before this Ordinance, fornication
was not an offence under the Pakistan Penal Code. Adultery with
a married woman was a private offence for which only the man could
be punished. Under the Zina Ordinance, an offence of rape is committed
where a person has "sexual intercourse with a woman or man,
as the case may be, to whom he or she is not validly married"
and where the act of sexual intercourse is committed without the
consent of or against the will of the victim.
Two
types of punishments are prescribed. The maximum or the hadd punishment
and the lesser punishment of tazir. The maximum punishment of hadd,
is stoning to death for married persons and one hundred lashes for
unmarried persons. The proof required for hadd is that there be
four Muslim adult male witnesses of good repute to the act of penetration
or a voluntary confession in a competent court of law. The confession
can be retracted at any time before the execution of punishment,
in which case it cannot be carried out. With any other type of evidence,
including that of women or non-Muslims, hadd cannot be inflicted.
The crime is then punishable by tazir, which in the case of zina
is imprisonment for a maximum of ten years, thirty lashes and a
fine, and for rape is maximum imprisonment of 25 years and 30 lashes.
For purposes of punishment, the law draws a distinction between
a married person and an unmarried one. An unmarried rapist cannot,
therefore, ever get the maximum punishment for rape irrespective
of how heinous the offence. Further, even though the hadd punishment
can only be awarded to adults, the definition of 'adults' under
the law may include girls as young as eight, the only criterion
being puberty. An adult man is "a person who has attained the
age of 18 years" and an adult female "the age of 16 years,
or has attained puberty".
This definition ignores all basic legal principles of protecting
children from criminal responsibility before they reach a certain
age. The Pakistan Penal Code had protected minor girls by providing
that sexual intercourse with a girl under 14, even with consent,
would constitute rape. Not only is this immunity not incorporated
in the Zina Ordinance, but the Ordinance further reduces it.
The Zina Ordinance is fraught with legal ambiguities. The
major flaw in this law is the fact that no distinction is made between
adultery and rape. Rape is considered no more heinous a crime than
zina. The demarcation line between the two offences is so thin in
practice, that when a woman comes into the court with a case of
rape, there is a possibility that she might herself be convicted
of zina if she cannot prove the rape. The onus of providing proof
in a rape case rests with the woman herself. If she is unable to
prove her allegation, bringing the case to court is considered equivalent
to a confession of sexual intercourse without lawful marriage.
Over the years, the judgements passed by courts have often
overstepped this fine line between the two offences. This definition
of zina has led to a series of cases where both women and men have
been falsely implicated on the pretext of not being validly married
to each other. In the case of void marriages, the cohabitation of
couples is taken as a "confession" of zina. The most notorious
case is that of Mohammad Sarwar and Shahida Parveen (NLR 1988 (SD)
FSC 188. The trial court in this case ruled Shahida and Sarwar's
marriage as being illegal and awarded them the maximum hadd punishment
of stoning to death. Shahida had been previously married and claimed
to have been divorced before marrying Sarwar. On trial she produced
a divorce deed allegedly bearing her ex-husband's signature. Since
Shahida's divorce had not been registered, the court took the view
that the divorce stood invalidated. Therefore, her marriage was
considered void and taken to be a confession of zina.
On
appeal, her defence counsel argued that the statement made by the
accused (that they were married) was not intended as a confession,
but as a denial of the charge of zina. Subsequently, the couple
was acquitted on re-trial. The principle laid down by the FSC in
the case of Mohammad Sarwar and Shahida Parveen was, however, completely
ignored in the recent case of Zafran Bibi (PLD 2002 FSC 1), where
a woman from Kohat was awarded punishment of stoning to death by
a sessions court. The prosecution while instituting the case had
alleged that Zafran Bibi had committed adultery with the brother
of her husband as a result of which she gave birth to a child when
her husband was in jail on murder charges. The district and sessions
judge, Kohat, had found the woman guilty of the offence and had
sentenced her to death by stoning. Even though the decision of the
trial court was reversed by the FSC, the judgement raises alarming
legal issues which were believed to have been settled. According
to the Maliki school of jurisprudence, the burden of proving Zafran's
lack of consent by "raising alarm or making complaint"
was shifted on her.
From decided case law it would seem that the courts require
"real resistance" (Bahadur Shah v. The State, PLD 1987
FSC 11) on the part of the complainant. Courts have not accepted
that submission does not necessarily mean consent and it has been
held (Ubaidullah v. The State, PLD 1983 FSC 11) that "since
no violence was found on her body, it could be reasonable to infer
that she was a willing party to sexual intercourse." To prove
the offence of rape corroborative evidence is generally required.
Such evidence could either be in the nature of marks of violence,
medical evidence, or third party testimony. Zafran Bibi's testimony
was accepted by the court since "there was nothing on record
to presume that she was a woman of easy virtue." Proving the
lack of consent becomes an arduous task as Pakistani law does not
protect the rape victim from attacks on her character. In fact such
attacks are permitted under the Qanun-e Shahadat Order 1984, which
provides that "when a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt
to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally
immoral character." Any change to the rape laws would not be
complete without reviewing the evidential requirements in rape cases.
Various commissions and committees over the years have advocated
the repeal of these laws. In 1997, the Commission of Inquiry for
Women headed by Justice (Retd.) Nasir Aslam Zahid recommended that
the Hudood Ordinances be repealed and that the repealed provisions
of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, be re-enacted with an amendment
to make marital rape an offence and to impose a more severe punishment
for rape on a minor wife. Recently the Special Committee to Review
the (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinances, 1979 under the aegis of
the National Commission on the Status of Women headed by Justice
(Retd.) Majida Rizvi also recommended repeal of the Hudood Ordinances
on the basis that "the Hudood Ordinances as enforced, are full
of lacunae and anomalies and the enforcement of these has brought
about injustice rather than justice, which should be the main purpose
of the enforcement of Islamic law." There is really not much
left to debate on the merits of these laws. The only thing missing
is the political will to tackle the issue.
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