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"As
in the Philippines and Burma," Simon Tisdall commented in The
Guardian late last month, "democracy in Thailand is in danger
of being musharrafed." It's hard to say for certain whether
this is the first time the name of Pakistan's military ruler has
been employed as a verb, but the usage obviously offers little cause
for pride.
There
are, naturally, several significant differences between what occurred
in Islamabad in October 1999 and last month's events in Bangkok.
But there are some striking parallels, too. An elected prime minister
is overthrown because he is said to be making a mess of things and,
not least, accused of attempted interference in the functioning
of the army. The junta that takes over, is reluctant about its action
being interpreted as a "coup" - it prefers the designation
"political change." It promises an improved democracy
a year or so down the road, and begins to investigate the deposed
prime minister's corruption.
There
is, of course, no likelihood of Thaksin Shinawatra ending up in
Saudi Arabia, but the takeover was effected while he was in New
York for the annual gathering of heads of state and government at
the United Nations, and at the time of writing he was effectively
in exile in Britain. There have been persistent rumours that a great
deal of luggage, ostensibly belonging to Thaksin, was flown out
of the country in the days preceding the coup, suggesting that he
was at least tangentially aware of what lay in store.
Like
Pakistan, Thailand is no stranger to the putsch syndrome. In fact,
in any competition it would win hands down, with 18 coups under
its belt over a 72-year period. That works out to an average of
one every four years. One reason for Pakistan's lower rate of attrition
is not particularly complimentary: we tend to tolerate military
dictators for much longer. Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq ruled the roost
for 11 years each, and Yahya Khan might have clung on for longer
than a little over two years had he not blundered into genocide
in East Pakistan and, consequently, a war against India. Pervez
Musharraf's regime is seven years old and still, on the face of
it, going strong, with the general usually able to deflect pressure
regarding his formal attire.
There
have, of course, been cases of military officers acquiring power
through a coup, and going on to retain it in the long run, by putting
themselves up as presidential candidates - which is clearly more
acceptable than completely ignoring the popular will, provided the
elections are not manipulated and the franchise is universal. Africa
is, by a long stretch, the leader in this field: Libya, Guinea,
Burkina Faso, Sudan, The Gambia, the Central African Republic and
Mauritania are all ruled by men who initially came to power through
a coup. Muammar Gaddafi took this route in 1969, while Mauritania's
Ely Ould Mohammed Vald grabbed the reins as recently as last year.
As continents go, until 20 years or so ago, the coup syndrome
was most commonly associated with Latin America, where civilian
rule was often the exception. Times have changed. Perhaps the closest
thing today to a former coup leader, in that part of the world,
is Hugo Chavez. As a relatively junior military officer, he attempted
a takeover in Venezuela, failed, and was imprisoned for his troubles.
After serving his term, he opted for a purely political tack, and
now has several landslides to his name. What's more, a US-supported
coup bid against him - organised in the classical style, through
a conspiracy between senior officers and the so-called captains
of industry - floundered in the face of popular resistance and opposition,
within a substantial section of the army.
One
reason why the lure of military rule has diminished in recent decades
is because the US has discovered that civilian regimes can offer,
more or less, the same quantum of loyalty, and they can generally
do so without human rights transgressions, on a par with the repression
associated with the likes of the Pinochet junta in Chile. By and
large, this change of approach has worked well enough: even the
ostensibly socialist-led governments in Chile and Brazil have not
deviated too sharply from the neo-liberal path so many Third World
countries were compelled to follow in the 1980s. As long as they
don't interfere with the operations of transnational corporations,
mild dissent - such as on the question of Iraq - is tolerated. Problems
arise, however, when people elect leaders who threaten or attempt
to topple the rotten edifice of the existing economic order and
replace it with something less inequitable and more humane. Hence
the alarm in Washington over events in Venezuela and Bolivia. Hence,
too, American encouragement for the military-industrial effort to
unseat Chavez.
There is, however, no reason to believe that the US had any particular
interest in Thaksin's overthrow. Nor is it particularly surprising
that western protests over the Thai generals' decision to stop democracy
in its tracks have been remarkable subdued. Thaksin - who was a
policeman before he went into business and became a billionaire,
acquiring political ambitions in the process - gave the impression
of seeking to establish himself as an independent Asian leader,
in the style of Malaysia's now retired Mahathir Mohamad. Although,
it is unlikely that he intended to follow in Mahathir's footsteps,
to the extent of becoming a leading international critic of the
US and the west, he was certainly careful to hedge his bets by making
a token contribution to the American-led war in Iraq, but was sufficiently
unpredictable to stir a degree of concern.
Thaksin
was a controversial figure in his homeland, popular among the rural
poor who benefited from his reforms, but held in contempt by the
urban middle classes. This helps to explain why Bangkok was relatively
quiet in the aftermath of the takeover, amid some celebrations.
The much-photographed instances of ordinary citizens fraternising
with patrolling soldiers, and children planting flowers in the barrels
of their guns, helped to reinforce the impression that army chief
Sonthi Boonyaratglin and his fellow generals wished to convey, of
a popular transition rather than yet another mundane bout of martial
law.
It
was vital for the generals to gain the royal stamp of approval for
their action, given that King Bhumibol Adulyadej, after 60 years
on the throne, is by all accounts widely revered - even deified
- among Thais. Bhumibol played a crucial role in bringing General
Suchinda Kraprayoon's rule to an end back in 1992, following considerable
violence in the streets; at the time, many looked upon that year's
events as signifying Thailand's final emergence from an era that
began back in 1932, when the army seized power in what was then
still known as Siam. That was not to be, as volatility persisted,
and last month's developments suggest that the Thai army remains
reluctant to relinquish its political role.
In
the days following the bloodless coup, Bhumibol did not react directly,
but the generals lost little time in announcing that they had won
his assent, and the palace offered no contradiction. His Majesty
may well have been hedging his bets, much like the world at large,
waiting to see how the generals behaved before publicly blessing
their move. The junta announced restrictions on the freedom of assembly,
but took no action against the first pro-democracy protest in Bangkok,
which attracted only a few hundred participants. Will this reserve
be maintained in the face of larger protests? A severe media clampdown
was claimed to be temporary: the state of the press, in the months
ahead, will serve as another litmus test for the generals' intentions.
In another parallel with Pakistan, Sonthi and his fellow conspirators
struck to thwart what they perceived as Thaksin's interference in
the army's affairs: Musharraf's antipathy towards Nawaz Sharif was
driven to a considerable extent by the latter's efforts to ensconce
favoured officers in positions of power. Shortly after the Bangkok
coup, Thaksin's supporters within the military were sidelined, while
those who had assisted in the putsch were promoted.
There
are said to be 10,000 claims of graft against the Thaksin administration,
and perhaps the most egregious violation of ethics directly associated
with the prime minister was the sale of Shin Corp, a telecommunications
giant owned by his family, to Singapore's Temasek Holdings for $1.85
billion: a sale on which no taxes were paid, and which, at the same
time, undermined Thaksin's nationalist posturing. Apart from the
corruption charges, the Thaksin regime sought to crush a Muslim
insurgency that erupted in 2004 in Thailand's three southernmost
provinces by using the most brutal of methods: random killings,
mass arrests and torture, with innocent civilians frequently being
victimised. The separatist revolt continues to fester. General Sonthi,
himself a Muslim, advised caution and negotiations, but was ignored.
Earlier,
in 2002-03, one of the priorities of the Thaksin government was
a so-called war on drugs, which resulted in the arbitrary execution
of at least 200 "drug dealers": many of the fatalities
involved either small-time drug peddlers or innocent citizens targeted
by the police force, in order to show it was diligently carrying
out orders.
In
some ways, Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai (Thai Loves Thai) party
is more reminiscent of Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia, rather
than Nawaz Sharif and his faction of the Pakistan Muslim League.
It would only be fair to point out that at least some of the Thaksin
government's measures - such as a health insurance scheme that enabled
all Thais to seek any sort of medical treatment at a cost of only
30 baht - were popular, and the prime minister also succeeded in
persuading the bulk of the rural population that he had their best
interests at heart. But even if his abuses of power outweigh any
good he might have done, it does not necessarily follow that a military
coup was the ideal means of removing him from power.
The
opposition parties boycotted the snap election Thaksin called last
April, and, amid widespread protests in Bangkok, Thai Rak Thai's
landslide triumph was adjudged to be untenable after Bhumibol stepped
in as an arbiter. Following a brief period of penance, Thaksin returned
to the helm as caretaker prime minister. One of the army's post-hoc
justifications for the coup is that forthcoming protests would have
led to clashes between pro- and anti-Thaksin demonstrators, resulting
in much bloodshed. There is, inevitably, an element of conjecture
in that conclusion. The point is, Thaksin's caretaker mode was a
short-term arrangement: to remain head of government, he would have
had to win another election. Unfortunately for his opponents, he
appeared to be perfectly capable of doing that. The question, then,
is: Was the coup primarily intended to pre-empt the possibility
of Thaksin's re-election?
It
is unlikely Thailand will end up in a position analogous to that
of Burma/Myanmar, which has suffered an uninterrupted acquaintance
with military rule since 1962. But even in nations whose military
high command consists of less intense control freaks, the generals
often demand a high price for staying on the political periphery:
they seek a permanently institutionalised military role in political
affairs. There is a high probability that Thailand's constitution,
once it has been revamped at the behest of the generals, will include
clauses that reflect this urge. In Pakistan, it is hard to imagine
a post-Musharraf scenario in which the army minds its own business.
In Turkey, land forces chief General Ilker Basbug recently warned
the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the level of Islamism
had reached alarming proportions, and declared: "The Turkish
armed forces have always taken sides and will continue to do so
in protecting the national state, the unitary state and the secular
state."
The
obscurantist tide, indeed, provides considerable cause for concern
in countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, but many people would
disagree with the idea that military force is the ideal means of
turning it back. Nor is religious fundamentalism, by any means,
the only trend that generals might oppose: in Latin America, for
instance, they were considered the guarantors of an iniquitous economic
status quo; besides, in Pakistan at least, much of the extremism
that now poses a problem for "enlightened moderates" was
either introduced or encouraged amid the gloom of Zia-ul-Haq's martial
law, yet not a word of criticism aimed at his less than illustrious
predecessor has ever passed Musharraf's lips.
As
a rule of thumb, countries where the army establishes itself as
a political player are, invariably, worse off than others. Musharrafisation
does not offer an acceptable solution to the dilemmas of democracy.
Notwithstanding the profound flaws of the Thaksin administration,
Thailand appears to have taken a step in the wrong direction. Just
as Pakistan did in 1999.
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