|
Once
again Afghanistan is in turmoil. Today, a strong resistance is building
up against the US-led western coalition and President Hamid Karzai's
beleaguered regime. Yet another jihad has been declared, more 'martyrs'
are being produced, while the Afghan people, as in the past, have
little say in decisions that affect their destiny.
The American and British invasion of Iraq triggered a noticeable
increase in the number of attacks on the US-led coalition forces
and their Afghan allies in Afghanistan. Though the Taliban and other
anti-US groups were involved in such attacks even before the occupation
of Iraq, their campaign has assumed a renewed urgency in recent
months. US military officials admitted that the number of attacks
against their troops not only doubled in the spring of 2003, but
also became more sophisticated. Regrouped and willing to take risks,
Taliban military commanders are now threatening to extend their
theatre of operations from their strongholds in the southern, southwestern
and eastern provinces to northern Afghanistan. In fact, some Taliban
guerilla attacks have already been reported in the northern provinces
of Balkh, Faryab and Kunduz, where Uzbek warlord, Abdur Rasheed
Dostum, his Tajik rival, Atta Mohammad and the Hazara leader, Ustad
Mohaqqiq, hold sway.
By
retreating from major cities and going underground, instead of putting
up a last stand in 2001, most Taliban fighters managed to survive
and hide their cache of weapons. It was a wise move because the
Taliban could have faced decimation at the hands of the superior
US fighting machines. With the US now preoccupied with the growing
resistance in Iraq and the Afghans growing increasingly restless
over the slow pace of reconstruction, the Taliban and other opposition
groups are finding it relatively easy to bolster the resistance
movement and find recruits for their anti-US campaign.
There
have been a series of daring assaults in recent months: the ambush
in Gereshk in Helmand province in which suspected Taliban fighters
killed three Afghan and two American soldiers and wounded several
others; the murder of an expatriate engineer working with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Urozgan province; the killing
of four German soldiers who were part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in an apparent suicide bombing in Kabul,
and the death of several Afghan soldiers, policemen and aid workers
in Taliban guerilla attacks in small towns and outposts. Religious
scholars supporting the Karzai government have also been targetted.
Missile assaults on coalition bases, hit-and-run attacks on their
patrols and remote-controlled bombs targetting coalition vehicles,
are now a routine affair.
So daring have the Taliban become that they recently launched
frontal assaults on a number of district headquarters in the southwestern
Urozgan and Zabul provinces, occupied the administrative and police
centres, and killed scores of soldiers and cops. American and Afghan
government spokesmen even reported attacks by a force of 600 to
800 Taliban fighters in the two provinces. It was, by far, the biggest
concentration of Taliban fighters after the American invasion of
Afghanistan. The formation of such a large armed force 200 kilometres
from the Pakistan border would not have been possible without local
support. It was obvious that many Afghans were willing to take risks
by offering sanctuary to the Taliban fighters. As Khalid Pashtun,
a senior government official in Kandahar commented, the Taliban
were employing the same traditional tactics used successfully by
the mujahideen against the Soviet occupation.
Though
the ISAF and the US military, headquartered north of Kabul at Bagram
airbase, had maintained all along that they didn't expect the war
in Iraq to cause any deterioration in the security situation in
Afghanistan, the importance of the US-led attack on Iraq and the
opportunity it created for anti-US forces was not lost on the Taliban.
One of their top military commanders, Mulla Dadullah, used the opportunity
to claim responsibility for some of the attacks on the coalition
troops and threaten further assaults. Referring to the US-UK invasion
of Iraq, he argued that it was part of the crusade against Muslims,
and urged the Afghans to join the jihad to evict "all foreigners,
all crusaders" from Afghanistan. It was the first time since
losing power that a top Taliban leader had agreed to be interviewed
- a testimony to their growing confidence after remaining underground
for more than a year.
Increased attacks against coalition forces in parts of Afghanistan,
particularly in those areas inhabited by the ethnic Pashtun majority,
shows that some Afghans are heeding the Taliban's appeal. As Dadullah
claimed, the Taliban had regrouped under 10 military commanders
appointed by their supreme leader, Mulla Mohammad Omar, forged new
alliances and waged a guerilla campaign in the Pashtun-inhabited
provinces bordering Pakistan. By declaring that the guerilla-style
attacks would henceforth be executed in the non-Pashtun majority
northern provinces, where the Taliban have traditionally enjoyed
little or no support, Taliban commanders are hoping to exploit the
hostility and frustration felt by ordinary Afghans towards corrupt
pro-US warlords and their tyrannical rule.
Likeminded
former mujahideen leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, also declared "jihad"
against the foreign forces in Afghanistan calling President Karzai
a puppet of the US. Himself a Pashtun from northern Afghanistan,
Hekmatyar attempted to exploit the anger of the Pashtun majority
over the loss of power to ethnic minorities such as the Tajiks,
Hazaras and Uzbeks. Though both Hekmatyar and the Taliban have denied
forming an alliance to fight coalition forces and the Karzai government,
it is likely that their fighters are cooperating at the local level
while confronting a common enemy. With his party's organisational
and propaganda skills, Hekmatyar was expected to bolster the strength
of the Taliban, who retain a reservoir of fighters but lack resources.
The
Karzai government's public support for the US invasion of Iraq did
not go down well with most Afghans, while the perception that their
President was an American creation has become palable. The fact
that President Karzai still needs American bodyguards for his protection
has further damaged his reputation. Karzai's efforts to rein in
the warlords and make the slowly emerging Tajik-dominated Afghan
National Army ethnically balanced, is turning members of his coalition
against him. With the presidential elections coming up next June,
the former mujahideen as well as the pro-west royalists and liberals
are coalescing into rival alliances to stake their claim for power.
Already, the monarchists have formed the Wahdat-i-Milli (National
Unity Party) under the leadership of former king Zahir Shah's cousin,
Ghazi Sultan Mahmood. Their rivals, including former mujahideen
affiliated with the Northern Alliance, have held meetings to organise
a united front against the pro-west forces. The former communists
too have revived their party under a retired general, Noorul Haq
Uloomi. In the process, the uneasy Karzai-led coalition cobbled
together as a result of the US-backed and UN-sponsored Bonn conference
in December 2001 is under threat.
The
disarray in the ranks of the Afghan government is causing disaffection
among its supporters and providing a window of opportunity to the
Taliban and other opposition groups. Some Karzai government officials
have conceded that their supporters have become demoralised due
to the friction in the ranks of the Karzai-led Afghan coalition
and the diminished US commitment to stabilising and rebuilding war-ravaged
Afghanistan. Increased Taliban guerilla activity has not only fuelled
insecurity and hampered reconstruction, but also triggered tensions
on Afghanistan's border with Pakistan due to Kabul's allegations
that the Taliban militants have their hideouts in Pakistani territory.
US military officials had to intervene recently to prevent further
escalation in hostilities when the Pakistan embassy in Kabul was
attacked by a mob protesting alleged encroachments by Pakistani
military on Afghan territory. The resultant instability in the area
has benefited the resurgent Taliban.
However,
the Taliban and their allies still have to overcome a number of
challenges before they can revive their credibility and inspire
the war-weary Afghan people. The majority of Afghans are fed up
of war and long only for peace and reconstruction, not another round
of fighting. The six-year Taliban rule was not popular with many
Afghans who will certainly refuse to support their return to power,
while most Afghans are well aware that Afghanistan would again become
isolated and foreign economic assistance would stop should the Taliban
regain power. Most non-Pashtuns kept their distance from the Taliban
in the past and would do so again. Meanwhile the Taliban lack the
resources required to sustain an armed struggle and there is no
indication that any outside country or organisation is ready to
finance their campaign. Moreover, past rivalries and ideological
and personal disputes will continue to haunt efforts to forge an
effective alliance between the Taliban, Hekmatyar and other anti-US
groups. Given this scenario, at this stage though the Taliban might
be capable of rendering parts of Afghanistan insecure, they are
unlikely to bring down the Karzai government or force a coalition
pullout from Afghanistan.
|