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As
soon as news of Nawab Akbar Bugti's death broke, mobile phone screens
across the country registered a blitz of SMS messages, mourning,
conjecturing and a few, celebrating the demise of Pakistan's most
controversial tribal sardar. But even those that saw him as a trouble-maker
had to concede that if not in life, in death the Nawab was a hero.
The
manner in which he met his death - the details are still shrouded
in controversy - gave a huge filip to the nationalist movement in
Balochistan, which had hitherto been largely considered a "renegade
movement" restricted to a few sardars and their followers.
Furthermore, it brought various tribes that had long been engaged
in bloody feuds with one another on to one platform.
"You
know what Bugti did to us, but all that is now irrelevant,"
said Nawab Haji Lashkari, a chieftain of the Raisani tribe, which
had been at war with Nawab Akbar Bugti's tribe for the last decade.
"His
killing is terrible news for the entire Baloch nation. In our culture,
even if we are embroiled in bloody feuds, when we are attacked by
an outsider, we become one."
Lashkari
added that Akbar Bugti's murder was a clear message: "'If you
ask for your rights, you will be killed,' and if this is the case,
then yes, we are ready to be killed," he declared. And as if
echoing this sentiment, virtually every Baloch leader not only condemned
the manner in which Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed, but also made
it implicitly, if not overtly clear, that if the need arises they
are ready to rise to the occasion.
It is not merely the Baloch who are up in arms. The opposition
has cashed in on the outrage engendered by the Bugti killing by
declaring it an example of government supression and ineptitude.
And to make matters harder for the government, no politician from
the ruling Pakistan Muslim League has publicly supported Bugti's
death, with some even publicly condemning it.
Even
the government's spin doctors have been unable to manufacture any
face-saving device. This has caused visible nervousness in government
circles and deep embarrassment to President General Pervez Musharraf.
For the first time since he seized power in a coup in 1999, Musharraf
and the army are under siege.
Just
how delicate matters are can be gauged by the fact that when violence
erupted in the province following Nawab Bugti's death, the government-backed
leaders of the ruling party in Balochistan, who were asked to handle
the issue, clearly communicated to Islamabad that the mishandling
of the case had placed them in a very difficult situation. They
contended that if they propagated the government position or attempted
to do a whitewash of how Bugti had been killed, their lives would
be in danger.
Even
the Balochistan Chief Minister, Jam Yusuf of Lasbela, who as provincial
leader had no choice but to call a press conference on the insistence
of Islamabad, had his cronies request the journalists present not
to ask tough questions. The ones that were fielded were answered
evasively, and ultimately the event yielded little more than a pre-worded
statement confirming Nawab Akbar Bugti's death.
The
concerns of Jam Yusuf and the other pro-government leaders in the
Balochistan government are valid. When a ghaibana namaz-e-janaza
(ritual prayers said at the time of burial) was held at the Ayub
Stadium in Quetta, and some Pakistan Muslim League (Q) leaders attempted
to attend the meet, they were asked by the masses to leave the ground
immediately or be prepared to "face the consequences."
The government has certainly not helped its own case, issuing statements,
then retracting them and issuing fresh ones completely contradicting
the earlier ones.
Soon after news of
Akbar Bugti's demise broke on August 26, the federal minister for
information, Mohammed Ali Durrani not only confirmed the death,
but said the resistance offered by Nawab Bugti's men was so intense
that arresting him alive was not even remotely possible. "The
operation started on August 23 when one of the two helicopters sent
on a tip-off about the presence of renegades in the Taratani area
of Kohlu district came under fire. Another helicopter was hit by
enemy fire shortly afterwards. The operation intensified on August
26 as the militants, operating out of heavily fortified bunkers,
employed high-tech weaponry and killed seven security officials,"
declared Durrani.
At this juncture, the government had obviously not anticipated what
a trigger this news would prove. When violence erupted across Balochistan,
the government immediately backtracked from its earlier statement,
and declared there was never an intent to kill Nawab Akbar Bugti,
and the army soldiers who were deployed to apprehend him had been
categorically ordered to "capture him alive."
Showing journalists the images of the mountains where the operation
was launched, Major General Shaukat Sultan, the top spokesman of
the army, now told mediamen that when some army personnel sought
to enter the cave where Nawab Bugti was apparently hiding, they
were assailed by heavy fire from inside. "They naturally returned
fire and then something in the cave exploded. As a result, the cave
collapsed, killing not only the servicemen at its mouth but also
the inmates," declared the general.
Shaukat Sultan disclosed that the cave was about 100 feet long and
had winding passages. Ironically, even while the government announced
that because the cave had completely collapsed and turned into a
huge heap of debris, it could take several days to retrieve the
bodies of Akbar Bugti and the tribesmen who had perished with him,
just a day later Shaukat Sultan told newsmen that nearly 100 million
rupees, $96,000 (USD) in cash, two satellite phones, documents,
eight AK-47 rifles and some rockets were found in the rubble. This
left many wondering how all of these were so easily accessible considering
the cave was, by the authorities own reckoning, virtually impossible
to negotiate at that point.
That was not the end of the story. Five days after his death, Major
General Shaukat Sultan announced that the Nawab's badly decomposed
body had been recovered from his cave hideout. However, to lend
further credence to conspiracy theories regarding the manner in
which he had been killed, Bugti's body was not handed over to his
family for identification or burial. Although the government did
reportedly ask the Nawab's sons to come to Dera Bugti for the purpose,
Jamil Bugti stated the family wanted the body to be brought to Quetta
because, since the government had brought and settled a large number
of their enemies in Dera Bugti and destroyed much of Akbar Bugti's
property, there was nothing left for them to go back to, let alone
bury their father there.
Citing the deteriorating condition of the corpse as the need for
a hasty burial, official sources maintain that a local maulana identified
Akbar Bugti and just hours after retrieving the body, performed
his last rites. Then, in the presence of 16 locals and officials
the Nawab was buried in a closed casket in his ancestral graveyard
in Dera Bugti next to his younger brother, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, and
close to his grandfather, Nawab Shahbaz Khan Bugti, and son, Nawabzada
Saleem Bugti.
Intriguingly, while people were disallowed from seeing Akbar Bugti's
corpse, because, the authorities insisted, it was mutilated virtually
beyond recognition by the rubble collapsing on him, the nawab's
watch and glasses, which were subsequently handed over to his sons,
miraculously had not even a scratch on them.
Startling disclosures about Nawab Akbar Bugti's death by reliable
sources tell an interesting story - and one completely at variance
with the official version.
According to these reports, the government launched its operation
against the Bugtis on August 23 in the Taratani area of Kohlu district.
Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was in the area, was reportedly asked to
vacate the location within three days and told to command his men
to surrender. However, the Nawab not only refused to leave the area,
but allegedly abused the army officials. He did, however, reportedly
give his comrades a choice: those who wanted to leave were free
to do so, but those who stayed should be prepared to fight to the
end. According to the information gleaned, some men left at this
juncture, while over a dozen chose to stay and fight. Ironically,
all those who left were later arrested by the army. On August 26,
when army officials reached the cave in which Bugti and his men
were staked out - ostensibly just to arrest him at this point -
he reportedly chose to fight, leading from the front.
Nawab Akbar Bugti was allegedly killed along with several of his
men in the battle, in which there was heavy firing. However, some
of his tribesmen who survived the first round, presumably because
they were deeper inside the cave, continued to fight, and in this
round at least 17 army officials, including two colonels, two majors
and other junior army personnel were reportedly killed. Later, army
officials reportedly used a gunship helicopter to finish the few
remaining tribesmen who had emerged and their corpses were subsequently
dumped inside the cave.
It has been widely conjectured but not confirmed that Akbar Bugti's
body was transported to Quetta the same day he was killed and kept
in a mortuary at the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) there. However,
sensing how combustible the situation was, the authorities could
not go public with this information.
Although, presumably in a bid to quell all the rumours surrounding
his death, the government has repeatedly offered to allow Akbar
Bugti's sons to come to Dera Bugti, have their father's body exhumed
and conduct a DNA test to determine if the corpse is indeed Bugti's,
it is probably too little, too late.
It was not just the final chapter of the Bugti-government face-off
that was badly botched by the authorities, but also the negotiations
preceding it. The Chaudhry Shujaat and Mushahid Hussain-led delegation
that met with Akbar Bugti last year, after hostilities had erupted
between the Bugtis and the army in the wake of Dr. Shazia Khalid's
alleged rape by an army major in Quetta, had reportedly managed
to defuse the situation to a large extent. Nawab Akbar Bugti had
reportedly agreed to bury his guns if the government acted on the
committee's recommendations, which including paying him compensation
of 25 crore rupees for the damage done to his property and that
of his people in Dera Bugti.
Rather than paying heed to the recommendations, however, sources
disclosed, President Musharraf dug in his heels and opted for a
confrontation with the Nawab, reportedly after he was convinced
by a top boss of one of the intelligence agencies and the head of
a gas company that Bugti was the leader of the Balochistan Liberation
Army and was receiving help from assorted foreign countries.
In various speeches Musharraf had often attacked the three Baloch
Sardars, Marri, Mengal and Bugti, calling them "corrupt,"
and holding them reponsible for all the problems in Balochistan.
However, most of his ire, it seemed, was reserved for Bugti. He
was first restricted to his house, then driven out of that, and
finally even driven out of his own area, where his opponents were
brought and lodged with the blessings and active support of the
army. The final nail in the coffin came when two days before he
was killed, Akbar Bugti was removed as chief of the tribe, after
a jirga of Bugti tribesmen, hand-picked and assembled in Dera Bugti
by the government, declared him a "proclaimed offender,"
and seized his property.
Pushed to the wall, in his twilight years, with little to lose and
only a reputation to gain, Bugti now decided to direct a guerrilla
campaign against General Musharraf and the army.
There is a general consensus that Nawab Akbar Bugti was never part
of the BLA, which aims for an independent Balochistan. Rather, his
fight was for a greater share of the province's resources. It is
therefore surprising that the government concentrated its energies
mainly on the Nawab and the Dera Bugti district, even while attacks
were increasing in the rest of the province, especially in the tribal
areas.
While it is admittedly not exclusively the Bugti tribe that has
felt the wrath of the government, it has been at the forefront of
the receiving end of the authorities' actions.
Ever since the army operation started in Balochistan, scores of
people have been picked up from across the province by the agencies
on charges of "spying for an enemy country" or for their
alleged connections with the shadowy BLA, and not been heard of
since. Many of these have been Bugtis or had connections with them.
Their relatives have lodged FIRs, filed habeas corpus petitions,
staged hunger strikes, and held press conferences charging agency
sleuths with kidnapping, but to date, this has been of little avail.
The missing remain just that.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has stated on record that
the military has indiscriminately bombed civilians and launched
a campaign of fear in the province, marked by torture, disappearances
and custodial killings. And the interior minister has admitted that
4,000 people have been arrested in connection with the Baloch conflict,
but no exact figure of those missing is yet available.
One of those reportedly picked by agency sleuths is Abdul Rauf Sasoli,
a renowned leader of the Jamhoori Watan party. Earlier this year,
he took journalists to Dera Bugti to show them the damage caused
by the army in the area, and on February 2, shortly after his return
to Karachi where he was residing, he went missing. There has been
no news of him since then.
Likewise, Hanif Sharif, a Baloch writer was picked up from Kaich
district while sharing a meal with friends at a local restaurant
on January 15. Nobody has heard of him thereafter.
Munir Mengal, a TV journalist, was picked up by FIA personnel from
Karachi airport on April 7, 2006, shortly after he disembarked from
his flight. He had come to Karachi to appoint people for the TV
channel 'Voice of Balochistan' that he was planning to launch. His
mother has staged hunger strikes and gone to every possible forum
to secure the release of her son, but to date he is nowhere to be
found.
A Bugti tribesman, who had a post-graduate degree from the Tando
Jam Agriculture University in Sindh, was picked up from Quetta after
agency operatives discovered Akbar Bugti's telephone numbers in
his diary. They kept him blindfolded at a camp for nearly three
months, but failing to get any information from him, subsequently
released him.
Requesting not to be named for fear of a backlash, the young man
disclosed that at the time he was picked up, he was to appear in
a viva voce of the provincial commission examination in which he
had already qualified. However, because of his illegal confinement
during this period he could not appear in the exam, and lost out
on a promising career - and a lifelong ambition.
He described how during custody he was subjected to extreme mental
and physical torture, which was perhaps exacerbated by the fact
that he had nothing to offer his captors. He could provide them
no information about his sardar, the BLA or their alleged training
camps. But he was one of the lucky ones - he got away.
There are reportedly dozens of other genuinely apolitical youths
like him who have been subjected to similar ordeals which have pushed
them into the ranks of the rebels.
According to official estimates, in the past two years, saboteurs
have staged nearly 27,000 rocket attacks aimed at military personnel
and outposts, government installations and foreign nationals in
Balochistan. In 2005, approximately 1,568 "terrorist"
attacks have occurred in the province and these attacks have not
been confined to the tribal areas.
Government sources maintain that weapons worth 50 crore rupees have
been procured from Afghanistan by the "Baloch insurgents"
in the past two years to enable them to carry out their guerrilla
war.
In his report, 'The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,' compiled
in 2006, Frédéric Grare, a visiting scholar with the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank, says there
are three separate but linked issues that bear on Balochistan today:
the national question, the role of the army, and the use of Islamism.
But he contends that the national question is obviously central.
There has long been frustration amongst the Baloch who have felt
virtually colonised by the Punjabi-dominated central government
and hold it responsible for the absence of economic and social development
in the province, despite the fact that it possesses almost 20 per
cent of the country's mineral and energy resources. Military action
against the Baloch by successive governments every time they have
raised their voice and demanded their rights has made the people
feel further marginalised. This feeling has fomented into real anger
that is now spilling over.
Many Baloch grievances are certainly justified. The first deposits
of natural gas were discovered in Sui in 1953. Gas was supplied
to cities in the Punjab as early as 1964, but Quetta, the capital
of Balochistan, had to wait until 1986 for its share of gas - and
that too only because at that time the government decided to extend
the gas pipeline to provide the facility to the military garrison
it had decided to station in the provincial capital.
Similarly, in the Dera Bugti district, home to the gas fields of
Sui and Pircoh, only the actual town of Dera Bugti is supplied with
gas, and here again, it receives its supplies only because a paramilitary
camp was opened there in the mid-1990s. Overall, only four of the
26 districts constituting Balochistan are supplied with gas.
Conversely, natural gas is supplied to almost every single village
in the Punjab and Sindh. In fact, Punjab today is known as a "The
mother of Condensed Natural Gas (CNG) stations," since almost
every car in the province has been converted from a petrol consumer
to a CNG one. Meanwhile, there is not a single CNG station in the
entire province of Balochistan.
For almost 60 years since independence, 95 per cent of Balochistan
has been considered a 'B-area', which essentially means that it
has been ruled by the levies or semi-private forces of pro-government
sardars. Ironically, when the government initiated mega development
projects in the province recently, and found the levies force incapable
of handling the 'insurgents,' it suddenly decided to dispense with
their services and bring some areas under the control of the regular
administration. However, other areas, where the government had major
interests, are likely to come under the vigil of the Pakistan army.
The government is now planning to construct military garrisons in
the three most sensitive areas of Balochistan - Sui, with its gas-producing
installations; Gwadar, with its port; and Kohlu, the "capital"
of the Marri tribe, to which most of the nationalist hard-liners
belong. The government apparently believes that by establishing
these garrisons it will be able to contain the Balochistan insurgency.
The anti-Baloch bias is visible even in the civilian set-up. Most
officials working in senior positions in Balochistan belong to the
Punjab or other provinces. From chief secretary to inspector general,
police, to most government secretaries working in Balochistan, they
are all outsiders. "If you visit the Balochistan secretariat,
check out the name plates outside each office. You will find virtually
no locals running provincial affairs," Nawab Akbar Bugti would
often tell visitors.
The manner in which he was killed, however, proved to be the straw
that broke the camel's back. The government compounded a history
of errors against the Baloch by falling into the trap set by Akbar
Bugti. He was certainly not the most radical of the sardars. Over
the years he had done business with various governments. And in
the process he had even been accused by the nationalists of betraying
them. But in the end, Bugti decided to redeem himself: he decided
to fight for Balochistan - and if that meant to the death, so be
it. The manner in which he was eliminated not just immortalised
him as a hero, but fueled the fires of Baloch nationalism and separatism.
Since the disgruntled Baloch has always seen the army as the enemy
- and the Punjabi and army are seen as synonymous - in the wake
of Nawab Akbar Bugti's killing the Baloch youth have declared a
war against all Punjabis. The victims of this have been the innocent
Punjabi settlers who have lived in the province for generations.
Following Akbar Bugti's death, rioters in Balochistan not only destroyed
government offices, but also attacked shops owned by Punjabi settlers.
So far at least four Punjabis have been killed, and the others,
for whom Balochistan is the only home they know, live in terror.
A Punjabi-speaking barber was killed when unidentified people entered
his house in Naushki town and fired at him. The attackers escaped
from the scene. Around 10 barber shops and a number of government
buildings have also been damaged and ransacked in the town. Two
teenage Punjabi boys, Shahnam Javed and Umair Akhtar were killed
in Smuglli in Quetta city when they were taking a stroll near their
house after dinner. And there have reportedly been copycat murders
in Karachi: two young Punjabi boys were recently murdered by unknown
militants in the Baloch area of Lyari.
Given the sensitivity of the situation and fearing for their lives,
Pakistan army jawans took into custody over 30 men from the Punjab
who were working as daily wage labourers in the Chagi district of
Balochistan, and sent them back to the Punjab.
Following Bugti's death, members of parliament from the Baloch Nationalist
Party (BNP) resigned from their seats and some nationalist Baloch
leaders, who earlier used to vent their anger privately, have now
openly started demanding secession for the province. They say the
time has come for a "decisive battle."
Said MNA Rauf Mengal of the BNP, "Now there is no choice but
to fight for liberation from Pakistan." Mengal contended that
the actions of the "Punjab-dominated establishment" and
its "political cronies" had made the people of Balochistan
lose all hope that their problems could be resolved through political
dialogue.
The mishandling of the Bugti affair has already cost the present
government heavily, and today it stands isolated as even members
of its coalition have distanced themselves. Political analysts believe
that this is merely the beginning of a long, hard battle. They predict
a full-fledged insurgency in Balochistan, and the deployment of
many more troops to crush it, which could bleed both, the army's
personnel and resources dry.
"The writing on the wall is clear: with army troops already
deployed on the eastern and western borders, [and new deployment
in Balochistan] defence force expenditure will increase, resulting
in an increase in the defence budget. Foreign elements will also
take advantage of the situation," says Major General (Retd)
Talat Masood.
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