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started with some rain. Then before you could say the word "infrastructure,"
the city flooded. The mayhem that followed was of Katrina-like proportions:
power outages, telecommunication failures, collapsed roads, sewage
in the streets, car breakdowns, stranded workers, five-hour commutes,
flooded businesses, crores of inventory soaked and ruined, inaccessible
hospitals and electrocuted pedestrians.
Amazingly,
Karachi's civic collapse didn't happen just once. It happened twice,
on two different days, just over two weeks apart.
But
it was no category five hurricane that hit Karachi. On July 30,
some dark clouds rolled into town and dumped 67 mm of rain on Karachi.
Then on August 17, the monsoon showered the city with 56mm. So,
less than three inches of rain hit the city on each occasion.
Three
inches. Three inches is less than the depth of a coffee mug. Three
inches is the length of an adult's index finger. Clearly, 'torrential
downpour' shouldn't be used to describe three inches of rain. Moreover,
three inches of rain should not be associated with the words 'state
of emergency.'
Karachi
has experienced worse. A downpour totalling 108 mm hit the city
on July, 28, 2003. Even that would not be considered torrential.
But what's important is that it too caused considerable disruption
and damage. July 2003 was not so long ago that it should be forgotten.
Did we learn nothing? And what about the nazim's grand promises?
In February he announced a 24.78-billion rupee mega project for
the city where at least 4.5 billion was allocated for water and
sewerage. What about the $800 million that started steadily coming
in two years ago during Naimatullah Khan's tenure from a group of
international donors that includes the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank? Was any of this money used to prepare for the monsoons as
promised? So, the big question is: Why did Karachi drown?
The
simple answer is drainage.
"I
tell my students that there are two key things in drainage,"
says Dr Muhammad Shafqat Ejaz. "First, water runs downhill.
Second, the need for outlets. If you don't have an outlet,"
says the professor of civil engineering at NED University in Karachi,
"you can't remove excess water."
Pakistan's largest city seems to have a problem with its outlets.
"The water cannot get to the sea," says Arif Hasan, Chairman
of the Urban Resource Centre (URC). "It's the major reason
for the flooding."
Karachi
is served by 42 major nullahs. Most of the city's underground sewer
lines feed directly into these open, natural drains. Most of these
nullahs lead to the city's two rivers, the Malir River and the Lyari
River. Both rivers flow south to the sea. It is one vast interconnected
natural drainage system for both sewage and excess rain water.
But
there's something rotten with the state of Karachi's vast nullah
network. According to Hasan, numerous nullahs around the city have
been encroached upon, narrowed or covered up completely.
There
are five major drains that don't flow directly into the city's two
big rivers, but feed into the backwaters of Mai Kolachi: Kalri drain,
Pitchard drain, City Railway drain, Soldier Bazaar drain and Nehr-e-Khayyam.
And this area of Mai Kolachi has been "heavily plotted up,"
says Perween Rehman of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP).
Since August 17, though, one nullah has been getting the most attention.
"In Clifton, the Nehr-e-Khayyam has been reduced from a width
of 125 feet to about 15 feet," says Hasan.
This drain, which crosses Punjab Chowrangi and cuts through the
Boat Basin on its way to the sea, serves the residents of Defence
Housing Society, Clifton and Bath Island - or at least it used to.
"Now it cannot take the flood waters."
Bath
Island was so inundated after last month's storm that vehicles couldn't
enter or exit parts of the upscale neighbourhood: residents were
trapped and some were even evacuated. A committee representing residents
in Bath Island alleged that the government illegally sold storm
water drains, including Nehr-e-Khayyam, to the land mafia for 10
billion rupees.
Around
the city, nullahs are being covered to make room for parking lots,
shopping malls and office buildings. Soldier Bazaar drain has been
become home to the Habib Bank Plaza and parking for Shaheen Complex.
But
none of this is news to city officials. Aasoodo Mal, Chief Engineer,
Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KW&SB), addressed a seminar
on July 13 highlighting the problem of covered nullahs. In Saddar,
Lyari Town and Keamari, KWSB workers could not enter the drains
beneath unauthorised structures for cleaning as the closed-in nullahs
had turned into deadly gas chambers, said Mal. The chief engineer
himself mentioned Kalri drain, Soldier Bazaar drain and Nehr-e-Khayyam
as just some of the drains affected by encroachments.
Needless
to say, there is much controversy over the legality of these nullah
encroachments. But this hasn't stopped government agencies, including
the Civil Aviation Authority, KPT and town administrations, from
blocking drains. Well-known projects, including Mai Kolachi Road
and the Korangi Bridge, have involved reclaimed land from the city's
natural drainage network. Near the Sindh Secretariat, the Sindh
Katchi Abadi building and the ombudsman office sit on concreted-over
nullahs. But according to KWSB's Mal, "No construction should
be allowed within 15 to 20 feet of a nullah."
Still,
it's usually other small-time encroachers who shoulder most of the
blame for compromised nullahs. "A lot of new settlements and
most slum areas have cropped up along drainage lines," says
Dr. Ejaz. "They constrict the natural flow of water."
This is not only due to residents reclaiming land for their own
use, but also because they treat the drainage channels as dumpsters.
Over time, nullahs become choked with garbage and literally become
giant plugged drains.
While
URC's Hasan agrees that too many people toss garbage into the nullah
system, he's less convinced that the slum neighbourhoods are the
major encroachers. "The katchi abadis contribution to this
tragedy is very, very small. It's almost negligible. The real contribution
is the land hunger of Karachi's elite and the planning agencies."
Sometimes,
though, the water doesn't even get to the nullahs. The problem lies
along our roads. "Street cleaners sweep garbage towards drainage
inlets," says Professor Ejaz. The piled up refuse blocks the
water's path underground. "They are taking care of one aspect,
but also causing untold damage."
Of
course, the garbage usually doesn't stop at the inlet. Open drains
and missing manhole covers allow people to dump garbage directly
into the sewers. The media and citizens alike singled out clogged
drains as the cause of Karachi's flooding.
But
across the city, government officials said they were prepared. City
Nazim Syed Mustafa Kamal said that the city government had cleaned
and desilted sewerage drains before the rains. Even in the badly
affected areas of DHA and Clifton, DHA administrator, Brigadier
Maqsood Hussain, claimed preparations were made beforehand and the
sewers were cleaned as part of "programmed cleaning."
Said the Brigadier: "I personally did spot checks." Still,
it was hard to convince residents and the conditions of the streets
spoke for themselves.
The
one place that water had no problem flowing down into was the Clifton
underpass. This much trumpeted piece of "modern engineering"
became almost entirely submerged in water and in no time at all,
KPT's supposed gift to Karachi's traffic-congested streets was suddenly
more suited to gondolas than cars.
In
the deluge of complaints and finger-pointing, various explanations
emerged. Vice-Admiral Ahmed Hayat, chairman of KPT, the organisation
responsible for its design and operation, blamed the city government.
"The underpass flooded due to inefficiency of the CDGK, as
the rainwater drainage system of the adjoining roads was choked."
He maintained there was no problem in the design of the underpass
and claimed that its integrated pump system was operational. The
problem was with the unforeseen inflow of water diverted into the
underpass from above.
The
city nazim had another view. "The KPT underpass is still incomplete
as its pumps have yet to start functioning," he told reporters
three days after the first rains soaked the city. "Rainwater
could not be flushed out."
A
call to the office of NESPAK, the engineering company behind the
design of the underpass, unsurprisingly revealed explanations that
mimicked those of the KPT chairman. The underpass and its drainage
system were designed to city building codes, said Mansoor Ahmed,
a design engineer on the project. An underground tank collects rainwater,
and then, after attaining a certain level, its pumps automatically
start to drain the water into the city's drainage lines. But the
existing drainage network in Clifton and Defence is old and inadequate,
says Ahmed. According to the engineer, the city government authorities
were notified about deficiencies in the drainage network and that
improvements were needed. He went on to say that because of the
existing topography around the underpass - and as Professor Ejaz
says, "Water runs downhill" - the structure might not
have been a good traffic solution in this part of the city.
Poor
drainage created another kind of havoc as well. "Many [power]
substations were located below the level of the roads, so they were
submerged by rain water. We had to switch them off, clean them,
dry them and repair the faults," says Frank Scherschmidt, CEO
of KESC. The result was 60-hour-long power outages that affected
not only residents, but also crippled the industrial sector. Flooded
roads have cost the city crores in lost production, destroyed inventory
and lost sales.
The
ultimate price was paid by those who died. The KESC is investigating
at least 20 electrocution cases. Flooded streets and fallen hidden
live wires turned the streets into virtual death traps. In a briefing,
KESC officials said the cause of the electrocutions was in the distribution
system: though snapped wires remain live, they should have fuses
that automatically neutralise them after snapping. Major upgrades
are in the pipeline, says Scherschmidt, "and will help bring
about drastic changes." KESC also plans to compensate the victims'
families.
But
what is baffling about Karachi's sewerage network is that on many
roads, like in DHA and Clifton, there is no provision for drainage
whatsoever. There seem to be no inlets to the sewerage system. In
other areas of the city, Nazim Syed Mustafa Kamal admits it's not
much better. He says the city has no storm water drains, but has
promised that from now all roads would be built with storm drains
along them. In fact, across Karachi work has already begun, and
mammoth 48-inch pipes can be seen along many roads, waiting to be
installed underground.
But
storm drains are just part of the solution. If Karachiites are to
be guaranteed that they will not be reliving the same horror next
year, much more needs to be done.
City
officials must understand that, in the end, storm drains solve little,
says Perween Rehman. "The city must accept the existing natural
nullahs as assets. They need to unblock these."
Professor
Ejaz agrees and adds that cleaning of sewers and nullahs needs to
be done annually. Moreover, people have to stop using the sewer
system as garbage dumps. "Street sweepers need to be trained
not to clog roadside drainage inlets," he says. "The authorities
also need to use the media to educate the public about the dangers
of dumping in nullahs and sewerage drains."
That
makes good sense, but citizens need an alternative as well. People
throw garbage into the nullahs because there is no effective garbage
disposal system, says Arif Hasan.
In
the DHA at least, says Brigadier Hussain, that is about to change.
Recently, three new contractors have been hired to collect garbage.
"We are also looking to create a transfer station in between
the landfill site and the locality from which the garbage is to
be collected. That will reduce the distance and travelling time
for the collectors, so that they can make more trips and therefore
collect more garbage."
Still,
garbage is not the root of the problem. The nullah system, with
its numerous branches stretching across the city, is. Maintaining
an open drainage system, which measures about 1,000 kilometres,
through constant cleaning and pleas to citizens to stop treating
it as a dump, is an inefficient system that is impossible to implement.
"The
only option is to make the nullahs pucca, cover them up, and have
decentralised treatment plants where they meet the sea," says
Hasan. "And this is what the studies of the Orangi Pilot Project
have pointed to."
Amazingly,
there may be light at the end of the nullah. The KWSB approach-ed
the OPP for advice recently. "I think there is an understanding
between the OPP and the KWSB on these issues," says Hasan,
"but it has taken a long time for this understanding to develop."
Meanwhile,
till the government gets it right - and going by past track records,
Karachiites shouldn't hold their breath - the city can take its
chances on a wing and a prayer.
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