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Marshal Asghar Khan has offered a strangely assembled memoir
that does not compare well with some of the books he authored
and edited earlier. But his diaries do provide his readers with
a good opportunity to sprint through 30 eventful years of our
history (1971-2001).
Despite
the fact that almost all the entries in the logbook are extremely
brief, and there are significant gaps too, one can get a fair
idea of Pakistan’s unedifying politics during the period
under discussion. It is not easy to decide how much the authoritarian
despots and their civilian-political challengers contributed
to each other’s perceptions and policies. A surge of sympathy
for the long suffering people of this country is unavoidable
after reading this book. The final essays, titled ‘Reflection
and Epilogue,’ contain many home truths.
The
book’s main feature is that it helps one to get to know
Asghar Khan better. One can see how he grew into a soldier’s
soldier – he joined the Dehradun military school at the
age of 12, and became one of the few in the subcontinent to
qualify for a commission as officer in both the army and the
air force. These two layers of military discipline cast him
in a mould in which, perhaps, the politician in him got suffocated.
We
also meet a kind patriarch who loves his family and cares for
his friends and relatives, and does not fail to commiserate
with the people he has known (and some of whom he has opposed).
But his son Omar is, without a doubt, the apple of his eye.
Every word in his notes on Omar’s studies, his brief and
outrageously severed stint at the Punjab University, his work
as a social activist and his political career, shows his affection
and pride in his son. These observations also give us an idea
of the old warrior’s grief at Omar’s sudden and
unexplained demise, and the kind of effort he has had to make
to avoid bending under the blow.
There
are many places where the Air Marshal’s attachment to
healthy political norms flashes through a somewhat colourless
narrative. He finds the system of awarding party tickets to
candidates in elections “rotten,” and notes that
“the speed with which our newspapers change their tune
and find hidden qualities in our rulers is sickening.”
Most Pakistanis will agree with him when he states: “I
feel that Pakistan must stay clear of the Afghan problem, and
should not convert [itself] into a base for operations against
Afghanistan … The risks are too great, and Pakistan’s
own survival and security would be placed in jeopardy.”
The
Air Marshal favours blunt idioms. If he finds a blackguard “a
thoroughly obnoxious character and a bully to the core”
and “a pain in the neck,” he says so. He does not
mind reproducing Ayub’s verdict on a well known army general
– “he is a rascal,” or a Swati politician’s
denunciation of a religious party’s workers as Satan’s
rivals. When he finds that “high living and enjoyment
is the order of the day amongst most senior officers in the
armed forces. Their houses are luxuriously furnished and they
are getting bigger and more expensive every year,” he
cannot avoid asking God to save Pakistan. He heaps scorn on
both the PPP and the PML, and when words fail to fully express
his gall against Bhutto, he gleefully reproduces Sir Maurice
James’ diatribe against a rival who certainly caused him
a lot of pain and misery.
As
for his political struggle, Asghar Khan has been an odd man
in Pakistani politics, something of an enigma. He came into
politics to defend Bhutto when the Ayub regime put him behind
bars, and liked the crowds he attracted. He generally appeared
to be a rational politician; he was on the go all the time,
he made endless speeches, and he had his share of calumny and
repression. And yet he could not reach beyond the middle-class
audience. He cared for peasants, workers and women more than
many of his contemporaries, and often knocked at the hearts
of the masses.But, somehow, he could not secure a niche there.
During
the early years of General Zia’s dictatorship, his bag
of political birds of different feathers kept getting bigger
and bigger, and he left quite a few other parties behind. His
party list of those days reads like a Who’s Who of Pakistani
politics: Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Musheer Pesh Imam, Malik Wazir
Ali, Javed Hashmi, Akbar Bugti, Aitzaz Ahsan, Nawaz Sharif,
S.M. Anwar, J.A. Rahim, Shaikh Rashid Ahmed, Gohar Ayub, Abdul
Hafeez Kardar, Ahmad Bakhsh Soomro, Nisar Khuhro, Mehnaz Rafi
and Nafis Siddiqui, etc.
What
happened to his political party, the Tehreek-e-Istaqlal? It
is possible that some of the party stalwarts were uncomfortable
with Asghar Khan’s sense of discipline, his emphasis on
integrity, his blunt manner of speech (despite his high sense
of courtesy), his solo flights, or were simply unable to overcome
the temptation offered by Zia/ Benazir Bhutto/ Nawaz Sharif/
Pervez Musharraf. But perhaps the most plausible explanation
is that the party was destroyed during the Air Marshal’s
long period of detention in the Zia decade, and this reflects
on the peculiar temper of Pakistan’s political parties,
especially their leaders’ obsession with putting flags
on their vehicles. Asghar Khan also seems to have attracted
adverse notices because of his strange equation with military
rulers. He was bitterly opposed to them, but Zia often sought
his opinion, General Fazl-i-Haq frequently called on him and
discussed matters in confidence, and he has a strong tilt in
favour of General Musharraf, to the extent of pushing his talented
son into the pack of nodders retained by the CEO – all
this suggests that there are chinks in his democratic armour.
Many
of his qualities – straightforwardness, boundless zest
for organisational work, strong emphasis on party elections,
formal democracy in the party and a considerable capacity to
pay the price for his views – mark Asghar Khan as a politician
different and apart from the general sun of unprincipled, rapacious,
self-seekers masquerading as politicians in this country. He
will also be remembered for taking the ISI to court for its
interference in politics. At the same time, it will be impossible
to forget his contribution to the rise of authoritarianism –
his letter to the service chiefs in 1977 (that he has, in vain,
tried to explain away), his apparent rejection of Bhutto, in
favour of Zia’s martial law, and his lapses into slogans
that had a brutalising effect (e.g. “I will hang Bhutto
at the Kohala bridge”). On the whole, however, history
is likely to recognise him as one of the cleaner players on
Pakistan’s difficult political pitch, even if he could
not wholly master the art of leading the masses. 
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