All conscious members of Pakistan’s tattered civil society should thank General K. M. Arif for joining the military versus politicians debate in his new book, Khaki Shadows.  Although the general apparently shares the military’s premise that it has been lured into the political domain by the politicians’ misdemeanors, he repudiates suppression of democratic governments in no uncertain terms.

            The book was planned to cover events up to 1997 only, but the author takes note of the latest military take-over as well.  His ruling is:

            “Despite the faults and failures of democratic governments in the country, the military is not a panacea for Pakistan’s political and administrative failures.  It has no magic wand to put the wrongs right.  Nor does the constitution authorise it to administer the country.  Its organising ability and efficiency are best utilised for the defence of the motherland.  It performs other tasks at the cost of its defence obligations.”

            His advice to the military establishment is to “critically evaluate the balance sheet of gains and losses sustained by the country and by the military itself during the military rules of Generals Ayub, Yahya and Zia.”  The exercise, he says, will benefit both the country and the military.  One can only hope that this salutary advice will be heeded sooner rather than later because an evaluation by military researchers and academics may prove more rewarding than the decades-long clamour for democratic governance by civil society.

            The book is also welcome because, in addition to exposing the misdeeds of politicians, it discloses the failings of military rulers as well.  In view of the author’s admission that “the establishment is so strong in Pakistan that any information of value is usually not accessible to the people at large,” the expose can only be appreciated.  The keenness to keep the people uninformed can be gauged from two incidents noted by Gen. Arif.  The GHQ ordered the destruction of the 1965 war diaries, and all the Foreign Office record pertaining to the East Pakistan crisis (1970-71) was also destroyed. Secret and closed governance at its worst.

            However, Arif discloses and confirms quite a few secrets assiduously withheld from the people.  In the chapter significantly titled ‘Follies in War,’ he describes the 1965 war as “one of the classic examples of an unintended war,” a war forced on the army chief, Gen. Musa, despite his opposition to the plan.  Gen. Arif laments that Musa did not exercise the “last honourable option open to him if his professional advice on the vital issue of peace and war was rejected.”

            The readers will agree that the truth about the debacle at Dhaka, which Gen. Arif describes as a monumental tragedy, should be known as “this would expose the political and military blunders made since 1947.”  The author does not mince his words while denouncing both Mujib and Bhutto, particularly the latter, for their role in 1970-71.  He may have his reasons for declaring that the very fact that “a self-appointed Quaid-i-Awam (leader of the masses) could influence a military dictator to take anti-democratic steps to place him in the power saddle, highlighted the tragedy of Pakistan.”  But how can he ignore the military ruler’s own interest in the intrigue?

            Gen. Arif discusses Gen. Zia’s conduct with a little more candour now than in his earlier book, Working with Zia. Gen. Zia could be viciously vindictive: an inexperienced youngster was hounded out of the army for questioning his order that military families should form a reception line for Bhutto.  “The army lost a handful of upright and intelligent officers who had the courage to ask discerning questions.”  He promoted officers for whom he had a soft corner.  “His political compulsions to stay in power required him to selectively compromise on principles.”  Zia had nothng to say about the ISI’s decision to keep Gen. Arif, practically the army chief, under surveillance.  Zia could retire Gen. Rahimuddin from the post of chairman, joint chiefs of staff, because he had reached the age of 60 and choose as his replacement Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman, who was already past that age, and in the process ignore Gen. Arif’s possible claim to that office.  The views of several senior officers are quoted to the effect that hypocrisy was one of Gen. Zia’s weaknesses and that his handling of public money was not above board.  It is also now confirmed that Gen. Zia was not sincere about holding elections in 1988 and believed Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada could pull something out of his hat.

            The chapter on the judiciary has quite a few disclosures.  Gen. Arif is quite justified in venting his outrage at the attitude of ridicule displayed by Bhutto towards Justice Tufail Ali Abdul Rahman.  However, he expresses no outrage when he describes how Sharifuddin Pirzada threatened Justice Anwarul Haq with dismissal and thus got him to grant Gen. Zia the power to amend the constitution – an unforgivable insertion in the judgement in the Nusrat Bhutto case made without intimation to brother judges on the bench.  Nor when the Law Secretary, Justice S. A. Nusrat, was asked to own the PCO draft written by Mr. Pirzada.  Nor even when Justice Usman Ali claimed authorship of a note on the Kalabagh Dam dictated by Gen. Fazle Haq.  The reason could be Gen. Arif’s view that since military rule was a negation of the constitution, democracy and civil law, there was no point in invoking values of propriety or morality.

            Despite maintaining that inept political rulers have been creating openings for military take-overs, Gen. Arif displays refreshing frankness in raising the question whether the 1958 martial law was inevitable, and answering the question thus: “Ayub’s martial law was a premeditated affair.  The country might have followed a different political course had Ayub Khan not been given an extension in service.”  Further, the author is frank enough to declare: “That the military had no legal and constitutional right to take charge even when the civilian rulers had failed to govern efficiently is a valid observation.”

            The much maligned democrats may wish to rest their case on that argument alone.

            Gen. Arif enjoys writing detailed summaries but these could have been shortened.  His account of history is episodical, since he has chosen to write about matters he had occasion to look into from the vantage point of authority. As one who saw the Yahya regime  from a close range, who was Gen. Zia’s chief of staff and confidant for long years, and who rose to the top of the army hierarchy, Gen. Arif is well qualified to give ordinary mortals a peep into the military establishment.  On that count, the book is a welcome addition to the country’s political literature.

     However, at the end of the book, a serious question is left unanswered.  Gen. Arif says: “Successive martial laws eroded state institutions from within.  They retarded the growth of democracy and democratic tradition…  A democratic order does not guarantee good government.  Moral, material and intellectual corruption is not an uncommon phenomenon in democratic societies.  Despite this drawback, a democratic dispensation is superior to military rule because it has an inbuilt and institutionalised process of accountability.  A representative government is perceived to function on the concept of collective wisdom and joint responsibility, unlike martial law which is a one-man rule… On balance, military indugence in national affairs weakened not only the country and the political system but also the military itself.”

         The question is even if by some logic, supersession of democratic rule by the military can be held unavoidable, how long can deviation from constitutionalism be  allowed?  One hopes Gen. Arif will be able to join this debate too.