General Pervez Musharraf has announced a date for general elections as the much touted local governments are installed into office. Seemingly confident, the general described his election plan as a ‘road-map to democracy.’  The ‘road-map’ does not, however, provide any answer to, perhaps, the most important question: what kind of  democracy will it be?  The question becomes more critical after clear indications that the General intends to introduce radical changes in the constitution  and stay on as president in the new dispensation.

            While there is still more than a year to go for the elections, at least one thing is abundantly clear, that they are unlikely to lead to restoration of full democracy.  What the general may have in mind is a ‘guided democracy’ under a military president and a powerful military-dominated national security council overseeing an elected parliament.  But it may not be easy for the generals to impose an engineered order.  Despite their best efforts they have not been able to eliminate political parties and their electoral influence.

            If  the results of the  local government elections are any indication, the parliamentary polls due next year may swing things out of the junta’s control.  Despite a bar on the direct participation of political parties, the elections have generated their own dynamics and revived political activities in the country.  It is not surprising that most of the elected Nazims belong to the major political parties such as the Pakistan People’s Party and Jamaat-i-Islami.  The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif) group has been wiped out, largely because of the military sponsored split.  The PML (like-minded) has not been able to gain much ground despite the military’s full backing.  It managed to win some Nazim seats, in  engineered results, mainly in some parts of Punjab.  So, the chances of a King’s party coming to power through an election do not seem to exist.

            The PPP’s triumph in Sindh was more or less predictable, but its success in Punjab and the Frontier came as a surprise even to the most optimistic loyalists.  The resurrection of the PPP has been largely due to the disintegration of the PML and exit of Nawaz Sharif from the political scene.  Despite its routing in the last parliamentary elections, the PPP remained a major political force in the two provinces and was able to fill the vacuum.  Local alliances with traditional political rivals like the Jamaat-i-Islami and PML(N) also helped the party to consolidate its position in the Nazims’ elections in many constituencies.

            This is the first time that the PPP and Jamaat have entered  into  an electoral alliance.  The two parties put up joint candidates for Nazims in Lahore, Peshawar and some other districts.  In Sindh, too, the Jamaat supported PPP-backed candidates in some areas.  Perhaps the military’s move to discredit political parties and prop up  the PML (like-minded) brought them together.

            Besides the PPP, the Jamaat-i Islami was another party that regained some ground.  It managed to win control of Karachi, largely because of the absence of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, which boycotted the polls, fearing the military would not allow it a level field.  The PPP’s electoral performance in Karachi, however, seemed more significant as its support base in the city had long eroded.  The Jamaat also did well in the Frontier province.

            The electoral success of these parties appears much more significant in view of the military government’s effort to engineer the polls, particularly at the second stage of elections for Nazim.  The ISI’s meddling in the polls has been quite evident.  In many constituencies, councillors were forced to vote for the PML (like-minded) or military-backed independent candidates.  The  interference was much more pronounced in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Gujrat and some other towns in the Punjab where military sponsored candidates for Nazim were elected.  In Lahore, the PML (like- minded) candidate won against a joint candidate put up by the Jamaat, PPP and the PML (N).  Interestingly, the majority of the elected  councillors in the district belonged to these three parties.  In Rawalpindi, former federal minister Sheikh Rashid was forced to withdraw his candidature for Nazim.  According to one report, councillors across the country were approached by ISI operatives to vote for the ‘cleared’ candidates for Nazims.

            While the elections in Punjab were widely engineered, the government’s options in Sindh were limited, because it had no alternative to present to the PPP in the province.  Thus, despite its best efforts the military regime has not been able to instal a totally manipulated system.  

            There are already signs of friction between the local governments and the regime over authority.  There is a lot of confusion over who controls the police and the administration.  The government  now finds it difficult to implement its own programme of 'devolution’ of power.  To make the situation even more complex,  army monitoring teams have been authorised to monitor and check the functioning of local governments.  Most observers agree that multiple layers of powers may paralyse the whole system.

            The uncertainty and confusion surrounding the local governments is likely to worsen after the central and provincial elections.  Most political parties have rejected the military’s imposed system, saying that it may weaken the provinces and lead to further centralisation of power.  Many political commentators fear the new local government system may meet the fate  of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s ‘basic democracy.’

      The situation does not look promising for the military government as it begins to implement its road-map for democracy.  The junta has promised to hold provincial and national assembly elections on party basis, but also warned that Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and other politicians facing corruption charges will not be allowed to participate in them.  There is also  a move to bar the parties led by the convicted leaders.  Sharif does not present any major problem as he has quit the field, but Ms Bhutto remains a major obstacle in the military’s game plan.  It has so far failed to undermine her position as a major political force.

            The military’s tough stance places the PPP on the horns of a serious dilemma.  To be able to participate in the polls, Ms Bhutto has to step down from the party leadership and nominate another leader for the top post.  This is a tough decision to take for the self-exiled leader.  She faces the danger of losing control over the party in the long run if the PPP decides to participate in the elections under a new leadership.

            Can Benazir accept that situation ?  The party appears totally divided over the issue.  General Musharraf’s recent meeting with the party’s acting chief Amin Fahim has fuelled speculation about an impending compromise between the military and the PPP.  The party’s strong showing at the local elections and the failure of the PML (like-minded) and other smaller parties to provide any alternative political platform may compel the military to seek some compromise with the PPP.  But senior PPP leaders rule out any deal with the government that will keep Ms Bhutto out of the electoral process. 

            There is still more than a year left to the deadline set by the Supreme Court for the  transfer of power to an elected government.  That gives General Musharraf time to review his roadmap.  He could, meanwhile, take some lessons from the country’s history.  Past experiments in ‘guided democracy’ have failed and in the present situation it will be even more difficult to impose quasi-military rule.