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After
a fortnight of pitched battles between Pakistani security forces
and Al-Qaeda guerillas and their tribal supporters, Washington and
Islamabad's diary on fighting terrorism will need a new chapter
about the tough lessons learned during the latest military operation
in South Waziristan.
The
Pakistani forces know now that their intelligence network, even
though bolstered by US support, is inadequate at best. It is crystal
clear that although tribal elders may well have welcomed the troops,
ethnic and ideological ties with the militants run deep, and that
the current resistance requires more than just an aggressive military
response in the long run. Operation Wana has managed to alienate
the Waziristan tribesmen, who after half a century of complete political
and social exclusion, are now caught in the crossfire with their
homes reduced to rubble in the fighting between "foreign terrorists"
and Pakistan security forces.
The semi-autonomous and independent tribal belt of South
Waziristan is home to 600,000 lawless Pushtoon tribesmen who traditionally
support the mujahideen and practice centuries-old tribal traditions
handed down from the colonial era. In the Wana operation, Islamabad,
in an unprecedented development, has been able to deploy thousands
of military and paramilitary troops in South Waziristan, sending
a strong signal to "foreign terrorists" and their local
hosts that they are not safe in the country and could face similar
operations in the future.
Thousands
of military and paramilitary troops ended the siege of remote towns
and villages, including Kallu Shah and Schin Warsak, west of Wana,
after using heavy artillery and gunship helicopters in what was
described as the biggest operation ever launched to hunt down "foreign
terrorists" and their supporters in South Waziristan. "The
scale of the operation, the media hype and use of force by Pakistan
had initially raised hopes, but fell well short of expectations,"
says a Peshawar-based analyst. "Arresting or killing some Chechens
and Uzbeks may carry significance for Pakistan but is not of great
importance to the Americans. They were hoping to get some Arabs
and top Al-Qaeda leaders from South Waziristan."
Zawahiri and other top Al Qaeda leadership remain as elusive
as ever, while Yaldashev, a 'high value target' escaped injured,
and many got away as intelligence reports failed to factor in 'tunnels
and escape routes.' Analysts, however, maintain some milestone objectives
were achieved. Officials claim that 63 militants, mostly Chechens
and Uzbeks, were killed and 166 fighters including 93 Pakistani
tribesmen and 73 foreigners were captured.
However, most analysts feel that these achievements have
been overshadowed by the losses suffered by the security forces.
"It shows the operation lacked proper intelligence. Officials
themselves say they were caught by surprise on the first day by
the number of militants that launched a counter-attack," says
an analyst. "By killing troops, Al-Qaeda sent out a message
of how powerful they are throughout the operation."
Pakistan's
security forces lost 46 military and paramilitary troops, while
26 were injured in attacks. In the deadliest attack, 12 were killed
when a convoy carrying military supplies was attacked. Eight bullet-riddled
bodies of soldiers were later found in a well. The authorities received
yet another setback when they recovered the bodies of two kidnapped
administration officials riddled with bullets from a well, despite
an agreement that the militants would release them. This happened
one day after the 12 paramilitary troops were released after influential
clerics of the area negotiated with tribesmen fighting for Al-Qaeda
in the remote village of Razghai, near the Pakistan-Afghan border.
Most
foreign terrorists and local fighters fled the towns and villages
and sought refuge in the mountains that had once served them as
a safe haven. Officials conceded that some militants could have
escaped under cover of darkness, while others may have escaped with
the help of locals and their knowledge of the terrain and escape
routes. Political observers believe that Pakistan, by establishing
a strong presence in South Waziristan, has to some extent flushed
out foreign militants from towns and villages and cut off their
supply line. "Not so long ago they were moving freely in Waziristan.
Their leaders were delivering speeches, while the locals were recruiting
young unemployed tribesmen in the name of jihad. They cannot do
that any longer; they are not safe," says Latif Afridi, a former
legislator from the tribal region and a Pashtoon nationalist leader.
"But they need to change their tactics in the future. They
should do effective groundwork by collecting accurate intelligence,
include tribesmen having knowledge of hilly terrains and intra-tribal
rivalries. Also, they should take tribal elders and sardars into
confidence," says Afridi. "Otherwise they will only achieve
short-term successes and the long-term problems of deep-rooted terrorism
will remain."
General Musharraf has vowed to hunt down the terrorists with
full force, saying that operations will continue until the terrorists
are flushed out from the region. The Wana operation, however, has
met with criticism and condemnation from all major political parties,
with the alliance of religious extremist parties, Muttahida Majlais-e-Amal
(MMA), spearheading protest demonstrations across the Frontier province.
The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy comprising major political
parties, among them the Pakistan Peoples' Party and the Pakistan
Muslim League, said the operation has resulted in a political crisis
which could break up the country.
Though Musharraf's resolve seems to be clear and the operation
has benefitted US interests in their war against terror, any real
gain for Pakistan is questionable. "Of course the US has gained
somewhat, but Pakistan's interest was not served. The forces targeted
the extremists, not extremism in South Waziristan. Women there still
cannot vote or leave their houses, child marriages continue to take
place, and women are bartered to settle their conflicts, against
all laws of the country," says Amir Murtaza, a human rights
activist. "These remain non-issues for the government, but
for us these are as abhorrent as the Al-Qaeda. The tribal Pashtoons
are a staunchly religious, anarchic group and have never lived under
organised state rules. If Pakistan wants to root out extremism there,
then it needs to promote a sense of belonging, develop infrastructure
and promote modern education to neutralise the clergy's role and
influence."
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